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Summary 
Typical problems impacting the Kenyan agricultural sector range from unfavorable weather 
conditions, technical production skills, capital insufficiency, and inadequate markets and have 
been well documented. Changes in the general macroeconomic environment such as opening 
up of the markets (liberalization and privatization) have also brought about newer challenges 
for the participants in the agricultural sector. The changes have impacted differently on the 
prices and quantities of various products for both producers and consumers. Whereas many 
production and or marketing based studies have been useful in identifying key solution areas, 
institutional and management aspects in the agricultural sector have not been adequately 
addressed.  
Based on the New Institutional Economics framework (specifically Transaction Cost 
Economics Theory) and Supply Chain Management frameworks, the study investigates two 
main issues among the market participating agents in the Kenyan milk supply chain. Firstly, it 
identifies and evaluates determinants of coordination mechanisms used in the Kenyan fresh 
milk supply chain. Secondly, it identifies and evaluates determinants of supply chain 
performance in the fresh milk supply chain. The two issues are investigated for transactions 
between milk producers and their buyers, between milk retail outlets and their milk suppliers, 
and between the retail outlets and their buyers. Coordination is defined by the kind of 
contracts used in transactions between the sellers and the buyers of milk. On the other hand, 
supply chain performance is defined by the extent to which the supply chain partners are 
satisfied with key aspects of their transactions with partners and is measured on likert type 
scales. 
Primary data using personally administered questionnaires was collected on commercial dairy 
activities from two districts in Kenya: Nakuru and Nyandarua districts, between May 2005 
and September 2005. The data collected comprised of the agents’ socioeconomic 
characteristics, farm/firm specific factors, transaction cost characteristics and performance 
related aspects such as prices, milk quantities, milk quality, information flows and 
communications, and transaction partner reputations and trustworthiness. Two econometric 
models were applied to analyze the collected data. The first is a multinomial logit model that 
was applied to analyze data on determinants of coordination mechanisms. The second model 
is an ordered probit model that was applied to analyze data on determinants of supply chain 
performance. Both models were run in LIMDEP™ econometric software. 
The results of the study provide a framework for characterizing coordination mechanisms, and 
factors influencing coordination modes or arrangements in the Kenyan fresh milk supply 
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chains. Three main coordination mechanisms were identified in the milk supply chains: spot 
market contracts, verbal contracts, and written contracts. The study demonstrates that the 
different kinds of coordination mechanisms have several advantages and disadvantages. The 
results also show that the coordination modes are used generally across milk transactions in 
the country. Furthermore, it shows that each coordination mechanism is associated with 
certain transaction costs, firm specific, as well as socioeconomic characteristics of the agents. 
With regard to supply chain performance,  the study shows that, socioeconomic, firm specific 
and transaction cost factors as well as the type of coordination mechanisms used are important 
determinants of performance in milk supply chains. Specifically, the study shows that milk 
producers are constrained more by lack of information on markets and prices and inability to 
effect any meaningful impact in the market for their milk. On the other hand, retail outlets are 
shown to be constrained by high transaction costs arising out of having to deal with numerous 
small sized milk producers in the upstream market and inability to influence prices in the 
consumer market. Furthermore, milk prices, availability of buyers and market information 
asymmetries are found to be important determinants of supply chain performance in the milk 
transactions.  
The study shows that certain state interventions may be necessary for the commercial 
development of the dairy industry especially with regard to reduction of key transaction costs, 
among them road transport infrastructure, farmer cooperative organizations, information and 
market search and contractual support institutions. The study is an important contribution to 
the operations of the dairy industry and in particular the fresh milk supply chain and provides 
a detailed insight into the mechanisms of coordination and supply chain performance in the 
dairy industry. It provides information on the institutional arrangements in the industry that is 
necessary for the understanding and development of the dairy industry in the country by 
private agents and policy makers. The information can assist in achieving better transaction 
partner selection when designing their milk supply chains. Most significant is in pointing out 
what kinds of transaction costs are important or likely to be faced by opting for certain 
transactions, transaction partners, and coordination modes. In the overall, the determinants of 
the contractual modes also show the sources of these transaction costs which can be addressed 
by the chain partners (or policy makers) or if they prove insurmountable, they can be avoided 
all together. 
Key words: New Institutional Economics, Transaction Costs, Coordination Mechanisms, 
Supply Chain Management, Supply Chain Performance, Milk Supply Chain, Household 
Model, Multinomial Logistic Regression, Ordered Logistic Regression, Kenya. 
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Kurzfassung 
Die typischen Probleme, die den kenianischen Agrar-Sektor beeinflussen, reichen von 
ungünstigen Wetterbedingungen, technischen Produktionsfähigkeiten, und 
Kapitalunzulänglichkeit bis zu unzulänglichen Märkten, und sind gut dokumentiert worden. 
Änderungen im allgemeinen makroökonomischen Klima wie Erschließung der Märkte 
(Liberalisierung und Privatisierung) gehen mit neune Herausforderungen für die 
Marktteilnehmer in verschiedenen Sektoren der Wirtschaft einher. Die Änderungen haben 
sich auf Preise und Mengen der verschieden Produkte sowohl für Produzenten als auch 
Verbraucher ausgewirkt. Während viele produktions- und oder marketingbezogene  Studien 
Lösungen für zentrale Probleme in diesen Bereichen bieten, sind Institutions- und 
Managementaspekte im landwirtschaftlichen Sektor bisher nicht ausreichend untersucht 
worden. 
Basierend auf der neuen Institutionenökonomie (beziehungsweise Transaktionskosten 
Theorie) und dem Konzept des Supply Chain Managements, untersucht die Studie zwei 
Hauptthemen der Marktteilnehmer kenianischen Milchindustrie. Es werden zum einem 
Determinanten der Koordinationsmechanismen, die in der kenianischen Milchlieferkette 
angewandt werden, und zum anderen Determinanten der Leistungsfähigkeit der Lieferkette 
bei Frischmilch identifiziert und analysiert. Beides wird für Verhandlungen zwischen 
Milchproduzenten und ihren Kunden, zwischen Einzelhändler und Milchlieferanten, sowie 
zwischen Einzelhändlern und ihren Kunden untersucht. Koordination wird durch die Art der 
Verträge definiert, die in den Verhandlungen zwischen Anbietern und Nachfragern von Milch 
zur Anwendung kommen. Demgegenüber wird die Leistungsfähigkeit der Lieferkette durch 
den Umfang definiert, in dem die Partner dieser Kette mit Schlüsselaspekten ihrer 
Transaktionen mit Vertragspartnern zufrieden sind, der auf Likertskalen gemessen wird. 
Die Primärdaten, wurden im Milchsektor in zwei Bezirken Kenia, Nakuru und Nyandarua, 
zwischen Mai und September 2005 mittels persönlicher Befragung erhoben. Diese Dateien 
umfassen sozioökonomische Eigenschaften der Marktteilnehmer, betriebs- und 
transaktionskostenbezogene Eigenschaften, sowie leistungsbezogene Aspekte der Lieferketten 
wie Preise, Milchmenge, Milchqualität, Informationsflüsse und Kommunikation, sowie 
Renommees und Vertrauenswürdigkeit der Verhandlungspartner. Zur Analyse der erhobenen 
Daten werden zwei ökonometrische Modelle angewendet. Zunächst wird ein multinomiales 
Logit Modell angewendet, um die Daten hinsichtlich der Bestimmungsfaktoren der 
Koordinationsmechanismen zu analysieren. Zusätzlich werden die Bestimmungsfaktoren der 
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Leistungsfähigkeit der Milchlieferkette mit einem Ordered Probit Modell untersucht.  Beide 
Modelle werden mit der ökonometrischen Software  LIMDEP ™ geschätzt. 
Die Ergebnisse der Studie bieten eine Grundlage zur Charakterisierung der 
Koordinationsmechanismen der kenianischen Frischmilchlieferkette und der Faktoren, die 
diese Koordinationsmechanismen beeinflussen. Drei Hauptkoordinationsmechanismen 
werden identifiziert: Spotmarktverträge, mündliche Verträge, und schriftliche Verträge. Die 
Untersuchung zeigt, dass die verschiedenen Arten der Koordinationsmechanismen 
verschiedene Vor- und Nachteile haben. Generell kommen unterschiedliche Arten der 
Koordinationsmechanismen bei Milchtransaktionen zur Anwendung. Es wird weiterhin 
gezeigt, dass jeder Koordinationsmechanismus mit bestimmten Verhandlungskosten und 
unternehmensbezogenen sowie sozioökonomische Eigenschaften der Teilnehmer verbunden 
ist. Im Hinblick auf die Leistungsfähigkeit der Lieferkette zeigt die Studie, dass 
sozioökonomische, betriebsbezogene und Transaktionskostenbezogene Faktoren so wie die 
Art des benutzten Koordinationsmechanismus wichtige Determinanten sind. Insbesondere 
werden Milchproduzenten dieser Milch mehr durch Informationsmangel über Märkte und 
Preise sowie mangelnde Einflussmöglichkeiten auf den Milchmarkt eingeschränkt. Anderseits 
werden die Einzelhandelgeschäfte auch durch die hohen Transaktionskosten aufgrund der 
Vielzahl kleinerer Produzenten mit denen sie im vorgelagerten Bereich in Beziehung stehen 
sowie mangelnder Einflussmöglichkeiten auf die Preise im Absatzmarkt für Konsumgüter 
belastet. Außerdem werden Milchpreise, Verfügbarkeit der Kunden und 
Marktinformationsasymmetrien als Determinanten der Leistungsfähigkeit der Milchlieferkette 
identifiziert. 
Die Studie zeigt weiterhin, dass bestimmte staatliche Interventionen für die kommerzielle 
Entwicklung der Milchindustrie besonders hinsichtlich der Reduzierung zentraler 
Transaktionskosten, wie beispielsweise Verbesserung der Transportinfrastruktur, Gründung 
landwirtschaftlicher Genossenschaften, Reduzierung von Informations- und Suchkosten sowie 
institutionelle Unterstützung von Verträgen notwendig sind. Diese Studie ist ein wichtiger 
Beitrag für die Betriebe der Milchindustrie und insbesondere der Frischmilchlieferkette und 
bietet einen ausführlichen Einblick in die Mechanismen der Koordination und 
Leistungsfähigkeit der Milchlieferketten. Sie stellt Informationen über institutionelle 
Vereinbarungen zur Verfügung, die für das Verständnis und die Entwicklung der 
Milchindustrie im Land durch private Teilnehmer und Politiker notwendig sind. Diese 
Informationen können bei der besseren Auswahl von Verhandlungspartner beim Aufbau von 
Milchlieferketten unterstützen. Als bedeutendster Aspekt wird dargestellt, welche Arten von 
 xiv 
Verhandlungskosten wichtig oder wahrscheinlich sind, wenn eine Entscheidung für 
bestimmte Verhandlungspartner und Koordinationsmechanismen getroffen. Insgesamt zeigen 
die Determinanten der Vertragsarten auch die Quellen der Transaktionskosten an, welche von 
den Partnern in der Lieferkette (oder von Politikern) beeinflusst werden können oder wenn sie 
sich als unüberwindbar erweisen, vermieden werden können. 
 
Schlüsselwörter: Neue Institutionenökonomie, Transaktionskosten, 
Koordinationsmechanismen, Supply Chain Management, Milchlieferketten , Supply Chain 
Performance, Haushaltsmodell, Multinomiale Logit Regression, Ordered Probit Regression, 
Kenia.    
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem setting 
A supply chain is a set of three or more entities (organizations or individuals) directly 
involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, and/or information 
from a source to a customer (Mentzer et al, 2001). The entities in the supply chain include 
producers, intermediaries, processors, retailers and product users among others. Coordination 
on the other hand is the extent to which the work activities of the parties are logically 
consistent and coherent so they are directed toward a common objective in such a way that 
they supplement and complement one another (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Coordination is 
necessary to ensure smooth flow of resources from one technologicINTRODUCTIONal level to 
another, such as from a producer to a processor or processor to retailer, that is, within a supply 
chain. This is especially so when the technologies are owned or controlled by different 
independent economic entities. Williamson (1985) has shown that there is a close relationship 
between coordination modes and transaction costs, a point further developed by Hobbs (1996) 
who develops an insightful framework for analyzing supply chain relations based on 
transaction cost economics. This study investigates coordination and performance 
relationships in the Kenyan fresh milk supply chain in the frameworks of supply chain 
management and transaction cost economics. 
The Kenyan milk industry has undergone major changes following market reforms in the last 
two decades. The period can be characterized as a transition period from state controlled 
agricultural sector to a market driven sector. Both the institutional environment (at the macro 
level) and the institutional arrangements (at the micro level) have been undergoing changes, 
which have had important implications for the management of the various agricultural supply 
chains in the country. Specifically, the implications are couched in terms of coordination 
modes and performance levels attained by agents in the supply chains. The thesis of this work 
is that determinants of coordination and performance in the supply chains have changed 
during the transition period and require an analysis to understand them and their implications 
for the performance of the agricultural sector. With regard to the dairy industry, these changes 
are illustrated in the following paragraphs.  
Agricultural market reforms in Kenya began in 1987 and brought about many changes in all 
major sub-sectors of agriculture. Most of the sectors were opened up to private participation 
and or the state led organizations were required to operate on commercial basis alongside 
private enterprises. In the dairy industry, the changes were characterized by an increase in the 
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number of milk processing firms from a single firm supported by the government to more 
than 40 firms within a span of five years. Before liberalization, the single processing firm was 
supported by an extensive network of cooperatives responsible for collection, bulking and 
onward distribution of the produce. Cooperatives therefore played a significant role in 
coordinating the flows of materials, information and funds in the dairy industry. However, 
after the market reforms, many primary cooperatives were adversely affected as they were 
unprepared and consequently failed due in part to their reliance on the milk processing firm. 
The failure of most cooperatives coupled with the withdrawal of state marketing bodies 
presented new challenges for the small-scale producers as they heavily relied on them to 
market their products. Producers were henceforth expected to coordinate both production and 
market side activities by themselves. Furthermore, the failure of farmer cooperative 
organizations and most of the milk processing factories meant that producers were no longer 
guaranteed a market for their products, product prices became subject to supply and demand 
forces and for the milk processors the problem of capacity utilization and cost control became 
critical to their survival as they were no longer guaranteed milk supplies. The upshot is that 
the nature of transaction costs faced in the milk supply chain has changed drastically and the 
costs are reflected in the type of coordination mechanisms used and the performance levels 
the supply chain participants are able to achieve in their transactions.  
Additional challenges have been provided by an increase in the number and types of 
intermediaries in the milk supply chain. New types of intermediaries in the milk supply chain 
include itinerant milk traders, brokers and agents and retail outlets for milk (such as milk bars 
and kiosks) in urban and rural areas. Thus the number and types of transactions in the supply 
chain have also tremendously increased for all participants in the supply chain with varying 
consequences on the transaction relations, transaction costs and performance levels in the 
supply chains.   
Furthermore, downstream in the supply chain, the consumer faces high prices for the 
processed products. Unlike producer prices that often vary with supply conditions, consumer 
prices for processed products are often either non-responsive or change only in one direction, 
upwards. The consumer pays for the coordination problems in the supply chain and the 
benefits of a liberalized business environment in the milk industry have been slow in reaching 
the consumer especially for the processed milk products. The growing importance of 
unprocessed milk transactions bought directly from producers or through intermediaries 
attests to the magnitude of the pricing problem.  
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The developments above have brought about new coordination problems in the Kenyan dairy 
industry that call for a new look at the management of the milk supply chains so as to keep the 
costs of transacting among the participants within manageable levels. The need to generate a 
fair return on investments by the producers, processors and other chain participants requires 
approaching the problems in the dairy industry from a holistic perspective. In an attempt to 
mitigate some of these problems, it is necessary to come up with institutional arrangements 
that can lower coordination costs for the benefit of all the participants.  
Whereas government efforts target sector-wide improvements, participants in the milk supply 
chain can shape the costs of transactions through choice of appropriate governance structures. 
Coupled with the choice of coordination mechanisms is the question of the extent to which 
coordination can be improved or optimized. It has been generally recognized that transaction 
costs are important in determining the kind of coordination modes employed by agents. Other 
factors besides transaction costs such as socioeconomic characteristics of the agents and 
firm/farm specific factors may have some role to play. However, it is not clear which among 
these characteristics and factors are major determinants for the type of coordination 
mechanism used in the Kenyan milk supply chain given the diverse nature of transaction 
costs, socioeconomic and firm specific factors. There is also recognition that the influence of 
these factors is not homogenous across the various stages of the supply chain.  
In addition to the above, it is understood that performance in the supply chains has to be 
enhanced for the benefit and sustainability of the dairy operations. This calls for an 
investigation into the main determinants of the level of supply chain performance attained by 
the supply chain participants. Establishing the link between coordination mechanisms and 
transaction costs, socioeconomic and firm specific factors and supply chain performance in 
the milk supply chain is necessary to provide possible future directions for coordination and 
performance improvement in the dairy industry. The study therefore addresses these issues. 
1.2 Objectives 
This study identifies and evaluates the determinants of coordination mechanisms and supply 
chain performance in the Kenyan milk supply chain.   
The specific objectives of the study are: 
• To characterize the coordination mechanisms used in transactions at the producer and 
trader stages of the fresh milk supply chain.    
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• To identify and evaluate the determinants of coordination mechanisms in transactions 
at the producer and trader stages of the fresh milk supply chain.    
• To identify and evaluate the determinants of supply chain performance in transactions 
at the producer and trader stages of the fresh milk supply chain.     
1.3 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses are advanced and investigated in the study 
• The predominance of the coordination mechanisms depends on the stage in the milk 
supply chain. As such, spot market contracts dominate transactions with direct 
consumers and verbal and written contracts dominate in transactions with other types 
of transaction partners.  
• Socioeconomic and firm related factors influence the type of coordination mechanisms 
employed. The strength and nature of influence differs according to the coordination 
mechanisms employed and also according to the stage in the supply chain.  
• Market search cost, negotiation cost and monitoring cost components of transaction 
costs influence the kind of coordination mechanisms employed. The strength of the 
association between the transaction cost components also differs with the type of 
coordination mechanism used and the stage in the supply chain. 
• Socioeconomic characteristics, firm related factors and transaction cost characteristics 
as well as the kind of coordination mechanism used influence the level of supply chain 
performance attained in the milk transactions. The impact of the factors on supply 
chain performance differs according to the stage in the supply chain. 
A detailed discussion of the specific factors and their theoretical relationships is found in 
sections 5.5 and  5.6. 
1.4 Justification 
The dairy industry contributes up to 3.5% of Kenya’s Gross National Product (GNP) and up 
to 14% of the agricultural GDP. It is a source of livelihood for over 660,000 rural households, 
365,000 direct farm wage jobs and 40,000 jobs in the processing activities. Most of the 
producers and other participants are small scale in nature and face costly market transactions. 
Coordination has consequences for the performance of the industry as it determines whether 
value is added in the milk supply chains or not. With the adoption of the common markets 
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such as East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), and the requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the need 
to achieve competitiveness and survival for the local milk supply chains is now more critical.  
This study therefore targets parties involved in the production, processing and distribution 
activities of the milk supply chain with the aim of contributing to their improvement and 
enhancement of their value creation processes for the benefit of the consumer.  
The study also aims at providing information and an understanding of the milk supply chain 
operations so as to help in creating a conducive environment (institutional) for the growth of 
the dairy industry, given the role the dairy industry plays in national development.  
The current knowledge base on the management of supply chains in Kenya is thin. While 
recognizing efforts in production activities, the probability of success is higher when a holistic 
approach to the chain is undertaken. Both the downstream and upstream chain activities and 
the management of the flows of information, materials, and funds are necessary for the 
successful functioning of agricultural supply chains. This works makes a contribution in this 
area of research. 
Finally the study makes a valuable contribution to the on-going academic development and 
research in the fields of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and chain management in 
agriculture, as well as agro-industrial and agribusiness areas. 
1.5 Scope and limitations of the study 
The study focuses on the basic milk supply chain involving production and retailing chain 
levels. The processing stage of the supply chain, input supplies and consumers are not 
investigated. However, this does not mean that their role in the dairy industry is in any way 
less significant. Resources available are limited and therefore milk producers and traders are 
selected as starting points for chain wide investigations in the operations of the Kenyan milk 
supply chain. 
Two districts from two provinces in Kenya have been selected for inclusion in the study: 
Nakuru district from Rift Valley province and Nyandarua District from Central province. The 
study does not therefore necessarily cover the entire country but uses the two districts due to 
the scope of dairy activities and the importance of the districts in the national dairy milk 
production and marketing. The two districts offer a fair view of the nature of transaction costs, 
coordination and supply chain performance of the other regions of the country, albeit with 
minor adaptations.  
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The emphasis of the study is on transaction costs, coordination and supply chain performance. 
These are not the only determinants of the operations of the enterprises in the dairy industry 
as there are other constraints such as production costs and other expenses to countenance 
with. The issues addressed here should be looked at together with other costs and constraints 
impinging on the operations of the agents in the milk supply chain. 
Furthermore, market participating agents are not the only groups operating in the Kenyan 
dairy industry. There are other dairy farmers or milk producers whose product does not reach 
the market. Insights from this study can be looked at as a glimpse in to the constraints facing 
non market participating agents as the constraints are the same but only worse in their case. 
Attempts to address problems facing non market participating agents have been addressed in 
studies elsewhere (for example Omamo, 1998; Key et al 2000; and Goetz, 1992 among 
others).    
1.6 Definition of terms 
• A supply chain is a set of three or more entities (organizations or individuals) 
directly involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, 
and/or information from a source to a customer (Mentzer et al, 2001; Daganzo, 
2003). 
• A basic supply chain: Consists of a firm, an immediate supplier and an immediate 
customer directly linked by one or more of the upstream and downstream flows of 
products, services, finances and information.  
• An ultimate supply chain includes all firms involved in all the upstream and 
downstream flows of products, services, finances and information. 
• A supply chain orientation is the recognition by a firm of the systemic, strategic 
implications of the activities, and processes involved in managing the various 
flows in a supply chain. 
• Supply chain management is the implementation of a supply chain orientation 
across customers and suppliers. It is the systemic, strategic coordination of the 
traditional business functions within a particular firm and across businesses within 
the supply chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the 
individual firms and the supply chain as a whole. 
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• Supply chain performance: A consideration of the chain wide performance as 
opposed to single firm performance measures. 
• Governance structures/coordination mechanisms/modes/contracts: These are used 
to capture the types of linkages used and the types of relations that subsist among 
the transacting partners. These terms are used interchangeably in this study to 
mean the same thing.  
• Coordination: Coordination is the extent to which the work activities of the parties 
are logically consistent and coherent, so that they are directed toward a common 
objective in such a way that they supplement and complement one another. 
• Spot market contract: A contract for the immediate exchange of goods or services 
at current prices. The identity of the party is irrelevant. 
• The relational bilateral governance (also implicit contract): A non-written (non-
legally enforceable) contract that specifies only the general terms and objectives 
of the relationship. The governance introduces the idea of repeated relations with 
the same agents and is equivalent to verbal contracts. 
• The relational bilateral governance with ‘qualified partners’. This structure is 
close to the previous one. However, agents are not free to choose their partners, 
but have to select a ‘qualified’ transactor (accredited for instance by a collective 
organization) 
• The formal (written) bilateral contract: A legally enforceable set of promises that 
defines all or part of each party’s obligations.  
• Financial participation in the ownership of the partner(s): In this case, the buyer 
(respectively seller) is a stockholder of the other but stays legally independent 
from the seller (respectively buyer). Joint venture is a canonical example of this 
type of governance structure. 
• Vertical integration: Refers to bringing of two or more successive stages of the 
supply chain under common ownership and management (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). 
• Transect sampling: A special random sampling technique used in ecological 
survey where sampling frames are unavailable. Straight lines are mapped out and 
objects randomly selected for inclusion in the study. 
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1.7 Organization of the research 
The study is organized as follows. Chapter two discusses institutional changes in the Kenyan 
agricultural sector with special emphasis on liberalization and its effects on the Kenyan dairy 
industry. Chapter three presents the theoretical underpinnings of the study, that is, the New 
Institutional Economics and in particular Transaction Cost Economics theory with reference 
to developing markets. Chapter four discusses empirical works on transaction costs, 
coordination mechanisms and supply chain performance, with special reference to agricultural 
and smallholder enterprises in developing countries. Chapter five discusses the economic 
problem facing market participating agents, presents theoretical and empirical models for the 
study and finally discusses the empirical specification of the relations under study. A 
descriptive overview of the data and variables of interest are discussed in chapter six. Model 
results and discussions on the determinants of coordination mechanisms and supply chain 
performance are presented and discussed in chapter seven. Finally, chapter eight summarizes, 
discusses policy implications and suggests further research directions in light of the findings 
in this study.  
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CHAPTER 2  
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND LIBERALIZATION IN THE KENYAN 
AGRICULTURE AND DAIRY INDUSTRY 
The chapter reviews major institutional changes that have occurred in the Kenyan agricultural 
sector and their impact on key agricultural commodity supply chains. It evaluates the effects 
of liberalization policies with special emphasis on the dairy industry. The chapter is organized 
as follows: Section 2.1 reviews the role of agriculture in both the national and individual 
welfare of the Kenyan people. Section 2.2 reviews the main institutional changes using 
examples from key agricultural sectors and industries in Kenya. Section 2.3 analyses the 
institutional changes in the dairy industry following liberalization policies while section 2.4 
provides a discussion of the current milk supply chain and possible coordination mechanisms 
used. Two types of supply chains and three types of coordination mechanisms are discussed.  
2.1 Role and contribution of agriculture to the Kenyan economy 
Kenya has a total area of 582,646 square kilometers, of which 11,230 km2 is under water 
(CBS 2006), and an estimated human population of 33.6 million as of the year 2005 (UNSD, 
2006). An estimated 65-75% of the population lives in rural areas with the rest residing in 
urban areas and towns. This means that agriculture will continue playing a significant role in 
the livelihoods of the people. It further means that Kenya’s economy will continue relying on 
agriculture to contribute significantly to the creation of the nation’s wealth or gross domestic 
product (GDP). Currently, agriculture contributes up to 25% of the country’s GDP.  The 
multiplier effect of agriculture on the performance of the rest of the economy cannot be 
gainsaid. Besides its general contribution to wealth creation, agriculture is vital for the 
following reasons:  
• It provides 70% of the raw materials required by all industries  
• Over 80% of the country’s population relies on agriculture for employment and 
general livelihood 
• Agriculture is a major source of foreign exchange, major items being tea, coffee, 
horticultural produce among others 
• It is also a source of employment and incomes, as it contributes up to 19% of 
waged employment in the country and employs over 59% of the country’s labor 
force (Ngigi, 2005).  
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND LIBERALIZATION IN THE KENYAN AGRICULTURE AND DAIRY 
INDUSTRY 
 10
The challenge facing the country is harnessing the limited agricultural resources to achieve 
the country’s needs in food security and incomes for the people. The constraints facing the 
country stem from the increasing population leading to reductions in arable land areas. It is 
imperative that agriculture produces not only enough to meet the food needs of those residing 
in the rural areas but also adequate surpluses to feed the rest of the population. Agricultural 
producers should be assisted to overcome their subsistence nature of production in order to 
increase their participation in the market. Thus commercialization of agriculture through 
strengthening of agricultural supply chains is necessary to help in achieving these objectives. 
The next section reviews major institutional changes that have characterized key agricultural 
sectors in Kenya in the last two decades. 
2.2 Agricultural liberalization in Kenya 
Before liberalization, Kenyan agricultural sector had been dominated by government 
parastatals set up to assist producers in processing and marketing agricultural commodities. 
The parastatals were set up for major commodities such as tea, coffee, sugar, rice, pyrethrum, 
maize, milk and beef among others. Others were set up to assist in financing and insurance of 
agricultural activities by guaranteeing minimum returns to farmers. For some time after 
Kenya’s political independence, the institutions were being run well and the government 
continued supporting them. The government also took over control of cooperatives through 
which it used to channel credit and extension services to farmers.  
Agricultural liberalization has been taking place in Kenya for the last two decades since mid 
1980’s. It had become evident that the parastatals were not performing well anymore due to 
poor management (Nyoro, 2002). The parastatals required government subsidies which was a 
drain on the economy. The Sessional Paper on Growth and Economic Management of 1986 
(Sessional Paper 1 of 1986) initiated the liberalization process in the agricultural sector. The 
aim was to remove the monopolistic trends and allow the private sector to participate and take 
up the functions of the parastatal bodies. A review of liberalization in the key crop and 
livestock sectors show that it has been driven by forces consisting of the donor community 
and institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
concerns underlying the liberalization have been the need for efficiency and private 
participation in the economy in sectors formally controlled by the government through 
parastatals. The key agricultural areas that have been affected include coffee, tea, grains 
(maize, wheat, and rice), sugar, and dairy industries.  
The objectives of the reforms included the following:  
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• to enhance productivity  
• to raise the level of production of basic food commodities to their potential 
• to improve quality and standards of products and diversify exports and hence high 
economic growth. 
A common feature of the liberalization process has been the withdrawal of the then existing 
institutions from the market and the coming up of new institutions to try and replace them. 
The institutional vacuum following the liberalization policies has been difficult to fill in 
certain industries. In certain cases, poor planning has been a major problem for less than 
successful performance of the newly liberalized industries, other reasons being government 
reversals or half hearted liberalization and lack of capacity to implement the reforms or lack 
of supporting institutions to enforce the new trading arrangements. These have had negative 
consequences for certain sectors while other sectors have successfully been liberalized. 
Examples of sub-sectors and industries that are being liberalized are briefly discussed below. 
Fertilizer  
Fertilizer trade was liberalized in 1990 (Omamo and Mose, 1999). Before then, international 
and domestic trade in fertilizer was being undertaken by the Kenya Grain Growers 
Cooperative Union (KGGCU), a parastatal body that was responsible for handling input and 
commodity trading in the country. However, due to inefficiencies in its operations, there was 
a need to liberalize trade in fertilizer. In 1990, the government liberalized international and 
domestic trade in fertilizer by abolishing quotas and licenses and decontrolling prices. As a 
result, many private traders entered the business, especially in major urban areas and rural 
trading centers. The results of the liberalization are so far mixed; in the high potential areas, 
fertilizer availability has improved but in low potential areas, the benefits have been minimal. 
The high competition in the trade means that revenues are depressed, yet economies of scale 
in the fertilizer trade are important. The institutions in the fertilizer trade are still evolving. 
Cereals  
Maize market reforms began in 1987/88 with the Cereal Sector Reform Program as part of the 
structural adjustment policies (Nyoro et al, 1999). The reform process intensified in the early 
1990s under pressure from international lenders culminating in the full liberalization of the 
maize industry in 1994. The government eliminated movement and price controls on maize 
trading, deregulated maize and maize meal prices and eliminated direct subsidies on maize 
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sold to registered millers. Maize and maize meal prices were previously set at pan seasonal 
and pan territorial levels. Private traders were allowed to transport maize across districts 
without any hindrance. The government still participates in maize markets but on a limited 
scale through the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) which functions as a price 
stabilization and strategic reserves agency. The expected result was to reduce maize 
marketing costs by encouraging more market participation by private parties. However, the 
objective has not been achieved as the policy environment has not been helpful, tariffs and 
trade bans intended to protect consumers and producers are still exercised as the government 
tries to ensure that consumers have access to food and that producers are not negatively 
affected by predatory pricing practices of traders.  A consequence of this is that more than 15 
years later, the maize supply chain is still not yet fully functioning. Market failures still 
persist, the private sector response has been low and is thought to be collusive and 
exploitative. Furthermore, government interference still persists. The same scenario applies to 
wheat marketing that was also liberalized in 1993. 
Coffee and tea 
The process of liberalization in the coffee sub-sector began in 1992 in line with the structural 
adjustment policies at the time (Karanja and Nyoro, 2002). At this time, the Nairobi Coffee 
Auction was required to conduct its trade in US dollars. Farmers were also allowed to be paid 
in dollars, and to retain part of the dollars for their own use.  For the farmers, direct payment 
gradually replaced the pooling payment system. The pooling system is slow unlike the direct 
payment system that is faster and payments are based on quality. However, smallholder 
marketing that works through cooperatives continues to use the pooling system. In 1993, the 
coffee milling monopoly of the Kenya Planters Cooperative Union (KPCU) ended and other 
millers were allowed to enter into coffee milling, increasing the milling capacity from 
140,000 to 230,000. The result is that there is overcapacity of about 60% in coffee milling. 
Full liberalization of the coffee sector took place in April 2002. Before then, coffee marketing 
was solely being undertaken by the Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK). Other agents have since 
then been licensed while the CBK has been left to regulate the industry. The rest of the 
structure (and participants) comprising of cooperative societies, milling factories and others 
remained as before as they were already being privately handled. The gradual liberalization 
process in the coffee (and in the tea) sectors were designed to avoid disruptions in coffee 
production, processing and marketing. Broad consultations have always been carried out 
unlike other sectors that were earlier liberalized. New institutional arrangements in the coffee 
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supply chain and their effects are still evolving. The need to protect the smallholder farmer 
can also be discerned in the coffee liberalization process.  
The tea industry was liberalized in the year 2000 and has been relatively successfully. 
Liberalization in the sugar industry is still going with some sugar processing firms having 
been partially liberalized while others are being prepared for liberalization. The pyrethrum 
industry is yet to be opened up.    
The next section discusses liberalization and institutional developments in the dairy industry.  
2.3 Liberalization and institutional change in the dairy industry 
2.3.1 The livestock sub-sector 
Livestock contributes about 47% of the agricultural GDP and about 12% to the national GDP 
(FAO, 2005). The varied climatic conditions in Kenya underlie the diverse livestock activities 
being undertaken in the country. The livestock activities range from cattle, goat, sheep, 
donkey, camel rearing and poultry keeping. In the semi arid areas are camels, donkeys and 
goats, conditions in these regions being unsuitable for cattle rearing especially for the grade 
and improved breeds. Among the livestock, cattle (beef and dairy) play the most significant 
role in both national and individual economic welfare. They are kept on both large and small 
scales for both commercial and subsistence purposes. 
Table 2.1 below shows that the total number of cattle in Kenya is estimated to be 11.5 million 
heads (FAO, 2005). A census has not been carried out for the last 40 years to ascertain the 
correct number and distribution of the animals hence the figures are at best estimates. 
However, the figures show that the number of cattle has been declining for the last decade. 
The table also shows that the quantity of milk produced and consumed has remained stable 
since the year 2000. 
Table 2.1 Key cattle performance indicators in Kenya 
Aspect of cattle Year  Annual growth rate 
 1980 1990 2000 2002 1980-1990 1990-2000 
Cattle ´000 10,000 13,793 11,706 11,500 3.3 -1.6 
Milk production ´000 metric 
tons 
1,033.8 2,480 2,884 2,841 9.2 1.4 
Milk consumption ´000 tons 968.6 2,235 2,645 2,640 8.7 1.7 
Source: FAO, 2005 
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Dairy is the second largest contributor to livestock GDP after beef. It provides income to 
more than 660,000 rural households, most of who have per capita income of less than US$ 2 
per day. The industry is characterized by smallholder producers, who produce over 70% of 
the total milk marketed in the country (Staal 2004a).  
There is an estimated 3.2 million dairy cattle in the country (Onyango et al, 2003). Cattle of 
milk producing ability constitute grade and cross breeds. About 80% of the dairy cattle are 
kept by the small scale farmers. Whereas dairy cattle contribute 60% of the total milk in the 
country, indigenous animals contribute up to 40% of total national milk production. However, 
most of the milk produced by indigenous cattle is not marketed as it is consumed by the 
households. The main dairy breeds kept in Kenya are the Friesians, Ayshire, Guernsey, 
Jerseys and the cross-breeds. 
Most of the high milk producing areas are found in Central Province, Rift Valley and parts of 
Eastern Province (slopes of mount Kenya). The two leading milk producing districts in the 
country are Kericho (Rift Valley) and Nyandarua (Central). Other districts are Uasin Gishu, 
Trans Nzoia, Nakuru in Rift Valley Province and Kiambu in Central province. The areas have 
the necessary conditions (temperatures and rainfall) favorable for dairy production.  
2.3.2 A historical perspective of the dairy industry: pre-liberalization period 
The history of Kenya’s dairy industry is almost synonymous with the history of Kenya 
Cooperative Creameries (KCC), a firm formed in 1931 following merging of three milk 
cooperatives that were then operating in Naivasha, Nyahururu and Kipkelion areas (Lumbwa). 
The need for the merging arose from fierce competition in a market characterized by thin 
local markets among the three dairy cooperatives and also from the need to increase the 
bargaining power of the farmers (Ngigi, 2005). KCC continued expanding its processing 
capacity in the 1950s to cater for the colonial farmers’ interests in the pre-independence 
period, to the exclusion of the indigenous people who were not allowed to produce and 
deliver their milk to KCC. The firm entered into contracts with the farmers as a means of 
reducing uncertainty in the utilization of its investment in processing capacities. Thus in this 
period, the dairy industry was dominated by large scale milk producers with smallholder 
producers playing a minimal or peripheral role.  
KCC remained the sole milk processor and its influence in the industry increased in 1958 with 
the formation of the regulatory arm of the government, the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB), 
through the Dairy Industry Act Chapter 336 Laws of Kenya. KCC was given powers to act as 
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a government agent in the processing, packaging and selling of milk in urban areas. It was to 
ensure that no raw milk is sold in the urban areas. However, raw milk could be sold in the 
rural areas. 
The role of the Kenya Dairy Board was generally to promote milk production and marketing. 
Specifically, it was mandated to  
• Organize, regulate and develop efficient production, marketing, distribution, and 
supply of dairy produce required by different classes of consumers 
• promote quality assurance to attain high quality products with emphasis on 
hygiene of milk production 
• encourage proper use of milk containers for transportation and storage facilities 
for milk and milk products 
• regulate the sales of raw milk and importation of dairy products 
• promote consumption of quality milk and milk products 
• develop, promote, and advise on proper packaging equipment and materials 
• license milk producers and processors to permit the greatest possible degree of 
private enterprise in production and processing of dairy products 
• enforce the Dairy Industry Act through anti-hawking operations and prosecutions 
• train farmers on clean milk production and modern techniques of animal 
management through short courses and seminars. 
However the Board was never fully empowered to regulate and oversee the development of 
the dairy industry. Besides lacking in adequate financing, most of the important functions had 
been transferred to KCC (nutrition function) and the Ministry of Agriculture (dairy 
development). Thus KCC, which was essentially a private firm but with heavy government 
influence and interventions, acquired regulatory powers. This situation continued even after 
independence giving rise to the monopolistic status of KCC in the dairy industry. 
In the last few years before and after independence, the share of the smallholder agriculture in 
national production and marketed surplus increased tremendously. This was largely due to the 
use of high yielding cattle breeds, supporting institutional and organizational frameworks for 
milk marketing and improved services for tick control, disease control, extension and artificial 
insemination services. It should be noted that the period before 1969 was characterized by 
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open markets with independent dairies processing their milk. However, after 1969, the 
situation started changing, especially between 1969 and 1992. Rationalization of the dairy 
industry by the government ultimately created a monopolistic market situation.  
One of the major developments in the period before liberalization involved initiation of milk 
price controls by the government in 1971 based on the uniform pricing system and abolishing 
the quota system. The result was that KCC received virtual monopoly rights in the industry. It 
was also required to buy all quality milk delivered at its gate without turning away the farmers 
subject to minimum quality requirements. This meant KCC became a buyer of last resort for 
the milk delivered by the farmers. It also acted as a strategic reserve provider of milk for the 
government through powdered milk. This also meant that the firm could even out deficit 
periods by reconstituting the powdered milk into liquid milk as need arose. It also acted as the 
government’s agent in the school milk feeding program (Ngigi, 2005).   
Consequently because of these expanded roles, KCC increased its capacity countrywide to 
include 11 cooling plants and 11 processing plants spread over the country and processed a 
variety of products. It provided a reliable outlet for all dairy farmers, which was favorable to 
the smallholders. Other private firms were restricted to niche or specialty products like 
cheese, yoghurt and ice cream.  
Despite KCC’s monopoly, Ngigi (2005) observes that the firm was only able to utilize 77% of 
its installed capacity that stood at 1.2 million liters per day as of 1991. This was due to the 
seasonality of the milk production eventually leading to cost control problems. The firm had 
also employed too much permanent labor and coupled with lower margins, heavy inventories, 
high transportation costs and wastes in the rainy season, its performance and efficiency 
declined. Delayed payments to farmers also set in leading to the insolvency of cooperatives 
which were in charge of the collection and the transportation of milk to KCC and transmitting 
payments to farmers. KCC was being served by about 700 cooperatives that were handling 
80% of the milk being delivered to the firm. In the 1980s two small cooperatives were set up 
on a pilot basis to process milk. These were Kitinda in Western Kenya and Meru Dairy in 
Eastern province. However, the two firms controlled only 2% of all milk marketed through 
the formal channel. Hence KCCs monopoly went on unchallenged. 
In summary, the pre-liberalization period was characterized by increased participation of 
smallholder producers due to reduced costs of marketing and improved services. It was also 
characterized by heavy government controls and protectionism for the industry. A single 
processor (KCC) was sanctioned by the government thereby becoming quasi parastatal, which 
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was however not able to efficiently utilize its capacity, control costs and effectively market its 
products on behalf of farmers. Social functions were emphasized at the expense of 
commercial or sound economic decisions. Furthermore the regulatory mechanism through the 
Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) was found to be inadequate. 
2.3.3 Post-liberalization scenario 
Reforms in the dairy industry began in 1987 when the government began divesting away from 
breeding services through cost recovery measures. The breeding service (Artificial 
Insemination) costs had earlier in 1966 been lowered to make them affordable to farmers. In 
1988, the government divested away from clinical services which were from then expected to 
be undertaken by the private sector. In 1989, the manufacture and sale of feeds was 
liberalized. In 1991, the process to transfer management of cattle dips to local communities 
was started and completed in 1992. And in 1992, the marketing of milk was liberalized 
following elimination of price controls. 
One feature arising out of the liberalization of the industry is the increase in the number of 
private firms and individuals operating in the industry besides KCC. The number of 
processors shot to 42 in 1999 from three in 1991. In the pre-liberalization period, KCC’s peak 
production per day was 0.97 million liters. Later in 2000, this daily intake reached a low of 
about 20,000 liters per day. The decline in KCC’s intake has had serious implications for the 
dairy industry. The next section analyses the milk supply chain in the post liberalization 
period in Kenya.  
2.4 The Kenyan milk supply chain 
2.4.1 The chain configuration 
The milk supply chain involves activities and processes from production, processing, trading 
and consumption of milk. The Kenyan milk supply chain can be categorized into two: the 
cold chain and the warm chain. Milk delivered to the main processing firms constitutes the 
'cold chain' or the pasteurized milk system while milk sold and used in an unprocessed form 
constitutes the 'warm chain'.  Each of these chains has an important role to play. The supply 
chains differ in terms of sizes, geographical distribution, degree of licensing, relative rewards, 
quality perceptions and long term prospects for the development of the dairy industry. There 
are continuing developments and tradeoffs in the industry meaning that the various 
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institutions and supply chains are still evolving. Figure 2.1 shows the typical milk supply 
chains in Kenya.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Diagrammatic representation of the typical milk chains in Kenya 
 
An alternative classification to cold and warm chains above is formal and informal milk 
supply chains. Supply chains handling non processed milk products are categorized as 
informal supply chains (Ngigi, 2005; Onyango et al, 2003). They include mobile (itinerant) 
traders, milk bars and kiosks, brokers, and self help groups. The formal chain participants are 
the milk processors, cooperatives, supermarkets and retail shops and kiosks, milk bars and 
others that handle processed milk products. 
An overview of the supply chains shows that 42% of the milk is often sold directly to 
customers by the milk farmers. On the other hand 32% of the milk is sold to informal market 
participants who also buy 6% from cooperatives to bring the total milk handled by them to 
38%. About 24% of the milk is sold through cooperatives and of this amount, 12% is 
delivered to processors and 6% sold directly to consumers. Only 14% of the farmers' milk is 
handled by the processing firms (Staal 2004b). However, evidence also shows that some of 
the informal participants deliver some of their milk to processing firms. 
Milk producers 
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2.4.2 Milk production system and consumption  
The type of milk production system depends on the technology used and the number of 
animals kept. The production systems are classified as small, medium and large scale 
productions according to the number of animals kept. The cost structures and margins 
(including milk prices) vary according to the production systems as well as from region to 
region (Ngigi, 2005; Staal, 2004a) (Table 2.2 below shows some of their characteristics).  
Table 2.2  Milk production (grazing) systems in Kenya  
 Small-scale  Zero Medium-scale  open  Large-scale open 
Cows (average)         3     12       146 
Milking cows         2       4         33 
Acres   1       4        160 
Marketed milk (liters) 2,014 3,180   73,700 
Other: Home use calf 
feeding and  unsold 
1,210 4,339   29,377 
Total (liters) 3,224 7,519 103,077 
% marketed      62      42          72 
Source: Adapted from Karanja (2003:8) 
However, the classification of milk producers by number of cows kept or size of land may not 
give a true picture of what is meant by smallholder producer. Other sources have classified 
smallholders as productions less than five liters of milk per day. This captures intensive 
producers who may have less than 3 cows and less than one acre of land but efficient enough 
to produce more than 5 liters of milk per day. The quantity of milk produced and marketed is 
a better criterion for classifying the milk producers. This study involves only small and 
medium scale milk producers with daily milk productions less than 100 liters.  
Table 2.3 Cost and price per liter of milk 
 Zero-grazing system small-scale open grazing large-scale open grazing 
Variable costs 8.60 6.20 8.50 
Labor costs 4.90 3.10 2.70 
Fixed costs 1.45 1.20 1.30 
Total costs 14.95 10.50 12.50 
Producer price 15.00 12.00 14.00 
Source: Adapted from Karanja (2003:11) 
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Figures available from Karanja (2003) indicate that zero grazing systems face higher milk 
production costs compared to small scale open grazing or large scale open grazing systems. 
However, the systems also face different prices depending on their locations, sales outlets and 
buyer arrangements (table 2.3 above).  
Table 2.3 above indicates that margins are narrower for zero grazing farmers. Their cost 
structure is higher as they use relatively more purchased inputs (feed) and fixed assets 
compared to other grazing systems. Per unit production costs also depend on the average 
yields per cow which vary according to production systems and regions. For example, in a 
study by Ngigi (2005), she finds that milk yields per cow were 2214.97 liters in Kiambu 
under zero grazing system and 1633.46 liters per year in Nyandarua and Nakuru under open 
grazing systems. Therefore the costs and production levels vary according to the production 
system employed and location of the farming units. Table 2.4 below further illustrates these 
observations.  
Staal, (2004a) estimates the average costs and revenue for three districts of Kiambu, Nakuru 
and Nyandarua and shows that milk producers are able to make some positive returns from 
their enterprises. Kiambu has the highest cost structure but also fetches a higher price by 
virtue of its proximity to the capital city, Nairobi. The other districts fetch lower prices but 
also are also low cost producers. In an efficiently working market however, Kiambu 
producers are likely to be disadvantaged. 
Table 2.4 Comparison of costs and revenues for three districts  
 Kiambu (1998) Nakuru (2000) Nyandarua (2000) 
Cost per liter (Kshs) 17.20 13.28 11.93 
Price per liter 
(minimum) 
17.63 15.19 14.30 
Revenue per liter 21.29 16.88 16.68 
Profit per liter 4.09 3.60 4.75 
Source: Adapted from Staal (2004a:3) 
2.4.3 Consumption patterns in the country 
Of the total milk produced in the year 2000, 63% was marketed, about 30% was consumed at 
home, and 7% fed to calves. The marketed milk is usually a surplus after home consumption 
and feeding of calves have been taken care of. 
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Though national milk production is currently higher than demand, the increasing population 
coupled with an improvement in the economic condition may put pressure on the milk 
supplies in a few years’ time. The balance between demand and production will depend on the 
state of the economy (Omore et al, 1999). In a depressed economy, the surplus situation in the 
market may persist for some time.  
About 80% of processed milk products are sold in Nairobi and Mombasa. Per capita 
consumption is estimated at 82 liters on average, but this ranges from less than 64 liters in the 
rural areas to 125 liters in the urban areas. Milk shows high income elasticity, which provides 
potential for the growth of the industry especially when economic conditions and incomes 
improve (Karanja, 2003; Onyango et al, 2003). 
Most of the marketed milk, whether raw or processed, is consumed in the urban areas. The 
informal milk outlets account for up to 80% of the outlets while formal or processed milk 
account for the remaining portion in the urban areas. However, in Nairobi, most of the milk 
consumed is processed milk (Staal, 20004b).   
2.4.4 Informal milk supply chain 
One feature characterizing the current milk supply chain is the emergence of informal milk 
outlets in the country. Informal milk sales account for up to 80% of the milk supplied and 
consumed in urban and peri-urban areas. Informal milk supply chains therefore cannot be 
ignored anymore because of the role they currently play in the milk industry. Sale of 
unprocessed milk in urban areas is illegal, however, it is legally allowed in the rural areas. 
However, Ngigi (2005) notes that unprocessed milk has always been sold in urban areas even 
before liberalization. This implies that it is the scale and openness of the operations that have 
brought the illegality of the practice into the open. The regulations regarding informal milk 
sales were not changed, therefore informal distribution of milk in urban areas remains an 
illegal activity. However the sale of unprocessed milk in urban areas has continued to flourish 
due to the lucrativeness of the market and inability of the Kenya Dairy Board to effectively 
regulate and ensure compliance.  
Informal milk distribution takes the form of direct sales to consumers by farmers, milk 
vending (mobile or itinerant traders), operating milk bars and other retail outlets that generally 
handle unprocessed milk. In urban areas, the diminishing purchasing power of consumers has 
made informal milk distribution an attractive source of milk for the people compared to the 
high prices offered for processed milk products. Consumer prices are sometimes up to 30-
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND LIBERALIZATION IN THE KENYAN AGRICULTURE AND DAIRY 
INDUSTRY 
 22
50% cheaper for unprocessed milk compared to prices for processed milk products. 
Consumers in the country also perceive whole milk as being superior (quality and taste) to 
skimmed pasteurized milk, based on the butter fat content. Furthermore for producers, milk 
prices have been found to be 10-20% higher than what processing firms pay the producers. 
Payment for the milk is also timely, so the farmer does not have to wait for long periods 
before receiving a payment. 
However, informal milk distribution faces problems such as perceived unhygienic conditions 
under which the informal milk dealers operate which are likely to pose health hazards to 
users. Many of the operators have no training or facilities to handle milk safely and 
hygienically. Some of the operators are not licensed to operate the milk outlets. Besides risks 
in handling of milk, there have been fears that use of raw milk may bring about zoonotic 
diseases (TB, Brucellosis, and Pneumonia) which can be transmitted to man. This is 
particularly so if the milk is not properly boiled before use, however it is common for milk to 
be boiled by households before use. 
There have been reported cases of adulteration of milk through addition of water, or additives 
and preservatives to enhance shelf life, which are harmful to consumers. This is a classic case 
of moral hazard and hidden action. Sometimes milk coagulates while being moved over long 
distances before they are sold. This causes losses to the vendor and or to the farmer.  
With most milk being consumed in raw form, form and time utility, which are created through 
processing, are lost. There are also possibilities of shortages (due to droughts) arising out of 
lack of reserves or storable products to even out the cycles. This is likely to create price 
instabilities in the market, which are not conducive for the development of the industry. 
Shortages are often reported in the coastal areas by as much as 70% and by 30 to 40% in the 
west of the country. However, most of the shortages are as a result of preference for raw milk 
rather than availability of milk in general. It is also a result of the inability of consumers to 
afford the high prices charged for processed milk. 
Sometimes producers have not been paid for their milk by the vendors or the vendors have 
disappeared with the proceeds from the milk. This means that whereas informal channels pay 
on time and a higher price, they cannot guarantee farmers a reliable market for their milk. As 
farmers increase their production levels, the informal distributors can absorb only limited 
quantities. Farmers have to look elsewhere for a market beyond the informal buyers, that is, in 
the formal market. Thus for the long term development of the dairy industry, the formal 
market has an important role to play (Staal 2004b; Launonen et al, 1985).  
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2.4.5 Milk collection, processing and marketing in the formal supply chain 
Collection of milk 
When brokers are used to collect milk from farmers, they are paid a margin or per unit (liter) 
commission. Brokers ensure that the milk collected from producers is of the right quality. 
Brokers are informal agents. Cooperatives and self-help groups also play a vital role in the 
bulking of milk for onward transmission to processing firms or direct resale to consumers and 
other traders. Some 332 dairy cooperatives are registered in Kenya and handle up to 24% of 
the total milk marketed by smallholder farmers (Staal 2004a). Most of them channel their 
milk to processors. To transport the milk, most transporters charge producers an average of 
Kshs 2 per liter of the collected milk (Karanja, 2003).  
The types and numbers of licensed milk traders in Kenya as of 1999 are shown in table 2.5 
below. Most producers and informal outlets are not registered hence are not reflected in the 
table. This is in addition to the supermarkets and other general grocery shops, whose role in 
marketing of processed milk is increasingly becoming significant. 
Table 2.5  Registered participants in the milk chain 
Producers Processors Milk bars Mini dairies Cottage Total 
1043 42 393 23 51 1552 
Source: Adapted from Karanja (2003:23). 
Milk processing and the problem of prices and capacity utilization  
Though the number of processors licensed stood at 45 in 1999, only 34 firms were operational 
at the time. Of the 3 billion liters of milk produced in 1999, only 200 million liters of milk 
were processed. The rest was used unprocessed, consumed at home or fed to calves or wasted. 
By the end of 2001 only 22 processing firms were operational and by 2004, the number of the 
firms is reported to have fallen to 17.  There are realignments in the industry and efficient 
processors are expected to survive. The large number of processing firms implies more 
competition for the consumer’s attention. Ultimately the number of processors will decline 
thus increasing concentration in the industry. The concentration levels in the industry are 
shown in table 2.6 below. 
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Table 2.6  Concentration in the Kenyan dairy industry 
 Top 2 firms, % Top 4 firms, % Bottom 10 firms, % 
1999 42 65.5 1.9 
2001 64.5 79.5 2 
Source: Karanja (2003:30) 
In 1999, the top 4 firms were Brookside, Premiere, Spin Knit, and Meru Central. In 2001, the 
firms remained the same but with Meru Central overtaking Premiere. The concentration ratio 
is expected to be even higher in 2005 as the larger firms (including New KCC) improve their 
milk intake and efficiency. Concentration levels affect economies of scale, transaction costs 
and other economies and this should benefit consumers in terms of lower prices (Girgzdiene, 
1999). Capacity utilization determines the firms’ ability to spread the costs of processing milk 
through economies of scale. The rate of capacity utilization is expected to change from time 
to time, especially with the on going realignments. Only 26% of installed processing capacity 
in the industry was being used as of 1999. This idle capacity was contributed to a very large 
extent by KCC. Of the total estimated 2 million liter processing capacity in the industry, KCC 
has 1.2 million liters or 60%. As of 1999, KCC was using only 10% of its capacity. The rest 
are shared by the other firms in varying capacities. However, the New KCC has currently 
improved its milk intake to about 300,000 liters per day since being reorganized by the 
government. Low utilizations of available capacity ultimately translate into high prices for 
consumers and low prices for producers. The inability to utilize capacity is an indicator of 
lack of sales growth, which indicates low performance.   
Pricing structure, competitiveness and performance of processors  
A feature closely linked to and impacting on the actual and potential performance of the milk 
processing firms is price of processed milk. On freeing up the milk market, the expectations 
were that competition would bring in favorable prices for both the producer and the consumer, 
but this has not been realized. Producer prices have remained relatively low as a proportion of 
consumer prices for the processed milk products. For example, the current prices paid by the 
processors to the farmers have ranged between Kshs 13 to 19. During periods of gluts (long 
rain season) the price paid to producers sometimes falls as low as Kshs 10.  
On the other hand consumers pay a price ranging from Kshs 42 to 60 for a liter of fresh 
pasteurized or whole milk. The gap between the consumer prices and the producer prices thus 
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comes to about three times the prices producers receive. With most people in Kenya living on 
less than 2 dollars per day, processed milk gets out of reach for most of them. But milk is 
essential for the health and nutrition of the people and since access to milk through the formal 
outlets is beyond most of the people’s reach, informal milk supply chains naturally fill this 
gap.  
When the consumer price is used as a measure of performance, there seems to be high levels 
of inefficiencies at the processing stage of the supply chain (Karanja, 2003). The trend in 
prices shows that consumer prices have increased for the last 15 years. On the other hand, 
producer prices decreased (in real terms) over the same period. This implies the welfare of 
producers has decreased. The proportion of consumer price paid to producers has declined 
from 60% between 1985-1990, to 28% in 2001. The processing stage is therefore a costly link 
in the supply chain.  
The fact that upcountry prices for processed milk are lower by as much as 20% than in major 
cities can be attributed to the marketing strategy differentials of the milk processing firms 
(Karanja 2003). Since the milk is supplied by the same processors, this cannot be attributed to 
the production cost structure alone. It may be a price skimming strategy by processors in the 
major urban areas. The margins on the milk in supermarkets are also thin. Karanja computes 
the processing margin to be 57% of retail consumer price for one liter of milk. Thus most of 
the margin between the producer and consumer prices can be attributed to the processing 
stage of the chain. 
The cost of packaging material constitutes the largest portion of the cost of milk, amounting 
to 26% of the consumer price. Packaging is monopolized by one firm. Cheaper packaging 
materials and technologies are necessary to reduce the costs of packaging and consequently, 
the consumer prices (table 2.7 below). The total cost of pasteurizing, cooling and packaging 
was estimated at 40% of the consumer price. The profit margin for the milk processing firms 
of 16% of consumer price is also very high. Raw milk cost accounts for only 26% of the 
consumer milk price. Transportation costs on the other hand have been found to be quite 
minimal relative to the consumer prices. Both informal and formal milk supply chain charge 
the same transport cost per liter. Therefore the contribution to these high consumer prices 
cannot be directly linked to transportation costs. The scenario shows the magnitude of the 
challenges facing the formal milk supply chain in the country. 
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Table 2.7: Components of consumer price 
Cost component Contribution to consumer price (%) 
Cost of raw milk 26 
Transport costs   6 
Processing 57 
Retail margin   8 
Distribution   3 
Source: Adapted from Karanja, (2003:35) 
Coordination in the milk industry 
Three types of coordination mechanisms are commonly used in the milk transactions: Spot 
market contracts, verbal contracts and, written contracts. Spot market contracts are 
characterized by one off transactions between agents with no prior arrangements and no 
guarantee for repeat transactions in future. The transactions usually take place at market 
centers but buyers looking for milk can also search for sellers to buy the milk. Most of the 
transactions involve spot cash payments and prices may be negotiated during the transaction. 
Furthermore, sellers use spot market contracts mostly when they have surplus milk that has 
not been committed for delivery to other buyers. On the hand, verbal contracts involve prior 
agreements to supply milk at certain prices (mostly negotiated in advance) and involve repeat 
transactions. The collection of milk is agreed upon in advance, which could be as follows: 
buyer collects from seller, seller delivers to buyer or another location for delivery is agreed 
upon in advance. Payments for the milk may be on the spot or deferred in case of credit 
transactions. Reputations play an important role in ensuring that the parties meet their part of 
the contracts. Finally, written contracts are very much similar to verbal contracts except that 
they are formal agreements, being backed by law. Written contracts are signed by the parties 
concerned for delivery of quality milk at specified prices and locations. Volumes may not 
necessarily be specified in the contracts.        
The chapter has reviewed the Kenyan milk supply chain in light of the institutional changes 
that have been occurring in the industry in the last two decades. It has shown that the nature of 
production and marketing activities leaves the milk supply chain prone to coordination 
problems arising out of transaction costs and that there are disparities in the performance of 
the milk supply chains. It has also reviewed the coordination modes in the milk supply chains. 
The next chapter discusses the theoretical framework that can be used to analyze transaction 
relations and performance of the fresh milk supply chains in the country.  
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CHAPTER 3   
TRANSACTION COST THEORY AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS 
The chapter discusses the theories underlying institutional arrangements, that is, coordination 
mechanisms, and performance in supply chains. It reviews the challenges facing product 
supply chains in light of transaction costs they face. According to Hobbs (1996), the 
appropriate framework for analyzing supply chain management relations is the Transaction 
Cost Economics theory, which is a branch of the New Institutional Economics (NIE). In the 
supply chains, transactions are determined not only by prices involved. The behavior of 
transacting parties is critical in determining whether the transaction takes place or not. 
Performance in supply chain depends on how chain relations are managed, that is, how agents 
go about managing costs of their transactions. 
The chapter begins by tracing developments in the economic theories underlying transactions 
between agents, from the classical economic theory through neoclassical economic theories in 
section 3.1. Section 3.2 introduces the New Institutional Economic Theory while section 3.3 
introduces the Transaction Cost Theory and various definitions for transaction costs. Section 
3.4 relates Information Economics to Transaction Cost Theory and section 3.5 relates 
elements of Behavioral Economics to transaction costs and coordination mechanisms. Section 
3.6 addresses the dimensions of transaction costs and their relationship to coordination 
mechanisms. Finally, section 3.7 reviews the role of institutions, transaction costs and 
coordination mechanisms in developing markets.    
3.1 Classical and neoclassical economic theories  
3.1.1 The classical economic theory 
The Classical School of Economic Theory began with the publication in 1776 of Adam 
Smith's monumental work, ‘The Wealth of Nations’. Adams Smith cited in Barney and 
Hesterly (1996) was among the first people to explain the role of decentralized system of 
prices as a coordination mechanism in the market through the operation of ‘the invisible hand’ 
in The Classical Theory of Economics. Much of this work was in developing theories about 
the way markets and market economies work. The working of the ‘invisible hand’ was such 
that it leads all individuals in the market, in pursuit of their own self-interests, to produce the 
greatest benefit for the society as a whole. The approach known as a 'laissez-faire' approach 
places total reliance on markets, and anything that prevents markets from clearing properly 
should be done away with. The government was not supposed to intervene in markets but was 
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to play its role by encouraging free trade and free markets. Any imperfections in the market 
that prevented this process should be dealt with by the government to ensure that optimum 
equilibriums in the economies or markets were attained. The government was supposed to 
achieve optimum equilibrium through the use of 'supply-side policies' (to reduce market 
imperfections) and to ensure a balanced budget based on three theories: free market theory, 
Says law and quantity theory of money.  Much of Adam Smith’s work laid the foundation of 
modern economics. Much of this work has subsequently been updated by modern economists 
who generally are referred to as Neo-Classical Economists, the word neo meaning ‘new’.  
Among the opponents of classical economic theory were the Keynesian economists arising 
from the works of John Maynard Keynes from the 1930s. Keynesians argued that markets 
would not automatically lead to full-employment equilibrium, but in fact the economy could 
settle in equilibrium at any level of unemployment. This meant that classical policies of non-
intervention would not work. The economy would need prodding if it was to head in the right 
direction, and this meant active intervention by the government to manage the level of 
demand, unlike classical theories that sought to have no government involvement in markets.  
Another critic of the Classical theory was John Stuart Mill who differed with the earlier 
classical economists on the inevitability of the distribution of income produced by the market 
system. Mill pointed to a distinct difference between the market's two roles: allocation of 
resources and distribution of income. The market might be efficient in allocating resources 
but not in distributing income, he wrote, making it necessary for society to intervene. Thus the 
issue of functioning and malfunctioning (failures) of markets had begun that necessitated a 
review of the economic thinking underlying the working of the markets.  
3.1.2 Neoclassical (new classical) economics  
Under classical economics the value of a product was thought to depend on the costs involved 
in producing that product. Goods were distributed in an economy, it was assumed, in the same 
way that costs were distributed -- thus a landlord would receive more goods than a tenant 
farmer because the landlord bore most of the cost. The problem with this approach was that 
prices for a product did not always reflect the expected value as indicated by the costs of a 
product. Clearly, something was wrong with the perspective that the cost of a product was 
expressed in its price, a phenomenon that is explained by differences in "utility." Economists 
began to explore the way that elements such as supply and demand effected price, and Neo-
Classical Economics gradually came into being. 
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New Classical Economics (NCE) emerged as a school in macroeconomics during the 1970s 
based on neoclassical economic framework. It emphasizes the importance of rigorous micro 
foundations, in which the macroeconomic model is built up from the actions of individual 
agents, whose behavior is modeled by microeconomics. Neoclassical economics refers to a 
general approach to economics based on supply and demand which depends on individuals (or 
any economic agent) operating rationally, each seeking to maximize their individual utility or 
profit by making choices based on available information.  
Neoclassical Economics is based on three main assumptions: rationality and self interest, 
utility and profit maximization, and full and relevant information. The assumptions are briefly 
discussed below.  
Rationality and self interest 
People have rational preferences among outcomes that can be identified and associated with a 
value. All agents also possess rational expectations. Rationality implies that preferences are 
rational if they are complete and transitive. That is, that the decision maker is able to compare 
all of the alternatives, and that these comparisons are consistent. The decision makers then 
choose or predict the best alternative. Rational expectations refer to the use of the available 
information to make the best possible predictions about the future. 
Neoclassical economists usually assume, in other words, that human beings make the choices 
that give them the best possible advantage, given the circumstances they face. Circumstances 
include the prices of resources, goods and services, limited income, limited technology for 
transforming resources into goods and services, and taxes, regulations, and similar objective 
limitations on the choices they may make.  
Strictly speaking, neoclassical economics does not assume that real, concrete human beings 
are rational and self-interested. Rather, most economists assume that economic systems work 
as if they consisted of rational, self-interested persons. The rationality and self interest here 
refers to the average person, where it is assumed that deviations from rational self-interest are 
random and will cancel out and so the system will act as if everyone were rational and self-
interested. Accordingly, neoclassical economics studies an economic system consisting of 
rational, self-interested persons.  
There are two very different issues here. The first issue is that people are sometimes altruistic. 
People often do act on non-self-interested values -- but when they do so they act on their own 
values, not those of the government, some philosopher, or (most important) the observing 
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economist. A broader neoclassical economics assumes that people choose in the way that best 
advances their own values, altruistic or self-interested as those values may be.  
Utility and profit maximization 
Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits. Utility maximization implies that 
rational economic agents make decisions that maximize their satisfaction in consumption. 
Under profit maximization, the agents determine price and output levels that return the 
highest profits possible. 
Full and relevant information 
The assumption implies that people act independently on the basis of full and relevant 
information. Information relevant for decision making is available to decision makers who 
make full use of it. There is perfect information such that no economic agent will be left 
worse off or better off for lack of relevant information for decision making. 
From the three assumptions above, neoclassical economists have built a structure to 
understand the allocation of scarce resources among alternative ends.  From the basic 
assumptions of neoclassical economics comes a wide range of theories about various areas of 
economic activity. For example, profit maximization lies behind the neoclassical theory of the 
firm, while the derivation of demand curves leads to an understanding of consumer goods, 
and the supply curve allows an analysis of the factors of production. Utility maximization is 
the source for the neoclassical theory of consumption, the derivation of demand curves for 
consumer goods, and the derivation of factor supply curves. 
The role of demand and supply was emphasized by Marshal in his book (Principles of 
Economics, 1890) where he explained that prices resulted from the intersection of demand 
and supply curves and introduced the concept of market periods, from the very short run to 
the long run.  
Neoclassical economists believe that free markets usually bring about an efficient allocation 
of resources. Consequently, efficient allocation is the important thing about free markets. In 
those more or less rare cases when markets "fail" to bring about an efficient allocation of 
resources, it is appropriate for the government to intervene to correct the situation, if it can. 
The framework of neoclassical economics is summarized as follows. Buyers attempt to 
maximize their gains from getting goods, and they do this by increasing their purchases of a 
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good until what they gain from an extra unit is just balanced by what they have to give up to 
obtain it. In this way they maximize "utility"—the satisfaction associated with the 
consumption of goods and services. Likewise, individuals provide labor to firms that wish to 
employ them by balancing the gains from offering the marginal unit of their services (the 
wage they would receive) with the disutility of labor itself—the loss of leisure. Individuals 
therefore make choices at the margin. This results in a theory of demand for goods, and 
supply of productive factors (Wikipedia, 2006).  
Similarly, producers attempt to produce units of a good so that the cost of producing the 
incremental or marginal unit is just balanced by the revenue it generates. In this way they 
maximize profits. Firms also hire employees up to the point that the cost of the additional hire 
is just balanced by the value of output that the additional employee would produce.  
The neoclassical vision thus involves economic "agents," be they households or firms, 
optimizing (doing as well as they can), subject to all relevant constraints. Value is linked to 
unlimited desires and wants colliding with constraints, or scarcity. The tensions, the decision 
problems, are worked out in markets. Prices are the signals that tell households and firms 
whether their conflicting desires can be reconciled.  
Neoclassical economics conceptualized the agents, households and firms as rational actors. 
Agents were modeled as optimizers who were led to "better" outcomes. The resulting 
equilibrium was "best" in the sense that any other allocation of goods and services would 
leave someone worse off. Thus, the social system in the neoclassical vision was free of 
irresolvable conflict. The next section relaxes some of these assumptions. 
3.2 Basis and foundations of New Institutional Economics 
A realization that perfect market competition was not always appropriate led to other models 
being introduced such as imperfect competition market model forms and industrial 
organization.  
Institutional economics regards individual economic behavior as part of a larger social pattern 
influenced by current ways of living and modes of thought. It rejects the narrow classical 
view that people are primarily motivated by economic self-interest. Opposing the laissez-faire 
attitude towards government's role in the economy, the Institutionalists called for government 
controls and social reform to bring about a more equal distribution of income. Institutional 
economics therefore developed as an alternative to the neoclassical economic theory 
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formulated by among others, Alfred Marshall in the 19th century. The most prominent of the 
so-called old Institutionalists were Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons.  
Major contributions to New Institutional Economics, to which transaction cost economics 
belong, have been made by Oliver Williamson, Douglas North among others over the last 
three decades. Williamson used the term New Institutional Economics to distinguish it from 
the ‘old institutional school’ pioneered by Commons and Veblen (Paarlberg, 1993). 
According to the old institutional school, institutions were a key factor in explaining and 
influencing economic behavior, but there was little analytical rigor and theory in this school 
of thought. It operated outside the neoclassical economics, and there was no quantitative 
theory from which reliable generalizations could be derived or from which sound policy 
choices could be made. Neoclassical economics on the other hand ignored the role of 
institutions and economic agents that were assumed to operate in almost a vacuum (Makhura, 
2001).  
According to the neoclassical theory, markets function according to the Walrasian model in 
which homogenous products are traded, perfect information is guaranteed for both sellers and 
buyers and friction in time or space does not occur (Kreps, 1994 in Boger, 2001a). However, 
the frictionless trading and business environment have been shown to fall short of 
characterizing the operation of market economies.  
In his path breaking article, ‘The nature of the firm’, Coase (1937), showed that despite the 
price system, firms continued to exist because sometimes the cost of transactions in the 
market were higher than if transactions are internalized, that is, carried out wholly within the 
organization. He stated that the cost of using the market involves the cost of establishing the 
price, the cost of negotiations, the cost of specification of the contract and, the cost of 
monitoring compliance. In the presence of high costs of using the market, firms provide an 
alternative to the market system. Specifically the coordination alternative used depends on the 
associated costs of transactions, that is, which coordination is more efficient (FitzRoy et al, 
1998). Neoclassical economic assumptions of no transaction costs, perfect information and, 
full rationality, are relaxed under New Institutional Economics, which helps cope with real 
world economic problems (Boger, 2001a; North, 2005). But the assumption of self-seeking 
individuals attempting to maximize their utility or profit subject to certain constraints still 
holds. The NIE encompasses both paradigms and acknowledges the importance of institutions 
within the framework of neoclassical economics.  
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New institutional economics explains the operation and evolution of institutions over time and 
evaluates their impact on economic performance, efficiency, and distribution (Boger, 2001a; 
North, 2005). There is a sort of two way causality between institutions and economic growth. 
On the one hand, institutions have a profound influence on economic growth, and on the other 
hand, economic growth and development often result in a change in institutions. However, not 
all institutional changes are beneficial. By influencing transaction costs and coordination 
possibilities, institutions can either facilitate or retard economic growth. This may be 
explained by the availability of different institutions in different countries and different 
economic development paths. 
The NIE represents an expanded economics that focuses on choices people make, while at the 
same time it allows for factors such as pervasiveness of information, evolution and evolution 
of norms, and willingness of people to form bonds of trust (Boger, 2001a; Clauge 1997; 
Williamson, 2005). The goal of new institutional economics is therefore to explain what 
institutions are, how they arise, what purpose they serve, how they change and how, if at all, 
they should be reformed (Klein, 1999).  
Institutions have been defined as rules of conduct (norms, traditions, value systems, religions, 
sociological trends) that facilitate coordination or govern relationships between individuals or 
groups. Institutions provide for more certainty in human interaction (North, 1990). Institutions 
therefore have influence on behavior and therefore on outcomes such as economic 
performance, efficiency, economic growth and development.  
Approaches to New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
NIE operates at two levels: macro and micro levels (Williamson, 2000). The macro level 
deals with institutional environment or rules of the game, which affect the behavior and 
performance of economic actors and in which organizational forms and transactions are 
embedded.  Williamson further describes it as the set of fundamental political, social, and 
legal ground rules that establish the basis for production, exchange and distribution.  The 
other level is the micro level which is also referred to as institutional arrangements, and deals 
with the institutions of governance. Institutions of governance refer to modes of managing 
transactions and include market, quasi-market, and hierarchical modes of contracting. The 
focus here is on the individual transaction and the question regarding organizational forms. It 
is these institutional arrangements that govern the way in which its members cooperate and or 
compete. Institutions in this case do not refer to organizations.  
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Among the branches of the New Institutional Economics is New Economic History by North 
among others, Public Choice and Political Economy by Buchanan and Tullock among others, 
New Social Economics by Becker, Theory of Collective Action by Ostrom, Olson and 
Hardin, Law Economics by Posner and Transaction Cost Economics by Coase, Williamson 
and Furubotn. Transaction Cost Economics branch is also closely associated with social 
capital by Putnan and Coleman, property rights literature by Alchain and Demsetz and 
Economics of Information by Akerlof, Stigler and Stiglitz (Furubotn, 2005). 
Among these branches of NIE, North’s New Economic History and Williamson’s Transaction 
Cost Economics have received major prominence and the differences in the approaches of the 
two are briefly discussed here briefly. North takes a macro level view of institutions and looks 
at the role of institutional change in fostering overall economic growth and explaining the 
divergence in the development of various countries, which tries to explain how economies 
evolve over time. According to North, institutions that evolve to lower transaction costs are 
the key to the performance of economies (North, 1990). He equates institutions in this case to 
institutional environment, which Williamson distinguishes from Institutional arrangements. 
North further posits that inefficient institutions can persist over time and this hinders 
economic growth. The main catalysts for institutional change are changes in relative prices 
caused by population changes and technological innovations. Both relative price changes and 
technological changes will lead to changes in the rules of the game thereby introducing new 
institutional arrangements in their transactions.     
On the other hand, Williamson’s approach takes a different view of institutions and 
transaction costs from a micro perspective. This study adopts Williamson’s definition and 
approach to institutions and transaction costs by virtue of being micro rather than macro in 
nature but operating within the institutional environment. However, the two approaches 
(micro and macro approaches) to institutions are complementary.   
3.3 Transaction Cost Economics: definition and approaches 
Transaction cost economics is based on the hypothesis that institutions are transaction cost 
minimizing arrangements, which may change and evolve with changes in the nature and 
sources of transaction costs. Building on Coase (1937), Williamson (1975, 1985) uses the 
Transaction Cost Economic Theory to explain the role of hierarchies as alternative 
governance structures to the price system. He explains that while the market governance relies 
on prices, competition and contracts to ensure that all parties to an exchange observe their 
rights and responsibilities, hierarchical forms depend on a third party who may be called “the 
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boss” to achieve the same intention. This approach is commonly referred to as Williamsonian 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). The transaction is the unit of analysis. Transaction costs 
cannot be directly measured but instead are estimated through proxies to bring out any 
significant relationship between the proxy and the governance of interest. The prevalence of 
coordination alternatives explain why firms exist in general and their behavior in the market 
and the problems necessitating their use in transactions. Williamson (2005) further points out 
that transaction cost economics is concerned with complex markets where there are small 
numbers of parties on each side of the transaction, which goes beyond the simple market 
exchanges. He refers to transaction cost economics as the science of contract and to 
neoclassical economics as the science of choice.  
Thus according to Williamson, a trade off exists between costs of coordination and 
hierarchies within an organization and the costs of using contracts in the markets (Drugger, 
1983; Makhura, 2001). This trade off depends on the magnitude of the transaction costs. 
Transaction costs defined 
Transaction costs are costs that arise when a good or service is transferred across a 
technologically separable interface (Williamson, 1985). Transaction costs arise because of the 
frictions involved in the exchange process. The exchange process involves transfer and 
enforcement of property rights. Eggertson (1999) defines transaction costs as ‘the costs that 
arise when individuals exchange ownership rights for economic assets and enforce their 
exclusive rights’. Transaction cost theory identifies the causes of transaction costs as market 
search and information costs, negotiating or bargaining costs (when prices are not 
exogenously determined) and monitoring and enforcement costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975, 1981, 1985). Basically the costs arise because the parties must find each other, 
communicate and exchange information, the goods and services must be described, inspected, 
weighed and measured. Contracts must also be drawn up, title transferred and records kept. 
These contracts may have to be enforced in cases of violation, which involve costs.  
Information costs arise because the markets are not perfect as information is not freely 
available. Information is costly as it requires time, efforts and money to acquire. Lack of 
information increases search costs for the transacting partners (Williamson, 1975, 1989; 
Hobbs, 1997; Douma and Schroeder, 1991). Resources are spent to acquire information on 
potential contracting partners, the price and quality of the resources in which they have 
property rights (Eggertson, 1999) which may be in terms of personal time, travel expenses 
and communication costs.  
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Monitoring of contractual partners is designed to make sure that they abide by the terms of the 
contracts. Monitoring costs are related to the level of trust between the transacting partners. 
Trust can be build over time or broken between transacting partners. When trust is adjudged 
to be low, there will be a corresponding increase in monitoring costs. The higher the level of 
monitoring required of partners, the higher the expected costs and consequently, the more 
costly it is to transact among the partners (Barney and Hesterly, 1996). 
Two further dimensions of transaction costs in the context of marketing agricultural produce 
are presented by Jaffee and Morton (1995) in Makhura (2001): 
• screening costs, which refer to the uncertainty about the reliability of potential 
suppliers or buyers and the uncertainty about the actual quality of the goods 
• transfer costs, which refer to the legal, extra legal or physical constraints on the 
movement and transfer of goods. The dimension commonly includes handling 
costs, storage costs, and transport costs among others. 
Other approaches to defining transaction costs include Drabenstott (1995), who refer to 
transaction costs as perceived risk, transportation, and administrative costs. Staal et al (1997), 
and Delgado (1995) in Makhura (2001) classify transaction costs into observable and 
unobservable or inhibitive transaction costs. The observable transaction costs include 
marketing costs such as transport, handling, packaging, storage, spoilage among others and 
are observable when a transaction takes place. Unobservable transaction costs include costs of 
information search, bargaining, screening, monitoring, coordination, enforcement (Bardham, 
1994 in Makhura, 2001), and product differentiation (Benham et al, 1998). Delgado (1997) in 
Makura et al (2001) identifies these costs as costs of participating in the market process, 
whether the market exists or not.  
 According to Hobbs (1997), transaction costs can be divided into information, negotiation 
and monitoring costs. Information costs arise ex ante of an exchange and include the costs of 
obtaining price and product information and the cost of identifying suitable transaction 
partners. Negotiation costs are costs of physically carrying out the transaction. She presents 
examples of negotiation costs to include costs such as are commission costs, costs of 
physically negotiating the terms of exchange, and costs of drawing up formal contracts. 
Monitoring or enforcement costs occur ex post of a transaction and are the costs of ensuring 
that the terms of the transaction (quality standards and payment arrangements) are adhered to 
by other transaction partners. Haddad and Zeller (1997) cited in Makhura (2001) equate 
transaction costs with administrative costs of screening, delivery and monitoring of 
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implementation of the program, which closely mirror Hobbs. Cuevas and Graham (1986) also 
cited in Makhura (2001) classify them as explicit costs for the observable costs and implicit 
costs for the unobservable costs. 
Frank and Henderson (1992) identify transaction cost factors related to uncertainty, input 
supplier concentration, asset specificity and internalization costs. For Zaibet and Dunn (1998), 
transaction costs include high transport costs due to distances from market, poor or non 
existent infrastructure, high marketing margins due to monopoly power and high costs of 
searching for markets and monitoring contracts.  
Other transaction costs in agricultural markets include bureaucratic costs and distortions in 
managing, and coordinating integrated production, processing and marketing, the value of 
time used to communicate with participating farms and to coordinate them, costs of incentives 
employed to convince farmers to voluntarily participate in integrated production, costs 
involved in establishing and monitoring long term contracts and the economies of scale 
forgone when batch production replaces commodity production (Hayes et al in Makhura, 
2001). 
Information inefficiencies and institutional problems like absence of formal markets give rise 
to transaction costs. The presence of transaction costs is often reflected by the difference, or 
discrepancy, between perceived buying and selling prices (de Janvry et al, 1991). In such a 
case, sellers experience low selling prices and will be discouraged to sell while buyers 
experience high buying prices and will be discouraged from buying. This creates disutility in 
the market and leads to market failures (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001). 
A further delineation of transaction costs is by Key et al (2000) who distinguish transaction 
costs into fixed and proportional transactional costs. Fixed transaction costs do not vary with 
the amount of product sold but proportional transaction costs vary with quantity of product 
bought or sold. In this study, transaction costs are defined and classified into three classes of 
information and market search costs, monitoring, negotiation and, monitoring costs according 
to Hobbs (1997) and North (1990).  
3.4 Information economics and transaction costs  
According to information economics, individuals act in an environment characterized with 
incomplete information. Incomplete information can also arise because of the inability to 
process all the information pertaining to a decision to be made due to bounded rationality. 
Seminal works on information economics have found relevance in transaction cost 
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economics. Stigler (1961) shows that searching for market information is not costless and that 
may explain why there is sometimes divergence of prices between efficient markets and why 
capital markets are imperfect.  Arkelof’s (1970) work on the market for lemons explains how 
quality guarantees, reputation, and trust are useful tools that ensure production of quality 
goods and provision of information about the goods. Other important works have been 
undertaken by Stiglitz (1998) on the role of imperfect information, adverse selection, and 
moral hazard, on the performance of credit and labor markets, and the behavior of firms. 
Information requirements determine the mix of coordination (between markets and 
organizations) that can be used in transactions (Douma and Schreuder, 2002). Under perfect 
competition, each individual is a price taker; they will have no influence individually on the 
market price. The price conveys all the necessary information to market participants. The only 
decisions that decision makers make is how much to sell given the prevailing prices. The 
product is also assumed to be homogenous in nature. Thus in this case the price mechanism 
will be adequate in coordinating the market.  
When the price does not provide all the required information about a product (such as 
quality), uncertainty sets in. In this situation, contingent contracts may be necessary to ensure 
that the prices and quality of the products delivered are acceptable to both parties. However, it 
would be impossible to cover all possible uncertainties occurring in future periods as there are 
limits on how much the human mind is able to accommodate at any one time. It would also be 
very expensive to arrive at such contracts as well as enforcing them. Alternative coordination 
modes are therefore be necessary in such cases. 
Information asymmetry 
Symmetrical information occurs when the distribution of information across all agents before 
a transaction takes place is the same. In such a case the information will have zero economic 
value. Sometimes information may be available but is unevenly distributed. This results in 
information asymmetry. The value of information can only be revealed to another party by 
disclosing that information, while such disclosure destroys its value. This is the information 
paradox (Douma and Schreuder, 2002). The paradox makes it difficult for those who have 
information to make it available to others before getting something in return. Parties that need 
the information are unwilling to pay for it before knowing the contents of what they are 
buying. Information asymmetries may give rise to opportunistic behavior (strategic behavior). 
All coordination modes require information, but the type of information requirements differ. 
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Markets and prices are able to transmit certain types of information, but not all types of 
information. 
Hidden information 
Hidden information (Douma and Schreuder, 1991, 2002; FitzRoy et al, 1998) leads to adverse 
selection. In a transaction, one may end up with a set of business partners or clients in which 
the high-risk part of the population is over-represented (lemons) (Akerlof, 1970). One partner 
to a potential transaction is better informed about a relevant variable in the transaction, which 
the other party does not have. The high risks have self-selected themselves in response to the 
market offer.  Ultimately, the costs of the offer will rise making it even more unattractive to 
potential lower risk parties. Adverse selection is an ex ante information problem as the parties 
concerned have no incentive to reveal this information truthfully as it will be harmful to them. 
At certain levels of information asymmetry, no transaction may take place and this may lead 
to complete market failures. The private information is unobservable to the other party to the 
transaction and consequently introduces risk for the other party (Douma and Schreuder, 
2002).  
Hidden information can manifest itself in all coordination types.  When private information is 
present it can preclude transactions across markets as well as within organizations. Markets 
and organizations offer different solutions to the information problem.  
Hidden action 
Moral hazard (or hidden action) is an information problem that can develop in both markets 
and organizations (Douma and Schreuder, 1991; and FitzRoy et al, 1998). It refers to actions 
(mostly, undesirable) which parties in a transaction take (or fail to take) after they have agreed 
to execute the transaction (Spencer and Zeckhauser, 1971). Thus moral hazard is an ex post 
phenomenon. One party to the transaction may have incentive to entertain actions that may be 
harmful to the other party’s interest. Outputs or claims may be falsified, inputs and efforts 
may also be misrepresented among other actions that may not easily be observed by the other 
party to the transaction. The effect of hidden action is similar to private information above. 
When potential transacting partners anticipate that hidden action is possible, the transaction 
may not take place at all. 
Information economics finds relevance in the agricultural field through the Imperfect Market 
Theory. The theory explains the emergence of key agrarian institutions which are seen as 
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substitutes for missing markets for credit or insurance in an environment of pervasive risk, 
information asymmetry and high transaction costs. Such institutions play an important role in 
the development of the agriculturally dependent economies. The kinds of governance 
structures crafted to address information problems have an important role to play here. 
3.5 Behavioral assumptions responsible for transaction costs 
Two basic assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism underlie the transaction cost 
theory. The concepts of bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior are used by 
Williamson to explain contractual choice and ownership structure of firms.  
Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality means that those who engage in transactions are intently rational but 
limited by their cognitive abilities. The inability to evaluate all the alternative courses of 
action and to select the most optimal alternative as caused by bounded rationality means that 
the participants cannot specify all the contingencies to their contracts. Bounded rationality 
therefore refers to human behavior which is ‘intendedly rational but limitedly so’ (Simon, 
1961 in Douma and Schreuder, 2002). The presence of complex and uncertain environments 
make bounded rationality a problem in transactions. For complex transactions and in 
uncertain environments, it becomes difficult or costly to write up a contract incorporating all 
contingencies to the transactions. A contingent contract encompassing all possible future 
scenarios would require enormous amounts of information that would be beyond an 
individual’s processing ability. The result of incomplete contracts is uncertainty because the 
economic players cannot foresee all the possible outcomes or formulate other responses to the 
unforeseeable eventualities. Sufficient information reduces uncertainty (Williamson, 1975, 
1981; Barney and Hesterly, 1996; Douma and Schreuder, 1991, 2002). These observations 
have also been made by Zuurbier & Bremmers (1997) and additionally, for frequency by 
Macbeth and Ferguson (1994), Douma and Schreuder (1991) and, Buvik and John (2000). 
Williamson (2005) further avers that all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete 
because of bounded rationality. 
Opportunism 
Williamson observes that human beings are not only boundedly rational but they also display 
opportunistic behavior. Opportunism means that economic players ‘display self-interest 
seeking with guile’ and as making ‘self disbelieved statements’. Opportunism arises when 
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there is incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially calculated to mislead, 
distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse partners in an exchange.  Some actors 
sometimes behave opportunistically and it is costly or impossible to distinguish between 
genuine and those likely to behave opportunistically before the transaction takes place 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2002). Williamson furthermore states that even those who behave 
opportunistically need not do so all the time. Opportunistic behavior can occur ex ante or ex 
post. Ex ante opportunistic behavior leads to adverse selection as in hidden action. Ex ante 
opportunistic behavior can occur only when there is asymmetric information: the seller has 
information that buyers do not have. Such opportunistic behavior may manifest itself as moral 
hazard, cheating, shirking, and other forms of strategic behavior. Shirking takes place if 
benefits exceed costs, that is, when the rewards or benefits are not perfectly correlated with 
productive efforts such that the incentive to produce or to apply more effort is diminished 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). If shirking can be easily detected at zero costs, neither party to 
the transaction would shirk, since the other party would renegotiate the contracts and pass 
over the costs to the shirking party. However, if it is costly to monitor efforts of the 
transacting partners, the shirking party may not bear the full cost of their shirking behavior. In 
this case, the marginal cost of monitoring will be higher than the marginal gains from 
detecting shirking. This means that when monitoring the behavior of transacting partners is 
less than perfect, the incentives to shirk will remain. The costs of monitoring will increase 
with increase in the number of violations of the contractual terms.  
Opportunism becomes a problem when there is small numbers exchange situation, that is, a 
situation where there is a small number of transaction partners. When there many sellers or 
buyers, opportunism is reduced due to the importance of reputations among the sellers or 
buyers. When there are very few sellers or buyers, the concern over reputations rises and this 
is likely to raise costs of verifying the reputations before transacting.  
Transacting parties use governance structures that take into consideration bounded rationality, 
opportunism and costs involved in the exchange. The mode of governance of a transaction is 
determined by minimization of the sum of transaction and production costs. Douma and 
Schreuder (2002) in addition remark that the atmosphere of a transaction also determines the 
governance mode of a transaction besides the transaction costs. The atmosphere in this case 
refers to the value attached to one mode of coordination, which despite having higher 
transaction costs may still be the preferred mode of governance. In this case, the benefits 
derived from the particular governance mode translate into higher utility which goes beyond 
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monetary returns or costs. The atmosphere also captures other influences on coordination 
mechanisms besides transaction costs.   
3.6 Dimensions of transaction costs and coordination continuum 
Asset specificity, frequency of transactions and, uncertainty and complexity of transactions 
have been hypothesized to influence the kind of governance structures adopted by transaction 
partners (Williamson 1985; Joskow, 1985, 1987). The relative influence of these factors 
differs according to the kinds and nature of products, sectors, or economies among others.    
Asset specificity 
Williamson (1985) defines asset specificity in relation to the ease with which it can be 
redeployed to alternative use without sacrificing productive value. The level of transaction 
specific investment determines the type of governance structure chosen. The investments may 
range from modification of the physical technology, operating policies and procedures or 
learning special language, styles and business practices of their partners to expedite the 
transaction and also the location of the enterprises. Despite the fact that investing in 
specialized production facilities has been known to increase productivity (Dyer, 1997; Douma 
and Schreuder, 1991), the investments have value in so far as they are applicable to only one 
partner or one transaction and not elsewhere. The bargaining positions of transacting partners, 
ex ante and ex post will be determined by the idiosyncratic investments made or likely to be 
made by each of them.  The partner that has made specific investments in the transaction is 
vulnerable to ex post contractual opportunistic behavior by the other party in attempting to 
appropriate quasi rents of the specialized assets (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). This is 
a typical ‘hold up’ problem (Williamson, 1991). Thus it is important to determine the 
importance asset specificity has on the mode of governance that is employed by the 
transacting partners.   
One remedy to the hold up problem is vertical integration by one of the parties that is most 
vulnerable. Other possible remedies include explicit agreements, or use of several governance 
structures. Transaction cost economics holds that parties tend to choose the governance 
structures that best control the underinvestment problem, given the particulars of the 
relationship (Klein, 1999).    
Figure 3.1 below shows the trade-offs between asset specificity, transaction costs and 
coordination mechanisms. k1 and k2  are two levels of asset specific investments indicating 
low and high levels of asset specificities respectively. Below k1 parties to transactions have 
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invested lower amounts in transaction specific assets. The risk of their partners behaving 
opportunistically or holding them hostage in the transactions is low, consequently the 
perceived level of transaction costs faced by the parties are relatively low. Spot market (open 
markets) contracts are therefore adequate in coordinating transactions between the parties as 
the need to safeguard the assets is low. However, as the partners increase the amount of 
investments necessary for their transactions from k1 to k2, the need to protect the investments 
from being taken advantage of by the transaction partners rises. But since the level of asset 
specificity is moderate, the levels of perceived transaction costs are also relatively moderate 
and consequently simple contracts and informal agreements may be adequate to safeguard 
their investments. The range of possible safeguards between k1 and k2 is large and these are 
generally referred to as hybrid coordination modes and include verbal contracts, written 
contracts, partnerships, share exchange, strategic alliances among others. Beyond k2 the level 
of asset specificity rises tremendously and the perceived level of transaction costs escalate. 
Hybrid based coordination mechanisms are not adequate to safeguard the investments from 
opportunistic tendencies in the market. As a result, the parties concerned are likely to 
withdraw from the market and bring the transactions in-house by carrying out self production, 
acquiring the relevant partners or merging with them. This leads to formation of integrated, or 
diversified or conglomerate firms referred to as hierarchies in order to minimize exposure to 
high transaction costs in the market. In such cases, the costs of internal organization are 
perceived to be lower than the costs of market organization.   
 
 
Figure 3.1 Transaction costs as a function of asset specificity 
Source: Williamson (2005:49) 
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Frequency and volume of transactions 
Another factor determining whether exchange relationships are carried out in-house or in the 
spot markets is the frequency with which transactions are carried out (Douma and Schreuder 
1991; Macbeth and Ferguson, 1994). When the frequency of transactions is high it is expected 
that transaction will be carried out within organizations rather than across markets. To set up 
specialized governance structures involves certain fixed costs and the need for safeguards 
against post contractual opportunistic behavior will be influenced by the frequency of the 
transactions. Whether the volume of transactions conducted through such specialized 
governance structure utilizes it to capacity is the remaining issue. A higher probability of 
repeated exchanges lowers the expected transaction costs per unit of exchange (Dyer, 1997).  
Without specific investments, spot market contracts will normally suffice, irrespective of 
frequency of transactions. At the other end, highly specific investments will require the use of 
hierarchies to govern the transactions, whether transactions are carried out frequently or not. 
For moderate levels of investments, hybrid governance mechanisms may be adopted such as 
contracting, whether formal or informal. Klein (1985) points to a self-enforcing contract 
encompassing an implicit enforcement mechanism that prevents strategic hold-ups. When 
transactions are carried out with a high frequency, contract performance can be implicitly 
enforced if the transacting party facing termination expects to earn a future ‘quasi-rent stream’ 
which is greater than the immediate short-term gain from breaching the contract.   
Uncertainty and complexity 
Douma and Schreuder (1991, 2002) indicate that uncertainty when combined with complexity 
of the transaction causes many exchange relationships to be brought in-house. For complex, 
high technology exchanges there will be more uncertainty surrounding it compared to 
uncertain but simple transactions.  
Without uncertainty, transactions would be predictable and ex ante. Uncertainty comprises 
unforeseen, exogenous disturbances as well as behavioral uncertainty. The former refers to 
changing market conditions, while the latter arises either from lack of communication or from 
strategic opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985). Increases in uncertainty makes it 
impossible to write out full contingent contracts, therefore it is not possible to spell out the 
full rights and obligations of the transacting parties (Joskow, 1985, 1987).  
Together with asset specificity, behavioral uncertainties affect the efficiency of governance 
structures. The most susceptible governance structures are the hybrid forms due to their 
typical contractual relationships (Williamson, 1996). Hybrids are more susceptible to 
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uncertainties because they do not normally contain adequate safeguards to withstand uncertain 
changes in the transaction environment even with moderate levels of asset specificity. In 
hybrids, the transacting parties remain independent and the cost of coordinating their activities 
including information flows, monitoring opportunistic tendencies (rent seeking) coupled with 
inability to enforce such contracts easily lead to a breakdown in the contractual arrangement. 
This leads to a shift in the transaction function of the hybrid mode as shown in figure 3.2 
below. It becomes difficult to build new contractual arrangements. A consequence of the shift 
in transaction costs associated with the hybrid coordination modes is that more transactions 
will move to the open markets and or to hierarchies leading to reduced efficiencies in the 
market due to institutional breakdowns. Some transaction parties may not recover to 
effectively participate in the market. The effects of uncertainty, frequency and asset 
specificity on the coordination mechanisms have useful implications for the performance of 
the transactions and the economies concerned.  
 
  
Figure 3.2: Governance structure shift due to uncertainty 
Source: Williamson (1991:140) 
A continuum of coordination mechanisms 
Inter-organizational coordination refers to how well the transacting members perform in 
accordance with their roles in the system (Cheung, 1983 cited in Hernandez-Espallardo and 
Arcas-Lario, 2003). It is the extent to which the work activities of the parties are logically 
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
 
co
st
s 
K1   k2 Asset specificity  k 
Markets 
Hybrids shift due to uncertainty 
Hybrids  Hierarchies  
TRANSACTION COST THEORY AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS 
 46
consistent and coherent, so that they are directed towards a common objective in such a way 
that they supplement and complement one another. Cyert and March (1958), Heide (1994), 
cited in Buvik and John (2000) provided the initial theoretical models of co-ordination.  
Inter-organizational coordination is considered as a continuum of governance structures 
bounded by the spot market prices at one end and within-firm organization at the other end. In 
between these extremes are hybrid forms sharing features of the two extreme types and 
include joint ventures, alliances, shareholding and shared product life (Macbeth and Ferguson, 
1994; Zuurbier, 1994, 1996). Figure 3.3 below shows the continuum of these governance 
structures. 
 
Figure 3.3: The continuum of governance structures 
Source: Adapted from Peterson and Wysocki (1998) in Boger (2001a:10) 
Williamson (2005) devises a schema for empirically testing and predicting contracting in the 
face of safeguards and asset specificity. This is shown in figure 3.4 below. Letting k be the 
measure of asset specificity and s the presence or absence of safeguards, organizations that 
use special purpose technology have their k > 0. In this case, there is incentive to safeguard 
their specific investments. Safeguards may include penalties, information disclosure and 
verification procedures, specialized dispute resolution and in the limit common ownership. 
When s =0, no safeguards are provided. Node A corresponds to the neoclassical spot market 
situation based on prices. Courts are used as safeguards in case of contract violations.  Node B 
poses unrelieved contractual hazards in that specialized investments are exposed (k > 0) for 
which no safeguards (s = 0) have been provided. Such hazards will be factored in the prices 
 Spot 
markets 
Specification 
 contracts 
strategic  
alliances 
formal 
cooperation vertical  Integration 
Characteristics 
of managed 
coordination 
High 
administrative 
control 
Cooperative 
adaptation and 
mutual interest 
Long term 
relationship 
Ownership 
Characteristics 
of market 
coordination 
High incentive 
intensity 
Automatic 
adaptation 
self interest 
Short term 
relationship 
Contract law 
Market Hybrid Hierarchy
TRANSACTION COST THEORY AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS 
 47
offered to take care of the implied contractual breakdown. Nodes C and D have added 
contractual safeguards. Transactions will be transferred from C to D if there are continued 
contractual breakdowns. Prices bid at C are expected to be lower than at B, which includes the 
contractual hazard premium. But transactions need not necessarily end at node D. Other cost 
effective safeguards like reputation or credibility can be used to achieve the same end. 
Macbeth and Ferguson (1994) have also related the coordination mechanisms to transaction 
costs, indicating that transaction costs vary on the coordination continuum.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Simple contracting schema 
Source: Williamson (2005:50) 
Coordination has become critical because of the structural changes that emerge in the business 
environment from time to time such as low or no market growth, greater and more 
international competition, more choice and enhanced value, improved food safety and 
legislation and consumer concerns about various environmental issues. Collaborating 
(partnering) is a strategic option for achieving and meeting these requirements (Downy, 
1996). Buvik and John (2000) note that greater vertical co-ordination of action between 
buyers and sellers will create additional economic value through interaction that takes into 
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within supportive governance structures, such as vertical co-ordination, that have higher 
chances of reducing ex-post transaction costs (Douma and Schreuder, 1991). 
One way of cooperating is through collusion where the parties agree in some way to cooperate 
in the market association as a group. The incentives to collude are mostly to gain economic 
profits by restricting outputs or by raising prices or both. The incentives to cheat by each 
member of the cartel are equally high. Bertrand (1833) and Cournot (1897) cited in Barney 
and Hesterly (1996) have illustrated examples of this cheating and the inherent opportunistic 
behavior. Given the strong incentive to cheat, effective collusion requires a very strong 
monitoring system. Monitoring however is difficult granted the dispersion of the members- 
the producers and customers (Stijnen et al, 1998).  
However, cheating is not limited to cartels only. Explicit governance structures, which are 
used to manage cheating problems, also face more or less the same problems. Besides the 
explicit governance structures, trust between parties to a transaction can be used to manage 
cheating. According to Downy and Cannon cited in Masuku and Kirsten (2004), trust exists if 
one party believes the other party is honest or benevolent. Over time, the partners realize that 
they can be trusted not to behave opportunistically. Thus trust can be used as a low cost 
substitute for costly governance structures (Barney & Hesterly, 1996; Mentzer et al, 2001). 
Beers et al (1996) recognize the importance of collaboration in agricultural product chains 
with regard to quality, delivery time, assortment and product life cycle of products.  They 
further note that a basic aspect of collaboration between organizations is the exchange of 
information associated with receiving, processing and delivery of materials and products. 
Porter (1985) argues that the use of information technology may bestow competitive 
advantage to those companies involved with regard to new forms of relationships with 
customers, new product characteristics, quality and delivery time of the product and services. 
Specifically information tries to bridge the uncertainties in goods flow and quality of products 
in agriculture (Trienekens, 1993 cited in Beers et al 1996; Downy, 1996).  
Frohlich and Westbrook (2001) in their study cited in de Treville and Hameri (2002) 
demonstrated that higher supply chain performance resulted when a firm combined with both 
an upstream and downstream partner, than either with an upstream or downstream partner. 
But one-sided integration was found to be better than none at all. Higher levels of integration 
brought about higher levels of performance (also observed by Gimenez and Ventura (2003). 
The success of a supply chain management strategy is dependent on the relations among the 
supply chain partners, which further depends on the costs involved, real or perceived. The 
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relations between the supply chain partners are determined by the level of transaction costs 
between them. 
3.7 Institutions, transaction costs and coordination performance in 
developing markets  
Developing markets face many barriers in their attempts to commercialize their agricultural 
activities. They face informational barriers and may not easily venture into distant markets for 
fear of opportunistic tendencies from potential trading partners. Institutions that are supposed 
to support the markets are poorly developed, missing or ineffective. Thus market 
arrangements and market support institutions that are common in developed markets may not 
be available. But limited transactions still take place under these conditions in these 
economies.  
Kydd and Doward (2003) show that disappointing performance of market liberalization 
policies in promoting agricultural performance in sub-Saharan Africa result from weaknesses 
in the neoclassical theory on which liberalization policies are based. After independence, most 
countries in Africa used state intervention to support agriculture at the expense of the private 
sector. State corporations were established to support the introduction and spread of more 
intensive production methods for the smallholder farmers and to develop rural areas. State 
intervention offered a means of providing a coordination mechanism across trading, 
infrastructural, research and extension investments and activities through financing, 
coordinating farmers, reducing systemic investment risks and investing in organizational and 
human resource development necessary to develop working systems. 
The state parastatals were not successful and as a result the 1980s saw pressure from donor 
countries to reform them and involve the private sector in the economic system. The 
parastatals were not profit driven, were prone to political interferences, and were a 
discouragement to private participation in the economies. Thus liberalization efforts set in 
based on the neoclassical theory of competitive markets. The urge to open up the markets was 
given impetus by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that based their 
mission on neoclassical competitive market solutions to the markets.  
Actions to promote more efficient and less distorted operation of agricultural markets, with 
privatization of agricultural marketing organizations (de-linking credit, input and output 
markets), deregulation of these markets and elimination of credit, input and output subsidies 
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were undertaken. These changes are among what Williamson (1996) refers to as changes in 
the institutional environment.  
Using figures from the World Bank and FAO, Kydd and Doward (2003) show that there has 
been low or negative per capita growth in agriculture in much of Sub Saharan Africa over the 
last 30 years which manifests itself in high incidences of rural poverty compared to other 
regions in the world. Arguments have been presented as to whether pre-liberalization situation 
should have been sustained despite not having delivered substantial improvements in 
agriculture as they were expected to, that is, to reduce rural poverty and increase food 
security. 
Various reasons have been presented for the lack of success in liberalization, ranging from 
lack of sufficiently thorough liberalization (partial liberalization) to weak institutions – 
cultural, political, and legal factors, which undermine clear property rights consequently the 
investment incentives. A third explanation for liberalization’s lack of success is the lack of a 
proper liberalization agenda. All these find relevance in developing agricultural markets in 
Africa. 
Major problems facing rural areas have been indicated as poor roads and communication, lack 
of a well developed monetary system, business environment characterized by weak 
information, difficult and weak contract enforcement mechanisms, high risks and high 
transaction costs, which Kydd and Doward define as the costs of protecting oneself against 
risks of transaction failure by searching for and screening potential contracting parties and 
their goods and services, then negotiating and contracting with them, and monitoring their 
adherence to the contract.  
Among the major risks facing agriculture in the rural areas is the transaction risk, which can 
be divided into two: coordination risks and risks of opportunism (Kydd and Doward, 2003).  
They define coordination as efforts or measures designed to make players within a system act 
in a common or complimentary way towards a common goal (Poultron, 2003 in Kydd and 
Doward, 2003). Economic coordination failure can thus be defined from two different but 
complementary perspectives: in terms of its direct effects on individual investors, it is the 
failure to make investment due to possible absence of complementary investments by other 
players at different stages in the supply chain. In terms of wider processes, and economic 
impacts, economic coordination failure occurs ‘‘where individuals’ failure to coordinate 
complementary changes in their actions leads to a state of affairs for everyone that is worse 
than some alternative state of affairs that is also an equilibrium’’ (Hoff, 2000 in Kydd and 
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Doward, 2003). Examples of failures to coordinate include having undue share of revenues in 
the supply chain, or delivering sub-standard products. Examples of opportunism include loan 
default by farmers, low product prices offered by traders at harvest time (when farmers are 
desperate for cash), or in remote areas (where farmers have no other sales outlets), sale of 
poor or adulterated products and, use of false weights. All these depress investments in the 
economic activity. 
Low level equilibriums result from low or depressed investments, thin markets, coordination 
failure and weak institutions (for coordination and contract enforcement). This leads to low 
equilibrium traps or vicious cycles.  Three different approaches are used to explain the 
problem of coordination failure or low equilibrium trap based on NIE. 
According to North, institutional change is considered as an evolutionary process where 
powerful groups respond to changes in relative prices, technologies and transaction costs by 
modifying institutions in ways that they perceive to be in their interests. These changes may 
stimulate very different types of institutional changes promoting, in broad terms, pro 
development form (structuring transactions to create and promote trade and investments) or 
an ‘anti-development’ form (structuring transactions to create rents and, in the process, 
creating the possibility of a low level equilibrium trap). There is a strong dependence in these 
processes as initial conditions play an important role in determining the relative perceptions 
and power of different groups, and the institutional and technological options that they face.   
 Williamson on the other hand takes a micro-economic approach to analyze the way that 
agents, in the context of their institutional environment, structure their institutional 
arrangements, and this then influences the organization of the economy with regards to 
choices to use firms, markets and relational contracts or hierarchical, market and hybrid 
contractual forms for exchange and coordination. The key insights relevant here are the 
influences on contractual form and transaction failure of asset specificity, risk exposure, 
frequency of contracts, the nature of goods and services exchanged, the institutional 
environment, and human propensity for opportunism. This can be applied to rural markets 
following the realization that asset specificity is the result of thin markets in developing 
economies. Complementary investments are difficult to make except perhaps when a 
monopolist is involved such that the monopolist ends up capturing an unfair share of the 
revenues. Williamson calls for non standard contractual forms in cases of high asset 
specificity which is also applicable to developing poor rural markets such as share cropping, 
interlocked markets and local monopolies. These may be the most efficient contractual forms 
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given the circumstances prevailing at the time and can ensure that transaction costs and risks 
are minimized and that the supply chain does not fail completely. 
The other institutional economics approach is found in Hall and Soskice (2001) cited in Kydd 
and Doward (2003) in their examination of ‘varieties of capitalism’ in Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies. They propose two types of 
national economy, at poles of a spectrum. Liberal market economies or LMEs, where 
activities are coordinated via intra-firm hierarchies, competitive market arrangements and 
vertical hybrid arrangements between firms in a supply chain, and coordinated marketed 
economies or CMEs, where there is more use of ‘non market relations to coordinate 
endeavors and to construct core competencies’ with more extensive information within 
networks. CMEs draw on a further set of organizations and institutions, supporting more 
horizontal or networked strategic interaction, both across and within supply chains. 
LMEs are associated with radical innovations while CMEs are linked to continuous technical 
innovations. The role of the state is higher in CMEs as they take deliberative and coordination 
processes that promote and enforce coordinated action and shared understandings of goals and 
distributive outcomes of such action. The CME approach may be more appropriate for poor 
countries facing serious weaknesses in the institutional environment that need continuous 
technical innovation and have serious coordination failures. 
Kydd and Doward propose a formal model of low equilibrium traps and coordination failure 
that demonstrates a mechanism by which coordination failure may lead to under development 
traps and also highlights key variables determining the movement of an economy to low or 
high level equilibriums. This is shown in figure 3.5 below.  
Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between the actors’ costs and returns and the volume of 
investments in a supply chain. It is assumed that all actors face a two stage investment 
problem, in which they must make stage 1 investments in assets specific to a particular 
activity in the supply chain in order to reap net revenues in stage 2. Their revenues in stage 2 
are however determined not only by the scale of their own stage 1 investments, but also by the 
scale of others’ stage 1 investments. This relationship with others is thus a result of potential 
coordination failure (limited stage 1 investment by others may mean that there is not 
sufficient supply or demand of complementary products or services to support full utilization 
of the capacity generated by the actors’ stage 1 investments) and of opportunism by other 
agents who, in a thin market, may be able to capture undue share of the surplus generated in 
the supply chain.  
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Figure 3.5 also shows that increasing total supply chain investments lead to increasing and 
then decreasing returns in net revenues assuming no loss of coordination failure or 
opportunism. However, there is a threshold level of total supply chain investment (I*) below 
which individual actors in that supply chain incur losses and above which they reap profits. 
Below the threshold, no actor has incentive to invest leading to a low level equilibrium trap. 
Above the threshold, we may expect the dynamics of competition and technical and 
institutional innovations to further lower costs with time with continuing increases in 
investment. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: High and low level equilibriums with coordination and opportunism risk 
Source. Kydd and Doward (2003:19) 
Following the CME logic, coordination cannot be achieved by the market mechanism alone. 
Non market mechanisms referred to by Kydd and Doward (2003) as local and extensive 
coordinations are also necessary. Vertical integration (e.g. for large scale commercial farms) 
and local relations linking various local agents interested in investing in different activities in 
the supply chain through farmer groups or powerful traders can be employed. However, this 
coordination needs support probably from the state to keep it on the growth path so that it 
does not become too slow and fragile. 
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An alternative to local endogenous coordination is externally assisted ‘soft’ coordination 
processes (state or NGO assisted) or the more extensive ‘hard’ coordination where some 
strong central coordinating body with a mandate from the state ensures investments across the 
supply chain with highly credible coordinated commitments. However, the history of such 
bodies (e.g. parastatals) does not make this option appealing. 
Total supply chain investments threshold can be lowered to make it attractive to potential 
participants by lowering coordination costs and risks, by lowering transaction enforcement 
costs and opportunism risks, and by raising expected returns net of transformation costs and 
risks. Most important is to lower stage 1 costs. 
Williamson (1996) presents a framework for linking governance structures, individuals and 
the institutional environment (figure 3.6 below). In it, he identifies the institutional 
environment as the overreaching wider or general environment in which individuals and 
governance structures interact. According to Menard (1995), the institutional environment 
provides the rules of the game and includes contract laws, norms, customs and standards 
which are capable of inducing a shift in the relative costs of transaction costs in different 
governance structures, thereby leading to a change in the governance structures. The 
institutional environment is visualized to operate at higher levels than governance structures, 
for example at the national or macro level rather than at the enterprise or micro level.   
 Governance structures, though they may be changed by changes in the institutional 
environment, have a life of their own (arrowed circle) and this is determined by transaction 
costs (Williamson 1996; Boger, 2001a). The governance structures have a feedback to both 
the individuals and the institutional environment. An example of a feedback is change of 
contractual law in response to new product developments.  
The individual in the diagram refers to the behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality and 
opportunism. The attributes of individuals influence the costs of transactions and the relative 
advantages of governance structures. Behavior is further influenced by the institutional 
environment: the rules and norms developed, for instance, determine the level of trust in a 
society (Boger, 2001a).  
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Figure 3.6: Links between governance, institutional environment and the individual 
Source: Williamson (1996:223).  
The links between institutions, governance and individual behavior illustrate the key 
interactions in economies and determine economic performance. Thus the difference between 
developed and developing markets rests in the effectiveness of property rights regime, 
information institutions, and market failure mitigating arrangements which allow the market 
forces to operate competitively and to move to whichever vertical coordination that is the 
least costly alternative given the available technology (Hobbs and Kerr, 1999). Institutions, in 
such an environment, are usually stable or change gradually and, for the most part, predictable 
for economic actors. The stability of institutions is a “necessary condition” for complex 
human interaction (North, 1990). 
Various studies on Williamson’s three links have been undertaken for both transition and 
developing economies. Among transition economies, Brunetti, Kisunk and Weder (1998) in 
Boger (2001a) find that the impact of property rights, political stability, corruption and 
predictability of rules on the flow of foreign direct investments and economic growth are 
important preconditions for successfully transforming and improving the performance of 
these economies. Thus institutional changes are likely to affect governance and economic 
performance of the economies. Institutional change can be gradual or abrupt (shock therapy) 
and these two show trade-offs. Both kinds of institutional change have been captured in 
theoretical models by Dewatripont and Roland (1996), and Roland and Verdier (1997) also in 
Boger (2001a).  Roland and Verdier develop a search model which explains why price 
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liberalization has been associated with an output fall in transition economies. The key factors 
leading to output decline in the model are search frictions in exchange and transaction specific 
investments. Asset specificity gains a new dimension in transition: due to substantial 
liberalization, disruption of previous production links and depreciation of the capital stock, 
searching for new business partners is usually laborious. New investments are made only after 
a new long term partner has been found. 
The disorganization of production links after the breakdown of state managed institutions had 
severe impacts on output decline in such countries. Before liberalization, the state institutions 
provided instruments for avoiding adverse effects of specificity (hold ups). There arose a 
vacuum of formal institutions such that the lowered specificity in firms’ relations opened 
room for bargaining due to asymmetric information and incomplete contracts. The consequent 
of the disorganization is that transaction costs increase as enterprises seek new customers and 
suppliers. The combination of the freedom to contract with imperfect information causes a 
breakdown of business relationships and a decline in production. Under such conditions, the 
question arises of how firms should reorganize (Boger, 2001a).  
A theoretical framework for reorganizing of firms in less developed and transition economies 
has been provided by Beckmann (1999, 2000), cited in Boger (2001a). He uses the basic links 
between asset specificity and governance structures in TCE to model a socialist style of 
economy (figure 3.7 below). It is assumed that only hierarchical modes of organization exist 
(fat line in the figure). Such organizations suffering from bureaucratic burden and high 
transaction costs are economically justified only if asset specificity and or uncertainty are 
substantial. The fundamental institutional changes in transition remove the constraint of 
keeping transactions in hierarchical structures and bring the freedom to contract. With 
privatization and restructuring of state owned firms, one would expect a change in governance 
structure for transactions with a low and medium degree of asset specificity (vertical solid 
arrows). However, the assumption that transition leaves asset specificity untouched may not 
hold. Decapitalization or abrupt interruption in business links (Blanchard and Kremer 1997 
cited in Boger, 2001a) can incur substantial sunk costs and reduce specificity (dejected arrow 
lines). Furthermore, specific relations in vertical coordination between firms will decline if 
liberalization leads to open markets and entry of new firms. Finally uncertainties due to major 
institutional changes negatively affect transaction costs of susceptible hybrid modes. The 
hybrid modes may either disappear or not evolve with the result that the spot market solution 
may dominate in early transition. 
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Figure 3.7: Dominance of hierarchical organization and adaptation during transition 
Source: Boger (2001a:38) 
 
The change in governance structures from hybrids to spot markets in early transition has 
feedback effects on the institutional environment. Recannatini and Ryterman (1999) further 
develop the model by Blanchard and Kremer by analyzing the institutional outcomes of 
disrupted business links. They argue that business networks emerge endogenously as a 
spontaneous response with a positive impact on firms’ performance. These ‘self organizing’ 
networks are more likely to emerge in regions where institutional disorganization is great. 
Evidence from a survey of Russian firms indicates that the networks of firms are hybrid forms 
of governance embedded in informal institutions that create reputation, trust, interdependence 
and altruism (Macneil, 1985 in Boger, 2001a). It is only if these institutions become widely 
accepted as business rules that the establishment of informal networks induce institutional 
change in such economies. 
The role of informal institutions and self organization on firms’ performance has been studied 
by Koford and Miller (1999) in Bulgaria and Fafchamps (2004) for countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. When legal enforcement is limited, firms trade mainly within business groups via 
repeated spot market contracts that have many characteristics of relational contracts. Due to 
high uncertainty related to new, unknown business networks, firms try to solidify 
relationships within established informal business networks. Reputation serves as the 
enforcement mechanism of delivery and quality. They further show that if reputational effects 
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are limited to groups, it may have important implications on market entry and competition. 
Private ordering via informal institutions might mitigate opportunistic behavior within the 
business groups but it lowers competition and provides fertile ground for market power. 
Furthermore, poorly developed formal market institutions such as contract laws and courts 
force firms to engage in lengthy and costly trust building processes leading to high transaction 
costs compared to a situation in which enforcement institutions function well (Hobbs and 
Kerr, 1999). 
Empirical evidence from private firms in Eastern Europe show that courts and relational 
contracts within a network are substitutes for enforcing contractual obligations (Johnson et al, 
1999). Thus the impact of institutional development is two fold: first the role of courts will 
increase over time as legal systems become more workable and as decreasing costs of 
searching for alternative partners deteriorate stability in networks. Second, an increasing 
importance of courts will lead to improved efficiency since transaction costs can be lowered 
and entry barriers from more efficient firms reduced. 
Market frictions go beyond the problems of contract enforcement and informational barriers 
associated with finding partners. Lack of quality and monitoring mechanisms create 
challenges in organizing business as well. Quality related problems affect buyers who may 
not be able to observe it before purchase.  
 In north’s view (North, 2005), institutions evolve to reduce transaction costs and these 
institutions are important for the performance of economies. North sees the role of the 
government as being crucial in specifying property rights and enforcing contracts both of 
which promote specialization and reduce the costs of market exchange. The inability of 
societies to develop effective, low cost enforcement of contracts is an important source of 
stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in developing countries (North, 2000, 2005).  
There has been a recognition that transaction costs are relevant for agricultural market 
analysis in developing countries because many of their institutions (formal rules of behavior) 
that are taken for granted in developed countries which facilitate market exchange are absent 
in these low income countries. The occurrence of market failures and incomplete markets has 
been linked to higher transaction costs and to information asymmetries, which cannot be 
explained by neoclassical economics (Makhura, 2001; North, 2005; Kydd and Doward, 2003).   
Earlier approaches at the recognition of transaction costs in agricultural markets have been 
explored by de Janvry et al (1991) for the case of missing markets in many African markets. 
They use the household as the decision making unit and show that in the absence of food 
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markets, households will normally strive to be self sufficient in their food requirements before 
they allocate their resources to cash crops. Another observation in the market is that there are 
wide variations between the selling prices (usually low) and the buying prices (usually high) 
(Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). The reasons for the missing markets have been attributed to 
transaction costs. Makhura (2001) provides examples of studies that indicate transaction costs 
to be a major reason for the observed missing markets such as for credit, labor markets, land 
markets as well as product markets. He further shows studies that indicate that these market 
failures result in alternative institutional arrangements, such as share cropping, interlinking 
and interlocking of markets among others.  
Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) study determinants of commercialization of small scale 
farmers and find that distance from markets, poor infrastructure, high marketing margins, 
imperfect information, supervision and incentive costs contribute a lot to whether a farming 
household participates in the market or not. Thus before a farmer participates in the market, 
he must overcome these transaction costs.  
The importance of transaction costs have been identified by Coase (1937) and Hobbs (1997) 
as costs of searching for potential transacting partners, negotiating with them and ensuring 
that they meet their terms of transactions. Participation in the market will not be possible 
when these costs are very high (Staal et al., 1997; Coase, 1937). Campell (1978) in Makhura 
(2001) illustrate the problem of transaction costs by indicating that after one has decided on a 
price, one needs to find a buyer. The longer one looks for ideal buyers, the higher the search 
costs incurred. The transaction costs include advertising, telephone and transport costs, and 
also the actual time spent. These extra costs of search and information may rise so high that 
they exceed the gap between the price at which one would be willing to sell or buy and the 
price asked or offered by the end user.  
Very high transaction costs limit the number of participants in the market. Unfortunately, the 
transaction costs associated with parties that are not able to participate in the market cannot be 
estimated or measured. But it is known that the transaction costs that the non market 
participants face may be too high to surmount in order to be able to participate in the market. 
High or prohibitive transaction costs may arise from prohibitive investment requirements 
(specifically asset specificity) (Frank and Henderson, 1992), too much uncertainty in 
transactions (natural and human), and high frequency/volume of transactions. Institutional 
arrangements are necessary to deal with problems such as hold up costs arising from 
differential investments in the transactions.  
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Staal et al (1997) shows that high transaction costs limit the amounts of products that can be 
available for transactions in the market, or the use of inputs (Strasberg et al 1999). Zaibet and 
Dunn (1998) show that household characteristics such as family size and dependency ratio 
may also limit market participation. Capital is not individual specific; it is shared among the 
family members (Goetz, 1992).  
These few studies point to the significance of transaction costs and institutional arrangements 
in affecting market relations of individuals and firms in developing markets. The next chapter 
provides a detailed review of relevant works with regard to transaction costs and other 
determinants of coordination mechanisms and supply chain performance with special 
reference to agricultural markets in developing countries.  
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CHAPTER 4   
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON TRANSACTION COSTS, COORDINATION 
MECHANISMS AND SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE 
The difficult in the measurement and estimation of transaction costs empirically has been 
recognized by many researchers and scholars (Allen, 1999; Wallis and North, 1986; Davis 
1986). However there have been continuing efforts in this direction over time.  
An assumption in empirically testing transaction costs follows directly from the Coase 
theorem which states that under assumption of zero transaction costs, the type of 
organizational arrangement does not matter. The merits of alternative arrangements can be 
explained through a direct comparison of the costs of governing exchange under each 
alternative (Masten, 1996). Coase’s argument is that: 
     G* = G1, if C1  >  C2 
 = G2,  if C1 ≥  C2   ……….……………………………………………………………1 
where G1 and G2 represent alternative governance structures, G* is the chosen alternative and 
C1 and C2 are the costs related to the transaction under the corresponding organizational 
alternatives. Problems with transaction cost measurement usually hamper this form of 
analysis. A major problem facing transaction cost analysis is availability of data. The data 
required is usually not collected on regular basis, neither is it standardized nor publicly 
available. This problem has been recognized by among others, Menard (2000); Masten 
(1996); and Hobbs et al (1997). These limitations have however not stopped efforts in 
empirically studying transaction costs. Using the Coase theorem and insights from 
Williamson, Masten (1996) formalizes Coase’s argument as 
2..........................................................................................................................11
1 eXC += β   
3........................................................................................................................22
2 eXC += β  
where X displays a vector of observable attributes of both the organizational form and the 
transaction, β1 and β2 reflect parameter vectors, while e1 and e2  summarize unobserved 
factors such as errors and misperceptions of transaction costs. How the types of transaction 
costs affect the differential efficiency of organizational alternatives can thereby be analyzed, 
even though transaction costs themselves cannot be measured. The probability of observing 
the governance structure G1, therefore becomes  
4..........................................................................).........)(Pr()Pr( 122121 XeeCC ββ −<−=<   
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The operationalization has been extensively used in recent empirical works.  
Masten, Meehan and Synder (1991) provide a method of measuring the costs of organization, 
which are used to represent transaction costs. They note that while the proxies capture the 
hazards of the market, they ignore the internal costs of governance. Reduced form estimates 
are unable to distinguish between internal and external transaction costs. They use switching 
regression techniques and adopt censored regression models used in labor economics. Actual 
dollar estimates of organization costs are obtained as well as estimates of the magnitude of 
individual coefficients to capture their relative impact. They applied this methodology to 
naval shipyards and found the overall organizational costs to be 14% of the total costs and 
that with an incorrect contract agreement the costs would go up to 70%.  
Other efforts at directly operationalizing transaction costs based on Masten’s (1996) structural 
discrete alternatives have been undertaken by Fahlbeck (1996). Fahlbeck analyses the 
influence of physical asset specificity, site specificity and human asset-specificity on the 
choice of the marketing channel among Swedish farmers. The results indicated that farmers 
with a higher degree of sunk costs, that is, greater asset specificity, favor trade with 
cooperative societies. Sales to cooperatives incur lower transaction costs when asset 
specificity is high compared to investor owned firms. Allen and Luech (1992) show that 
measurement and enforcement costs dictate the choice between cash rent contracts and 
cropshare contracts in land leasing while risk-sharing considerations derived from 
neoclassical theory are irrelevant for contract choice. Cropshare contracts are directly linked 
to low measurement costs of output and a high chance of soil exploitation. 
Vakis et al (2003) measured transaction costs based on observed behavior in the market 
among potato farmers in Peru. They estimated proportional and fixed transaction costs using 
reduced form and semi structural conditional logit approach to market choice. A result of their 
study was that the choice of a market is a function of effective farm level prices and of market 
information that account for fixed transaction costs. Information that farmers receive reduces 
fixed transaction costs by increasing the price received. They observed that the effect of 
information availability was two times that of transport cost reduction. The study shows that 
transaction costs are not synonymous with transport costs and that fixed transaction costs are 
critical if the market is to properly function. In the same vein, Renkow et al (2004) present a 
framework for quantifying fixed transaction costs facing semi-subsistence households in 
Kenya. Log likelihood regression was used on the demand and supply side equations.   
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Frank and Henderson (1992) studied transaction costs as determinants of vertical coordination 
in the US food industries. They measured vertical coordination by a vertical coordination 
index derived from the industry’s upstream and downstream matrices of connections for a 
product as dependent variables using ordinary least squares regression. Explanatory variables 
used included farm output supply concentration, flow economies, capital intensity, demand 
and input supply uncertainty and concentration, and idiosyncratic investments and scale 
economies, all which were found to be significant. Non market exchanges were found to 
reduce transactional inefficiencies. 
On the other hand, Buvik and Andersen (2002) have studied the impact of vertical 
coordination on ex post transaction costs comparing domestic and international buyer-seller 
relationships. Using ex post transaction costs as the dependent variable and vertical 
coordination and asset specificity as explanatory variables, they analyze relationships between 
manufacturing firms in Norway using ordinary least squares regression. Governance 
performance varied widely under international buyer-seller relationships compared with local 
relationships due the higher costs of performance monitoring in the international business 
relationships. The study involved unilateral rather than bilateral buyer seller relationships. In 
Buvik and John (2000), relationship development effectively reduces the threat of 
opportunism in long-term ties which in turn reduces ex post transaction costs. Thus 
performance should be higher in long term ties due to in part, lower inventory costs.  
Perishability and the bulky nature of milk combined with tropical climates and poor market 
access means that milk lends itself to quality problems, and needs an appropriate location of 
processing plants and specialized transportation arrangements. Though asset specificity is 
observed, temporal specificity is the most relevant for milk as it determines the subsequent 
investments and activities (Masten, 2000). The temporal nature of milk therefore requires 
short and fast supply chains. Extensive negotiations in the market are not appropriate. Ngigi 
(2002) and Staal et al (1997) also note that the lengthy period to maturities or gestations in 
agriculture causes supply inflexibility in response to market changes in agriculture. 
Agriculture is also prone to transaction, environmental and behavioral uncertainties. Seasonal 
variability in output for non-storable commodities increases dependence on relational 
contracts between suppliers of raw materials and processors. Ngigi further notes that the milk 
industry is characterized by multiple sales outlets for the small-scale producers, sales on credit 
where lump-some payments are expected at the end of an agreed period, as well as spot cash 
sales due to different levels of transaction costs faced by the agents.  
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Aust (1997) examines vertical integration versus vertical coordination in the broiler industry 
in the USA and finds that the driving force behind contracting in the industry is asset 
specificity and uncertainty. She notes that vertical coordination is chosen over vertical 
integration because of its flexibility, which allows firms to obtain inputs with specific 
characteristics without getting into another business where large investments may be required. 
She uses Schmid’s (1987) Situation-Structure and Performance framework to analyze the 
industry and categorizes transaction costs into asset specificity and information costs. She also 
notes that contracts do not eliminate risks fully as there are still risks of contract non renewal 
and the risk of contractor not keeping chicks in housing on regular basis. She thus provides a 
link between the transaction costs and their reduction through the coordination mechanisms.    
Hobbs and Linda (1999) provide a theoretical framework for analyzing vertical linkages in 
agrifood supply chains. Based on Transaction Cost Economics, they show that vertical 
coordination is determined by transaction costs that arise from transaction characteristics, and 
that these characteristics are a result of product characteristics, which are further influenced 
by regulatory, technological and socio-economic factors. Using examples from the 
agricultural sector they show that vertical relations are widespread and that trust and strategic 
alliances play a vital role in the supply chains.  
Von Bailey and Hunnicutt (2002) evaluate the role of transaction costs in market selection for 
commercial feeder cattle in the Utah State. They find that transportation, shrinkage and 
commissions alone are not enough to explain the selection of marketing alternatives (video, 
internet, direct sales and the traditional auction). They provided a detailed analysis of the 
components of transaction costs and their measures and the role trust plays in the reduction of 
these costs. Other significant factors are size of operation, and experience. Respondents were 
asked to indicate their perceptions of transaction costs under different pricing methods. The 
proportion of cattle sold through each market type was then regressed against the transaction 
cost factors using seemingly unrelated regression model. Transaction costs were found to be 
significant and present in the industry.   
Hobbs (1997) measures transaction costs in the choice between direct sales and auction sales 
of cattle in the UK. The influence of transaction costs and farmer variables in the choice of 
coordination mode were tested. The dependent variable was the proportion of cattle sold 
through each coordination mode against the measures of information, negotiation and 
monitoring costs. The study approached the measuring of transaction cost by looking at the 
importance of individual transaction costs. A two limit maximum likelihood regression 
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estimation technique (Tobit) was used. Four types of transaction cost and three producer 
characteristics were shown to be significant in the study.  
Mathye et al (2000) in Makhura (2001) also study the choice of marketing channels for 
smallholder banana and mango farmers in the Northern Province of South Africa. They find 
that not all farmers sell their produce and that those who sell tend to use different channels 
such as fresh produce market, ‘achaar’ (type of salad) market and direct sales to consumers. 
Problems of transport, searching for markets and education were identified as the major 
factors determining which channel was used by the farmers.  
A study of the grain marketing in Ethiopia by Gabre-Madhini (2001) provides further insights 
into the measurement of transaction costs in the agricultural sector. The study covered the 
grain supply chain and detailed measures of transaction costs such as search time, search 
labor, working capital and social capital. These were estimated using revenue functions 
through instrumentations for each of the cost components. Two stage least-squares estimation 
was then applied to the revenue functions. She concludes that transaction costs (social capital) 
form a major component of the total costs in the Ethiopian grain transactions. 
In a study by Fafchamps and Minten (2001), the role of social capital or networks in the 
resolution of disputes among traders is studied. They measured social capital in terms of the 
number of relatives in the trade, the number of traders known personally as well as the 
number of clients known personally. They find that incidences of contract breach are low and 
that traders preferred to depend on trust based relationships for contract enforcement rather 
than formal legal institutions such as courts and the police. The study closely mirrors Gabre-
Madhini (2001) on the role of social capital in transactions.  
The significance of trust among supply chain partners has been studied by among others 
Whan et al (2004). Trust is highly associated with both side’s specific asset investments. 
Constructs were used to identify and measure the variables for trust and asset specificity. An 
ordinary regression analysis was then applied with trust as the dependent variable. The 
biggest challenge to implementing supply management relations was traced to the ability to 
cultivate trust among the partners. Trust takes a long time to build showing that it is dynamic 
in nature. In the study, trust is considered as a consequence of asset specificity; however trust 
could as well be an antecedent to asset specificity. This point is still unclear. 
In studies on the predictions made by transaction cost theory regarding the relationship 
between governance structures and the characteristics of transactions using ‘survivor 
analysis’, Pint and Baldwin (1997) find that inefficient governance structures are weeded out 
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by competitive pressures. Also vertical integration will be more efficient when asset 
specificity, uncertainty and thin markets are present. It is also possible to tailor contracts to fit 
characteristics of transactions. They stress importance of reputation in reducing opportunism. 
Key et al (2000) have used proportional and fixed transaction costs in Mexico to study why 
some maize producers may have different relationships to the market. They use estimates of 
supply elasticity and measures of the relative importance of factors that determine both 
proportional and fixed transaction costs for households. The reduced form model of the 
market participation equation and the supply functions under the log likelihood were then 
applied to the data. Transportation and improvement of market institutions were found to be 
critical in improving production and increasing market participation by the producers. 
Improvement of market institutions is expected to reduce transaction costs. This was shown 
by the result that selling to official sources tended to significantly increase the production and 
selling threshold for the sellers. Ownership of assets (pick-up truck) also increased the 
tendency to participate in the market.  
In their study on alternative techniques for influencing market participation among peri-urban 
milk producers in the Ethiopian highlands, Holloway et al (2000) find that institutional 
innovations to promote entry into the market should be accompanied by a mix of other factors 
such as infrastructure, knowledge, and asset accumulation in the household. The location of 
the producer together with distance also influenced the level of participation in the market.  
Furthermore, in Staal et al (1997), transaction costs are presented as the cause for lack of 
participation in dairy markets in East Africa. In this case contracts and cooperatives are 
essential in reducing transaction costs. Larger producers face less transaction costs than 
smaller ones and this is reflected in the market outlets they choose, costs of inputs and the 
prices they receive. Transaction costs are also likely to rise with distance from captive 
markets. Long distances increase costs of information search, wastage and spoilage when the 
roads are bad and the buyers are not found on time.  
Staal et al (2000, 2002) further study the effect of location on the uptake of technologies by 
smallholder dairy farmers in Kenya. They use elements of market access such as distance to 
destination, quality of road, utility derived by the producer and transaction costs. Transaction 
costs are captured by the individual capacity and resources of agents at the point of 
observation. Transaction costs faced by the agents are found to be a function of their 
individual characteristics and their ability to use market information and conduct exchanges.  
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The effect of transport costs on the household’s decision to devote resources to low yielding 
crops rather than to cash crops has been studied by Omamo (1998) in Siaya district of Kenya. 
The results indicate that transport costs were important in explaining the cropping decision of 
the households. More resources and land are devoted to cash crops when the distances to 
markets are shorter or when the households are located closer to roads. Similar results were 
realized in Fafchamps (1992) study where the relationship between food price volatility and 
market integration were investigated. He found that better roads and transportation tended to 
equalize price movements across a larger or international market, but also that the food prices 
were highly dissociated from local supply and demand conditions. Furthermore, Minot (1999) 
also find that transaction costs (particularly transportation costs) do not only decrease market 
surplus but that they can substantially reduce the elasticity of supply and demand.  
De Janvry et al (1991) use household characteristics to measure unobservable transaction 
costs. The rationale is that market failures are household specific. Grosh (1994) and Key et al 
(2000) add that market failures are also commodity specific. However, there is possibility that 
transaction costs are transaction specific as the same commodity being sold by the same buyer 
using different coordination mechanisms may attract different levels of transaction costs. 
Goetz (1992) studies the effect of transaction cost factors on market participation of coarse 
grain farmers. He used proxy variables such as ownership of a cart for transportation of grain 
to the market, physical distance to market and regional dummy for location of market. The 
results indicate that there was a significant relationship between the grain price and the 
probability of buying, and the quantities bought and sold. Other factors that influenced market 
participation were better information and access to grain processing technology.  
Strasberg et al (1999) and Zaibet and Dunn (1998) study the effect of land size, location, 
number of plots and existence of annual crops (as proxies for transaction costs) on market 
participation. They test the proposition that larger family ownership systems, as opposed to 
restricted family ownership systems and farm size are sources of increased risk aversion and 
transaction costs in market participation. They find that nuclear family ownership system had 
a significant and positive correlation with fertilizer purchasing.  In the case of mechanization 
and labor hiring, the estimate was positive but not significantly different from zero for nuclear 
family. For a large family, farm size was significant and positively correlated to 
mechanization and labor use. Strasberg et al (1999) show that the use of fertilizer depended 
mainly on the distance to a motorable road, assets such as the value of agricultural equipment 
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owned, value of the livestock owned, and human resource factors. This shows that transaction 
costs are also available in the input markets just as in the output markets.  
The cost of market information has also been recognized as a major component of transaction 
costs. Market information costs are defined as the costs associated with lack of or access to 
sources of information. Abdulai and Delgado (1999) find that the decline in the cost of 
information and transport flows as a result of good infrastructure reduces transaction costs. In 
Strasberg et al 1999, increased human capital has a significant positive effect on the effective 
use of inputs since the chances are that better management skills, and thus a greater 
propensity to seek information on operations of the market are available. 
Makhura (1994) in Makhura (2001) defines access to information amongst others as having 
the opportunity of listening to radio for agricultural communications. He finds that farmers 
having access to the use of such information sold more agricultural produce while those 
having no access sold less. He and Yang (1999) find that farmers in some regions of China 
used neighbors, TV and newspapers or magazines and carried out investigations on markets to 
access market information. Transaction costs were thus lowered in all the cases. High 
transaction costs faced by the farmers really originated from small transaction scale, outdated 
information and disorderly marketing system.  
Randolph and Ndung’u (2000) measure the importance of attributes of different health 
services for the decision of the smallholder dairy farmers in Kenya to choose an animal health 
service using conjoint analysis. The results indicate that promptness and professionalism of 
the service determine the farmer’s decisions whereas the price is the least important reason for 
choosing a health service. Thus the risk of delays in the health services outweighs the price 
considerations showing the significance of transaction costs.   
Leathers and Kähkönen (1998) focus on market participation in post liberalization agricultural 
markets in Tanzania and Zambia. They define transaction costs to include information, 
negotiation, enforcement costs and transfer costs (costs of handling, transport, storage, 
processing, wholesaling and retailing). They use a descriptive survey to show that transaction 
costs for many farmers are too high for them to participate in the market despite a growing 
private sector after liberalization and privatization. The results show that the high transaction 
costs emanated from poor institutional environment and infrastructure.  
Makhura (2001) studies the role of transaction costs on market participation of smallholder 
commercial farmers in the Northern Province of South Africa using Heckman’s two stage 
estimation approach. Transaction costs were divided into fixed and proportional transaction 
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costs. The results show that information, asset endowments and market access significantly 
influence the decision to participate in the market by households. 
Boger (2001a, 2001b) studies the effect of transaction costs on the governance structures in 
the Polish Hog sector. Using multivariate and multinomial logit models and variables such as 
asset specificity, quality systems, grading, bargaining power, market structure/site specificity 
for market channels and contract types, she finds that farmers that did not invest significantly 
traded on spot markets and received relatively low prices. Those who invested significantly 
secured their investments through neoclassical or relational contracts and received higher 
prices. However, there were some transactions that had high investments but were taking 
place on the spot markets and thus lacked any safeguards for their investments.    
Low economic performance stems from high incidence of cheating, whether real or perceived. 
Potential customers can keep away from new products when they suspect there may be a 
hidden flaw (Casson, 1991). Insisting on pre-payment of sales and post payment of purchases 
eliminates all exposure to risk for some chain members. Transaction costs are expected to be 
lower in smaller stable compact groups and information flows among them will be better. 
Parties found cheating risk loosing reputation and are punished as it is easier to monitor the 
activities of each other leading to better performance than large amorphous groups (Casson, 
1991). Chains that have lower information costs are expected to perform better than those that 
do not. Information costs can be captured by various kinds of uncertainty that impact on 
performance through the chosen coordination mechanisms.  
Supply chain performance measurement is difficult because it involves different groups or 
firms. However, Beamon (1999) provides a framework for the selection of a performance 
measurement system. The main measures for performance identified are resources, output and 
flexibility. The measures contain quantitative and qualitative measures unlike simple 
numerical measures that limit the scope of performance measurement. The measures are also 
more complete, accurate and therefore more effective. 
The importance of measuring the impact of supply chain performance is underlined by 
Bolstorf (2003).  Using the Supply Chain Council’s SCOR model (Supply Chain Operations 
Reference-model), performance is evaluated through measures such as delivery performance 
(time, order fulfillment, lead time and supply response time) and total supply chain 
management cost (within firm) and also cash-to-cash cycle time. Most of the information that 
is critical may be not be open to the public but may be confined within the firms.  
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Chen and Paulraj (2004) carry out an extensive survey of research done in the field of supply 
chain management consisting of its critical elements, its performance measurement and the 
theoretical framework. They assert that Supply chain performance should go beyond financial 
performance and operational performance measures to include system wide measures such as 
extent of mutual trust, changes in inventory held and turnover at the various stages of the 
chain and adaptability of the supply chain as a whole to meet customer needs.  
Performance in SCM has been measured by Kaplan and Norton (1996) and also emphasized 
by Brewer and Speh (2000) using the Balanced scorecard approach. The scorecard provides a 
multidimensional scorecard and balances financial and non financial measures. It measures 
performance across four balanced perspectives of: financial perspective – return on 
investment, economic value added; customer perspective – customer satisfaction, customer 
retention, market share, customer acquisition; learning and growth perspective and – 
employee satisfaction, information technology (IT) system availability and; internal business 
processes – costs and quality, response time, new product introductions. Similar approaches 
on supply chain performance have been used by Bullinger et al (2002) cited in Hieber (2002).  
Performance has also been measured by the prices paid and or received by members of the 
supply chain. Keidailene and Hockman (2002) in a study in Lithuania, measures performance 
by the prices that cooperatives were paying relative to private firms. The prices were found to 
be about 10% higher for raw milk delivered to cooperatives societies compared to deliveries 
to dairy processing firms, implying that better performance for the producers concerned and 
the entire chain was achieved by selling through cooperative societies. 
Performance measures vary from absolute measures to relative measures, both of which are 
relevant in the evaluation of performance in supply chains. Performance measures can also be 
grouped as financial and non financial performance measures. Both types are also necessary 
for a proper evaluation of the supply chain activities. However due to lack of standard 
performance measures and especially at the chain level, multiple constructs consisting of 
financial and non financial indicators can be used. Standardized measures of performance are 
still evolving. However, subjective measures of performance have been widely used to 
measure performance. A composite measure of performance incorporates the measures 
subjectively derived from the respondents, as well as financial measures where available. 
Likert-like scales are used for the subjective measures. Subjective measures have been used 
widely by Venkatraman and Ramanujan (1987), among others. They find that subjective 
measures give results similar to their quantitative counterparts. 
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CHAPTER 5  
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The chapter begins by introducing the theoretical foundations of smallholder market 
participation in the face of transaction costs as a prelude to modeling determinants of 
coordination mechanisms and supply chain performance in the Kenyan dairy industry in 
sections 5.1 and 5.2. Section 5.1 introduces the economic problem facing smallholder market 
participation in the presence of transaction costs. Section 5.2 builds on this framework to 
compare farmers’ and traders’ decision making under two conditions: with and without 
transaction costs. These foundations are necessary to understand the kind of challenges that 
farm households and agricultural commodity traders face in their attempts to commercialize 
their farming activities or to participate in product markets as sellers. 
The economic model for the study is discussed in section 5.3 for market participating farmers 
and traders. The model does not take into consideration non market participating agents but 
the understanding is that the constraints facing agents participating in the market are worse for 
those agents not able to participate causing them to be shut out of the market. In section 5.4 
the econometric model for the determinants of coordination mechanisms in the supply chains 
is discussed. Empirical specification of the determinants of coordination mechanisms are 
discussed in section 5.5. Finally, section 5.6 discusses a theoretical and econometric model for 
the determinants of supply chain performance in the Kenyan fresh milk supply chains. 
5.1 Theoretical foundations for smallholder market participation 
Most of the markets in developing countries are dominated by small scale operators, generally 
referred to as smallholders. This is both at the production and marketing/trading levels of the 
respective primary product supply chains. The number of producers is usually large. The 
number of traders can also be large in number or dominated by few large buyers 
(monopsonists) depending on the commodity and location of interest. 
Based on the competitive market situation, smallholder market participation has been 
modeled to account for the fact that production and marketing decisions of the decision 
makers are usually not separable. The decisions are rather looked at as a continuum, on one 
end is autarky (self production), both production and buying in the middle (net buyers), and at 
the other end full market participation as net sellers (Key et al, 2000; Bellemare and Barrett, 
2006). The location of the agents on the continuum is a function of transaction costs they face. 
It therefore means that the amount of a product sold or the degree of participation in the 
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market is a function of the transaction costs so faced by the decision makers. A threshold must 
be attained before the individuals decide to participate in the market whether as sellers or 
traders. Figure 5.1 below illustrates these relationships. 
 
Figure 5.1: Relationship between transaction costs and household sales and purchases 
Source: Adapted from Makhura (2001:36). 
 
HHTCS = sales by household facing high transaction costs 
HLTCS = sales by household facing lower transaction costs 
HHTCP= purchases by household facing high transaction costs 
HLTCP= purchases by household facing lower transaction costs 
Net selling individuals and household will receive an observed sales price of Pi-δ, where δ 
represents the marketing costs. At this price, sales will be reflected by HLTCS, i.e sales of a 
low transaction cost household. When the household faces more transaction costs, ξ, the 
unobserved decision price is Pi-δ-ξ and will correspond to sales of HHTCS, i.e sales of a 
household facing high transaction costs, which is less than sales of HLTCS. Thus at high 
transaction costs, less quantities will be sold, implying that transaction costs are negatively 
related to market participation (Makhura, 2001). 
On the other hand, deficit households which purchase food will face the observed price of 
Pi+δ where δ are the observable costs. At this price the household equilibrium conditions will 
be at HLTCP, that is, purchases by households facing low transaction costs. But if the 
Pi+δ+ξ 
Pi+ δ 
µi/ξ 
 
Pi 
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household faces unobservable transaction costs, ξ, the decision price will be Pi+δ+ξ, thus 
purchasing at HHTCP or purchases of a household facing high transaction costs. The 
household tends to purchase less when faced with high transaction costs as compared to when 
it is facing low or no transaction costs (Makhura, 2001). Thus it can be similarly concluded 
that market participation is negatively related to transaction costs. 
It has been noted by Ejupu et al (1999) that non surplus producers may also participate in the 
market as sellers. Makhura (2001) also shows that a production level is necessary but not 
sufficient condition for commercialization or market participation. Other household related 
characteristics also affect the decision to participate. He further indicates that a household 
model rather than a competitive market framework would be required in this case.  
Commercially participating households and individuals require the separatibility of 
consumption and production/marketing decisions. The competitive market framework can be 
used taking cognizance of the household decision making process in the presence of 
transaction costs. The next section compares household and individual agent decisions in the 
presence and absence of transaction costs by expanding on the exposition above.   
5.2 Market situation facing smallholder market participants  
In order to conceptualize the market situation facing commercial agricultural producers and 
traders in agricultural supply chains, consider a household that produces an agricultural 
product, in this case milk. The household’s decision can be divided mainly into production 
and marketing decisions. Firstly, the household chooses the optimal allocation of resources to 
determine the quantity to be produced. Following a typical household setting, this decision is 
based on the utility that can be derived from the production activity, monetary or otherwise, 
given the available resources such as labor, land, and other factors. Secondly, the household 
then makes decisions regarding the market where the volumes of the product to sell or buy are 
determined.  
The exposition below draws from several sources including Key et al (2000), Vakis et al 
(2002, 2003), and Makhura (2001) to illustrate the economic problem facing smallholder 
farmers and traders participating in markets under two situations: when transaction costs are 
assumed to be absent and when transaction costs are present.  
5.2.1 Market situation under assumption of no transaction costs 
Under the assumptions of no transaction costs, the household maximizes its utility (U) by 
deciding on the consumption of k goods ( )( kc , production of k goods )( kq , and sales of k 
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goods ( )( ks . The inputs used to produce product i can be depicted as ikx . The sales 
component enters into the utility function through the revenue generated from sales ( )kk sp , 
the sum of which is used to purchase other goods represented by kR , meaning the household 
will purchase an equivalent of kR  in other goods. 
Thus the neoclassical subjective equilibrium for a commercializing or market participating 
household or individual is   
1...........................................................................................).........;,( ukk HRcuUMax =  
that is,  the households can consume what it produces ( c ),  or gain revenues to purchase other 
goods (R), given household characteristics  ( uH ). The household characteristics represent a 
set of factors that can shift the utility function. 
The constraints imposed on this utility maximization are shown by  
[ ] [ ] 2..................................................................................)(
11
∑∑
==
+−≤+
N
k
kkk
N
k
kkk TsqpRcp  
which is the full income constraint, implying that expenditure on all purchase must not exceed 
revenues from all sales and transfers (T), 
3...........................................................................................kkkkikikkkk eRqpxpspcp ++≤++  
or commodity resource balance, stating that for each of the N goods, the amount consumed, 
sold, and used as inputs is equal to what is produced and bought plus the endowment of good 
k (Tk), represented by ke  
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or production technology (G) that relates inputs (Xik) to output (qk), given the set of household 
characteristics (Hq) shifting the production function.  
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Pk (pks for selling price and pkc for purchase price) and pi are given market prices of good k 
and input i respectively. 
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Thus c, R, s and q are defined and decided over k goods, where the set k covers all goods 
entering into production, consumption and the market or commercial activity. 
The household jointly makes its production, consumption and market participation decision 
subject to a number of constraints: the full income constraint (2), the resource equilibriums (3) 
and the technology (4) to produce the output.  
The market situation without transaction costs can thus be captured by the Lagrangian 
demand and supply equations as below.  
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where µ, Ф, and λ are Lagrange multipliers associated with the full-income constraint, 
resource balance equilibriums, and technology constraint, respectively.  
The optimal consumption, input use and market participation must, respectively, satisfy the 
following first order conditions, upon solving which the optimal supply and demand can be 
determined. These represent the shadow prices of the constraint resource. 
For consumption the partial derivative of u (or L) with respect to ck is: 
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For other purchased goods, the partial derivative with respect to Rk is 
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For output, the partial derivative of G with respect to qk is: 
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For inputs, the partial derivative with respect to xik is  
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For marketed goods, the partial derivative of G with respect to sk is: 
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Using equations (7) and (8) subject to the full income constraint (2), we can solve for a 
system of demand equations for consumption, ck (p, I; Hu) and purchased goods Rk (p, I; Hu). 
I is income redefined under full income constraint (Key et al, 2000). 
Using equations (9) and (10) for profit maximization, subject to (4), we can solve for output 
supply equations, qk (p; Hq) and input demand equations, xi (p; Hq). 
Using equations (11) and (8) subject to constraint (5) we can solve for a system of market 
participation equations sk(pk; Hq, Hu). This implies that market participation will be 
endogenously affected by prices, as well as by exogenously determined household 
characteristics. This supposes that participation in the markets is just a response to an 
observable signal. 
5.2.2 The market situation in the presence of transaction costs 
The above derivation assumes a market without any frictions or transaction costs. Though 
transaction costs are largely unobservable, the presence or absence of certain factors can be 
used to provide an indication of the effect of the transaction costs. Transaction costs can be 
categorized as proportional transaction costs (tpc), varying with the amount of product 
exchanged and fixed transaction costs (tfc) that do not vary irrespective of the amount of 
product transacted (Key et al, 2000). Transaction costs have been shown to arise among 
smallholder farming enterprises and households. Different households face different levels of 
transaction costs and these arise due to information asymmetries and differential assets, 
including household and firm specific characteristics.  
Transaction costs lower prices effectively received by the seller and also increase the price 
effectively paid by the buyer and this is likely to lead to lower market participation. The 
difference in the prices received and prices paid result in price bands such that if the decision 
price falls within the band, households will not participate or will withdraw from the market 
(Sadoulet et al, 1995; Minot, 2000; Key et al, 2000).  
The objective function of the household under transaction costs becomes 
12.........................................................................................).........;,( utttt HRcuUMax =  
Subject to: 
Full income constraint under transaction costs 
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With the resource balance equilibriums affected by transaction costs in the similar way as 
under the assumption of no transaction costs, where skτ  =1 if sk > 0 and  kτ =0 if sk =0. 
t
kR  is 
the revenue gained under transaction costs and tkR =0, when sk =0 and  
t
kR  ≤ kR . The 
c
kτ = 1 if 
ck >0 and ckτ =0 if ck =0.  
These conditions imply that when the household is not participating in the market, variable or 
proportional transaction costs will not exist, and the fixed transaction costs (tfc) will determine 
whether the household participates or not. That is, the household’s response to transaction 
costs is twofold. When transaction costs are perceived to be too high, the agents will not 
participate in the market and will switch to consumption of the products. On the other hand, 
when the agents are able to participate in the market, differential transaction costs they face 
will cause them to shift their transactions from one market to another so as to minimize the 
transaction costs. 
Demand and supply equations can be derived conditional on market participation of 
households facing both fixed transaction costs (tfc) and proportional transaction costs (tpc). The 
lagrangian is defined as: 
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The optimal solution here cannot be found by solving the first order condition since the 
presence of tfc (fixed transaction costs) creates discontinuity in the Lagrange. This requires 
consideration of Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Key et al (2000) postulate a two step procedure in 
this case: solve for optimal condition subject to market participation, and then choose the 
participation level leading to highest level of utility. When transaction costs are specified as 
fixed transaction costs, per unit shadow prices through the Lagrange multiplier for that 
constraint can be computed. 
The first order conditions (FOCs) for equation 14 above are: 
For consumption of own production 
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For consumption of purchased goods, 
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The income constraint takes two forms: When the household participates in the market, the 
change in utility as a result of unit change in µ  will be equivalent to income constraint in (13) 
which has both fixed and proportional transaction costs. However, when the household is not 
yet participating 
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We can solve for systems of demand equations under transaction costs 
1.21...............................................................................).........,;( upcttktk hItpcc +=  
2.21..........................................................................................).........,;( upcttktk hItpRR −=  
The systems of output supply equations under transaction costs 
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Input equations 
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and the system of market participation equations is given by 
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depending on whether =skτ 0 or 1, 
and  
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From the foregoing, and according to Makhura (2001) and Key et al (2000), transaction costs 
affect all systems of equations. Utility maximization under transaction costs is different from 
one when transaction costs are assumed not to exist. Under transaction costs, more of the 
production will be consumed since producers will be valuing output consumed at 
kpck ptp ≥+ , and they will be saving on a higher purchase price. 
On the other hand, less of other goods Rk will be consumed since there is a low propensity to 
participate in the market. A twist in the indifference curve and an inward shift of the full 
income constraint will be observed. 
The household’s market supply without transaction costs is a function of prices and household 
characteristics, that is 
),,( quk hhpss =  
Equation (21.5) thus shows that households participating in the market face both fixed and 
proportional transaction costs. Fixed transaction costs will shift the supply curve with respect 
to both revenue (R) and price, thus increasing the threshold at which market participation can 
take place, that is, when production under transaction costs (particularly fixed transaction 
costs) will lower the decision price considerably so much so that it might not be worthwhile to 
participate in the market.  Furthermore, consumption is a residual of production and market 
participation; 
),(),,(),( upcqupctkqpc htpchhtpshtpq +=−−−  
This shows that market participation and consumption are inversely related. With this 
observation in mind, the equations can be modified to apply to traders participating in the 
market. In this case consumption is either zero or negligible and a solution for profit 
maximization can be carried out in the same way. 
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Equation 21.5 also indicates that when no sales take place, we can get the decision price, dkP , 
for selling by setting the amount sold to zero (s= 0) and solve for dkk PP = . The equation for 
shadow decision price will be given by  
22..........................................................................................).........,,,( uqkfcdkdk hhptPP =  
Equation (21.5) shows that the decision to take part in the market depends only on fixed 
transaction costs, while the market supply (conditional on participation) will depend on both 
fixed and proportional transaction costs. When a certain threshold of fixed transaction costs 
has been attained positive values of supply (sales or market participation) will be observed for 
the commodity (Makhura, 2001a).  
The rest of the exposition below focuses on agents (households and traders) that are net sellers 
(that is, s>o) to model determinants of coordination mechanisms used in their transactions in 
the market. Section 5.3 to 5.5 model determinants of coordination mechanisms in the milk 
supply chain transactions while section 5.6 models determinants of supply chain performance 
in the transactions. 
5.3 A theoretical model for determinants of coordination mechanisms   
To model determinants of coordination mechanisms used by market participating agents 
(farmers and traders) in the Kenyan fresh milk supply chains, we assume that the agents make 
two types of decisions: production decisions and marketing decisions. The decisions are also 
assumed to be made in the presence of transaction costs. For the farmers, production decisions 
involve allocating resources to the various portfolios of crop and livestock activities, while 
marketing activities include finding markets and entering into transactions to sell their 
products under various coordination mechanisms in various supply chains. Both decisions are 
interrelated and should be simultaneously determined. However, this study models farmer 
marketing decisions assuming their production decisions are predetermined. The question of 
whether or not to participate in the market is therefore not addressed as all the agents are 
assumed to be already participating in the market, albeit at different levels. Milk retail 
operators also make marketing decisions by buying the farmers’ milk and selling it to 
consumers and or other buyers. The study concentrates on market participating agents, at both 
producer and trader stages of the milk supply chain.  
We assume that milk producers and traders wish to maximize some utility function of net 
revenue over time and in so doing choose not only the profit maximizing production methods 
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but also appropriate contractual forms for the various transactions they engage in. We take 
note that to realize the net benefits, several costs will necessarily be incurred by the agents for 
each transaction. The costs are assumed to be specific to each coordination mechanism used.  
The relative benefits of alternative coordination mechanisms to use in transactions with other 
parties have to be addressed by the market participant. The benefits or losses derived under 
each coordination mechanism are determined by quasi rents available in their transaction 
relationships. The transacting parties will continuously be evaluating the opportunity costs of 
their transaction arrangements. The quasi rents are a function of transaction costs (Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian, 1978). The problem of hold up is likely to arise in this case as the 
parties compare their switching costs from one transaction arrangement to another. Ultimately 
for each transaction, the chosen coordination mechanisms are expected to be the net revenue 
maximizing coordination arrangements. 
The modeling draws from several sources including Doward (1999, 2001), Vakis (2003), and 
Hobbs (1997). Doward categorizes costs faced by agents into two groups. The first category is 
production or transformation costs necessary to physically produce the products in readiness 
for the market. These costs are likely to vary due to efficiencies and scale economies of each 
farm or firm. The other category of costs is referred to as transaction costs. These costs 
consist of pure transaction costs (information and search costs, negotiation costs and 
monitoring and enforcement costs) as well as the associated risk costs arising from the 
transactions. Vakis et al (2003) distinguish transaction costs as fixed transaction costs and 
variable or proportional transaction costs. Hobbs (1997) does not distinguish between fixed 
and proportional transaction costs but classifies the fixed and proportional transaction costs 
into three classes: market search and information costs, negotiation costs, and monitoring and 
enforcement costs. In this study, risk costs are not handled separately as these arise out of 
opportunistic tendencies among transacting partners because of information asymmetry 
problems and asset specificity. Risk costs are therefore assumed to be part of the pure 
transaction costs. The study therefore uses Doward’s framework but defines transaction costs 
according to Hobbs and Vakis et al.   
To generate revenues, a firm will need to select quantities of milk to sell under each of the 
coordination mechanisms. Let the total amount of milk sold be Q, such that the firm is able to 
select or allocate various quantities or volumes of milk to sell under each of the coordination 
mechanisms. A firm may sell all its milk under spot market contracts, under verbal contracts 
or under written agreements or allocate partial volumes under each of the coordination 
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arrangements. Let the volume of milk handled or sold under each of the coordination 
mechanism be Qj. Furthermore, let the transformation costs be represented by C, proportional 
transaction costs by Pj, fixed transaction costs by Fj and finally TR as the total revenues 
received by the agent or firm. Assuming that all agents are rational, net revenue maximization 
(П) can be found by choosing the volume (Qj ) to be obtained under each contractual form j to 
maximize 
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where TR are the gross revenues derived under each coordination mechanism, C are the 
transformation costs, Qj is the quantity sold under coordination j, Fj are the fixed transaction 
costs under coordination j, Pj are the proportional transaction costs under coordination j and zj 
are the relevant individual socioeconomic and firm specific characteristics that also affect the 
net revenues derived under each coordination mechanism.  
Fixed transaction costs relate to searching for the best market and buyer or obtaining 
information about prices. In addition, they are invariant to the specific quantity sold and may 
also be market or transaction specific. For example, knowledge of market specific attributes 
such as prices and relevant infrastructure (that could potentially affect the probability of 
finding a buyer) can influence the decision of a farm enterprise or trader as to where to sell 
and how to sell it. On the other hand, proportional transaction costs vary with the number or 
value of transactions undertaken. Such transaction costs include transport costs and time taken 
to reach markets or buyers.  
Socioeconomic characteristics such as experience, education, gender and age could also 
enhance the ability to collect and analyze relevant information and thus can affect choice of 
coordination mechanisms. The type of supply chain partner (and their relations) and the 
location or region where the sellers and buyers are located may also affect what kinds of 
coordination mechanisms may be used in the transactions. The benefits derived from a 
particular coordination mechanism also depend on the quantity sold (qj) in addition to the 
above factors since the scale of operation influences bargaining related attributes.  
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Assuming that farmers and milk traders are risk neutral, they will undertake their market 
transactions under coordination mechanisms that yield the highest net revenues ( jΠ ), subject 
to transaction costs they face, their socioeconomic characteristics and their firm specific 
characteristics. Thus the net revenues represent revenues net of fixed transaction costs which 
may not be quantifiable. Specifically a transaction will be carried out by farmers and traders 
using a coordination mechanism j which maximizes the following net revenue function: 
 
{ } 24...............................................................................)(max jjjjjj zFPCTR −−−=∏  
represented in proportional transaction costs are distance and time costs assumed vary with 
quantities bought or sold while fixed transaction costs include information and search cost 
components, negotiation cost components and, monitoring and enforcement cost components.  
The coordination mechanisms used vary from j to k. The components entering the model are 
allowed to vary for each transaction relation between the producers and buyers, traders and 
suppliers and traders and buyers, that is, for each stage of the supply chain. The type and 
number of coordination mechanisms are also allowed to vary under each of the three stages in 
the supply chain. Since farmers and milk traders are assumed to be risk neutral and as such 
strive to maximize their net revenues subject to transaction costs and other resource 
constraints, observing transaction i under coordination mechanism j implies: 
25............................................................................................................., kjikij ≠∀Π>Π  
That is, coordination mechanism j is observed if and only if j∏ > k∏ . However, the net 
revenues associated with each coordination mechanism may not be directly observable but 
can be represented by their latent profits, *ij∏ , such that the chosen coordination mechanism 
represent the maximum possible latent net revenues available to the transacting partners.  
5.4 Specification of the econometric model 
The econometric specification follows a multinomial logistic regression given the nature of 
the issues under consideration. The use of a particular coordination mechanism is choice 
based, in that agents can opt to use one coordination mechanism based on the perceived 
benefits that can be derived from using it. The values of interest are discrete in nature. Three 
coordination mechanisms are possible in the milk supply chain: spot market contracts, verbal 
contracts and written contracts. However, when only two choices are available, the 
multinomial logit model collapses to a binomial logit model.  
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5.4.1 The multinomial logit model 
Essentially the multinomial logit model (MNL) only deals with individual specific data, 
which means that the values of the independent variables are assumed to be constant among 
all alternatives in the choice set (Maddala 1983, Wooldridge, 2002). A general formalization 
of the MNL according to Schmidt and Strauss (1975) is: 
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The estimated equations lead to a set of probabilities for J+1 choices for a decision maker 
with the vector wi describing each individual transaction characteristics and the vector of 
coefficients ßj associated with the jth coordination category. Normalization is achieved by 
setting ß0 = 0.  We thus obtain a vector ßj for each probability except for the first which is the 
normalized alternative. The estimated coefficients of the model can therefore be interpreted as 
the effect of the characteristics wi on the probability of an alternative j relative to the chosen 
option (John and Weitz, 1988 in Boger, 2001a).  
Thus the probability of choosing alternative j, if one were to define it, would either be one or 
zero depending on the relative profitability of alternative j (Train, 1993) subject to perceived 
opportunistic behavior of transacting partners captured in transaction cost related factors, firm 
specific factors and socioeconomic characteristics. Since the possible coordination 
mechanisms are more than two, the model can be estimated using multinomial logistic 
regression. The model parameters are estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation. The 
dependent variable need not be normally distributed under the maximum likelihood 
estimation since the estimates remain consistent.  
The empirical model for the study can thus be summarized as follows.  
28................................................................................................* ikkikiik WX εφβ ++=∏   
where *ik∏ are the latent net revenues from transaction i under each coordination mechanism j, 
iX is a vector of transaction cost characteristics, iW  are socioeconomic  and firm related 
attributes of the operators, βk and kφ are parameters to be estimated, and εik are iid. error 
terms.  
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The estimated coefficients give the role of transaction costs, farmer and trader socioeconomic 
characteristics and firm specific factors in selecting the coordination mechanism to guide 
transactions among buyers and sellers of milk.  
For a better interpretation of the outcomes, marginal effects are computed by differentiating 
the coefficients at their mean. The marginal effects of the attributes on the probability of 
observing the coordination mechanisms are therefore represented as: 
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5.4.2 Model justification 
The model adopted for analyzing coordination mechanisms in the fresh milk supply chains is 
determined by theoretical and practical data constraints. The determinants of coordination 
mechanisms employed are largely individual specific, individual here referring to the unit of 
analysis, the transaction, based on transaction cost economics and supply chain management 
frameworks. The alternatives may also not be fully independent of each other under the 
independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumptions. This implies that there is a 
possibility of employing more than one coordination mechanism by the decision makers at the 
same time, however, this should present no problem as each transaction is analyzed 
independently. The focus is not the individual decision maker rather the transactions that the 
individual undertakes. It is possible that some choice specific attributes also influence the type 
of coordination mechanism employed, implying that a nested logit model would be more 
appropriate. In carrying out the transactions, three types of coordination mechanisms are 
possible, spot market contracts, verbal contracts and written contracts. However, a fourth 
mechanism comprising of hybrids between any two of the coordination mechanisms is 
possible in the transactions. But for the purpose of analysis, whenever more than two 
coordination mechanisms are observed, the transaction is classified according to which 
coordination had the larger amount of milk transacted under it. Sampling results showed that 
less than 1% of the transactions consisted of hybrid coordination mechanism, a negligible 
number of transactions. The inability to get information on the coordination mechanisms not 
observed or not employed rules out the use of nested logit models or conditional logit models. 
Such information on unobserved alternatives is normally difficult to get from the decision 
makers (Boger, 2001a; Benham and Benham, 2000). The nested model does not also allow for 
varying of individual choice sets as it assumes the dependence of alternatives. For these 
reasons, nested and conditional logit model are not employed in this study. 
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A natural alternative to the nested logit model is the multivariate probit model (Greene, 2003; 
McFadden, 1984). However, this model would require two simultaneous equations of 
binomial choices. Such a model can be achieved by a multinomial logit model. The 
multinomial logit model measures the probability with which the individual will choose one 
of the three coordination alternatives for a particular transaction given a set of socioeconomic, 
firm specific factors and transaction cost characteristics. The multinomial logit model 
provides estimated coefficients of the variables of each alternative so that distinctive criteria 
typifying the alternatives can be obtained for each contractual form. The large number of 
coefficients associated with the number of choices is a desirable advantage due to detailed 
information on the single alternatives (Boger, 2001a).  
Since the MNL model assumes individual characteristics as independent variables and not 
choice specific attributes, this model specification is only feasible from the perspective of the 
transaction, not of the individual who carries out the transaction. In essence the interpretation 
of the results is not about the probability of an individual using a certain coordination 
mechanism, rather the probability of a transaction being carried out with one of the 
coordination mechanisms (Boger, 2001a). Three models are estimated for transactions 
between milk producers and their buyers, retail outlets and their milk suppliers and retail 
outlets and their milk buyers.  
5.5 Empirical specification of determinants of coordination mechanisms 
Three coordination types are identified, spot market contracts, verbal contracts and written 
contracts. The three coordination modes constitute a part of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1992) six 
part coordination continuum. Milgrom and Roberts define spot market contracts as a contract 
for exchange of goods and services at current prices without bothering with the identity of the 
parties. Verbal contracts are termed as relational bilateral contracts or implicit contracts and 
are basically non written and legally non enforceable. They are characterized by repeated 
transactions with the same agents. Formal or written contracts on the other hand are 
enforceable by law being sets of promises that define each party’s obligations. These three 
have been identified to be extensively used in milk supply chains in Kenya. It is hypothesized 
that the kind of coordination mechanism employed is determined by certain socioeconomic 
characteristics, certain firm or enterprise specific characteristics and various transaction cost 
components. Each mode of coordination is identified by the proportion of milk sold through 
it.  
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5.5.1 Household and individual characteristics 
According to Zaibet and Dunn (1998), certain household characteristics impinge on 
transaction costs. Zaibet and Dunn consider these household characteristics as endogenous or 
internal transaction costs. They indirectly impact on the level of transaction costs that a 
household faces.  Family size is shown to have influence on the level of transaction costs, 
such that larger or extended families are likely to be associated with higher transaction costs. 
However, other household related factors independent of family size play an important role in 
moderating or influencing the transaction costs. Such characteristics may include education 
level of farm/firm operators, their experience and gender.  
The gender of the operator affects the level of transaction costs. Females have been found to 
face more transaction costs compared to male operators or male headed households (Makhura 
et al, 2001; Udry, 1996; and Pingali et al, 2005). If we let the coordination mechanisms to 
vary on a continuum from less coordination (that is spot market contracts) on one end and 
more coordination (written contracts) on the other end with verbal contracts falling in 
between, it is hypothesized that female headed operations will employ more coordinated 
transactions compared to their male operated counterparts. Female operators are more likely 
to perceive higher transaction costs than male operators. Conversely, it is hypothesized that 
male headed operations are more likely to use spot market contracts than their female 
counterparts. 
Age of the operators also influence the level of transaction costs. Age has been used as a 
measure of experience especially for operations that have been continuing over time. Higher 
experience makes certain information and search costs easier or cheaper (Pingali et al, 2005). 
This implies that older farm or enterprise operators face lower transaction costs than younger 
operators. Over time, operators set up business relations based on trust and or reputation 
which becomes a valuable asset (social capital) in their activities. Older operators are 
therefore likely to be more involved in relational based transactions than spot market 
contracts. Conversely it is hypothesized that younger operators will employ more spot market 
contracts due to their low relational asset specificities or social capital. Lack of stable 
transacting partners implies that younger operators face more transaction costs in the market 
and this will be associated with the use of spot market contracts.  
There are, however, exceptions to using age as a measure of experience. A case in point is 
liberalization efforts in many developing countries in the last two decades that led to a 
breakdown of existing relations and institutions and setting up of new institutions and new 
agents entering the industry. In this case the link between age and experience may not be 
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obvious. For example at the retail and processing levels of the Kenyan milk supply chain, 
many traders and processing firms have come up after liberalization meaning that most of the 
participants are new in their enterprises. In this case experience measured by the number of 
years since the enterprise begun would be more appropriate to use. At the production level, 
the changes were not very drastic in terms of new entrants, except in the number and types of 
milk buyers. In general however, the higher the experience of the operator, the more likely it 
is that the operator will use relational based contracts rather than spot market contracts. Lower 
enterprise experience is likely to be associated with spot market contracts and to some extent 
written contracts. 
Another socioeconomic characteristic is the educational level of the operator (Boger, 2001a). 
Education increases the efficiency of searching for and processing information. Thus 
information costs are likely to be lower for more educated operators (Pingali, 2005; Makhura 
et al, 2001). The ability to evaluate more information about a transaction means that the 
problem of bounded rationality is lower for more educated operators. More educated 
operators are likely to be less averse to explicit contracts such as written contracts due to 
higher information access in the market. It is therefore hypothesized that higher education 
levels increase the likelihood that the transaction will carried out using written contracts. 
Higher education level is also likely to lead to more usage of spot market contracts due to 
better information search, and processing ability and, communication. Educational level and 
experience are inversely related in that more educated operators are likely to have operated 
their enterprises for shorter periods than less educated operators of the same age. 
5.5.2 Firm specific characteristics 
Besides socioeconomic characteristics, other important variables likely to be associated with 
the governance structures are firm specific factors. Such characteristics include firm sizes in 
terms of level of quantity of product handled or produced, type of enterprise, stage in the 
supply chain and location of enterprise. The quantity of milk handled by a firm can be used as 
an indicator of its size. Firm size has been measured in terms of land size for arable crops 
(Makhura et al, 2001; Boger, 2001a).  Larger firms are expected to employ more relational 
coordination mechanisms rather than spot market contracts. The reason could be the larger 
quantity of product handled requires more certainty in the market. Fresh milk shows high 
temporal asset specificity and transaction costs can easily rise when the operator is exposed to 
the spot markets. To avoid possible losses, operators opt for coordination mechanisms that 
ensure that their milk is sold as fast as possible. The likelihood of the price being bargained 
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down or the failure to secure a market for the milk rises when the quantity available for sell is 
large. Larger milk producers and traders are easily left exposed to opportunistic tendencies 
from other traders or buyers, especially from partners that have not made complementary 
investments. Large firms are as a consequence likely to adopt either written contracts to 
safeguard their investments or use spot market contracts to ensure fast sales in the absence of 
safeguards. 
Pingali et al (2005) point out that location specific factors are also associated with differential 
transaction costs. This means that firms located in one region are likely face higher or lower 
transaction costs than other firms located in a different region. The reason for this may be 
infrastructural or simply historical in nature. In this study, two regions were investigated: 
Nakuru district and Nyandarua districts. Nyandarua district suffers from poor road and 
communication infrastructure relative to Nakuru district despite being a high potential district. 
Historically, Nyandarua was formerly served by a good network of cooperatives and good 
processing facilities from the only milk processing firm in the country at the time (Kenya 
Cooperative Creameries) before liberalization of the industry most of which later collapsed 
and left the dairy industry disorganized as a consequent of liberalization. In this transition 
period, households and individuals in Nyandarua district face more transaction costs as they 
try to realign their transactions and institutions. Lack of suitable institutions in Nyandarua 
implies that spot market contracts are likely to persist relative to Nakuru district.  
The length of the supply chain can be captured by the number of distinct stages the milk goes 
through before it finally reaches the consumer. Farmers can sell milk directly to consumers, to 
traders, to farmer cooperative organizations or directly to the processing firms. Direct sales to 
consumers constitute short supply chains (part of the warm chain) while sales to processing 
firms constitute long supply chains (cold chain). Iyengar (2005) finds that the length of the 
supply chain is inversely related to the level of transaction costs faced. Thus short supply 
chains are a reflection of the prevalence of high levels of transaction costs and the converse is 
true for long supply chains. Short supply chains are expected to use spot market contracts and 
verbal contracts, while long supply chains are expected to use both spot market contracts and 
written contracts. However, exceptions are likely to arise in the presence of social capital 
among the transacting partners.  
5.5.3 Transaction cost specific characteristics 
Besides the above socioeconomic and firm specific factors, transaction cost characteristics are 
also hypothesized to affect the type of coordination mechanisms employed by agents in the 
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milk supply chains. Based on Hobbs’ (1997) classification of transaction costs into 
information and search costs, negotiation and monitoring costs, the hypothesized relationships 
are discussed below. The classification can also be seen in the light of ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs. Ex- ante transaction costs are those that are observed or determined before a 
transaction takes place and are generally represented by information and market search costs. 
On the other hand, ex post transaction costs are those that are observed after a particular 
transaction has been carried out and are represented by monitoring costs. Negotiation costs 
occur when the transaction is actually being carried out. Transaction cost characteristics 
constitute one category of the independent variables in the study. The three components of 
transaction costs are further discussed below. 
Information and market search costs 
One of the factors influencing transaction costs is uncertainty in the markets. High levels of 
uncertainties are likely to lead to high transaction costs. Uncertainties arise from imperfect 
market information on prices of outputs and inputs. Information costs include the time spent 
discovering information on price, potential partners and the resources used to acquire this 
information (Coase, 1937: Williamson, 1985; Gabre-madhini, 2001). Being located in remote 
areas or far away from markets will require more efforts at discovering market prices and 
customers. More resources in terms of money and time are required to search for such 
information and markets in distant markets compared to nearby markets. Transaction costs are 
therefore likely to increase with the remoteness of an operator from markets. It may also be 
difficult to establish closer relations among the transacting parties due to low knowledge 
about potential transacting partners. Consequently it is hypothesized that explicit contracts 
will prevail with longer distances between the sellers and the buyers. It is also hypothesized 
that the transactions are also likely to remain at arms length (spot market contracts) for those 
not able to initiate explicit contracts. 
Related to distance, is the average time required to travel between the seller and the buyer 
(Vakis et al, 2003; Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2005). Travel time is determined by the 
condition (quality) of the available road infrastructure besides plain distances between sellers 
and buyers. It also depends on the means of transport used for traveling and transporting the 
milk products, which is a function of the parties’ asset endowments and scale of operation. 
When the road infrastructure is good for all transacting parties, the effect of distance is likely 
to be minimal. On the other hand, shorter distances with poor road infrastructure may have 
bigger influence on marketing decisions of the agents concerned. In such a case, the time 
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required to travel between the sellers and the buyers is a better measure of the difficult of 
accessing the market compared to plain distance measures. It is therefore expected that the 
time required to reach buyers or sellers will be directly associated with transaction costs. 
Consequently spot market contracts and written contracts are likely to prevail with increases 
in the time needed to reach the markets. Shorter travel times to market favor use of verbal 
contracts. 
In addition to the above items, transport costs (Hobbs 1997; Omamo, 1998) are used to 
capture some of the bargaining costs in the market. Transport costs depend on the distance 
and or the means of transport. The means of transport commonly used by the parties to 
transport milk products are on foot, by animal drawn carts, by bicycle or motor vehicle. The 
costs of transporting milk on foot, bicycle, or on carts are difficult to discern or quantify and 
may not be proportional to distances between the sellers and buyers. Milk transactions are 
also not wholly carried out at one market point or outlet. Estimates of transport costs to such 
market points are likely to be very unreliable, especially when in combination with the diverse 
means of transportation used. Difficulties in transportation are therefore better described by 
distances between the partners and time taken to reach the partners. 
Market search costs are also measured by the time taken to sell the milk products in 
possession of the agents concerned. Vakis et al (2003) and Hobbs (1997) have used various 
measures to capture the time required to sell agricultural products in the market. For the case 
of milk, this refers to how long it takes the seller on average to sell the milk products before 
they expire or get spoiled. In the presence of difficulties to sell the milk, sellers will spend 
more effort, time and money searching for alternative buyers which increases transaction 
costs. Relational coordination mechanisms are more likely to be used to reduce this problem. 
Higher costs will be incurred when it takes longer to close the sales. Longer times to sell milk 
will be associated with spot market contracts and to some extent written contracts.  Low times 
to sell the milk will be associated with verbal contracts. The type of coordination mechanism 
used will be however moderated by the distances between the transacting agents and social 
capital considerations.  
The ease with which a buyer can be found and a price agreed on in advance has also been 
used to estimate information and search costs in the market (Vakis et al, 2003; Hobbs, 1997). 
Knowledge of prices in advance of a transaction reduces search costs. Uncertainties in prices 
cause sellers and buyers to exert more efforts and time to get the price information. This may 
discourage some parties from the market. Ability to determine price information in advance of 
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the transactions increases the likelihood of using verbal and written contracts in the 
transactions. Inability to determine market prices in advance is likely to be associated with 
usage of spot market contracts.  
Related to information search is the importance of various sources of market information to 
the transaction parties. The source of price information provides an indicator on the ease of 
information flow and exchange between the transacting parties. Price information sources 
could be public such as by state organs, mass media or private such as from other transacting 
parties (traders or producers). Public information sources are likely to favor use of spot 
market contracts. On the other hand private sources of price information are likely to favor 
use of relational based coordination mechanisms. This is because public price information 
improves the market for all participants and reduces opportunistic tendencies and the problem 
of private information.   
Measures of bargaining/negotiation costs 
These are costs that arise while transactions are actually taking place. The costs depend on the 
ease and time taken to reach an agreement between and among those engaged in the 
negotiating activity. Boger (2001a) uses price to distinguish between contractual 
arrangements. The average price received or paid is expected to be inversely proportional to 
the transaction costs involved. For sellers, transaction costs will be reflected in lower prices 
which they receive due to high transaction costs (Key et al, 2000). For buyers, it will be 
reflected in the higher prices which they pay for the products. Thus the effect of transaction 
costs is to squeeze margins for all transacting parties. Higher bargaining costs will lead to 
lower prices received. For the sellers, high prices are likely to be associated with spot or 
verbal contracts while lower prices are likely to be associated with written contracts reflecting 
the presence or absence of transaction safeguards. For the buyers, high prices are associated 
with verbal and written contracts and lower prices will be associated with spot market 
contracts. 
Related to prices received or paid is the coefficient of variation of prices (Vakis et al, 2003). 
Price variation captures the difference between the highest and lowest prices for the product 
over the latest year or the ending 12 month period. Higher variations in the prices are 
therefore a reflection of the seasonal nature of production as well as transaction costs inherent 
in the transactions. It is hypothesized that higher price variations are associated with the use 
of spot market contracts. Low variations in milk prices on the other hand are be associated 
with verbal and written contracts. However, this variable was not used in this study. 
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The number of buyers in the market provides an indication of market access and consequently 
the ease of getting buyers for the milk products. The presence of a large number of buyers 
reduces the costs of negotiating in the market. Producers are usually large in number while 
buyers (not consumers) are usually fewer and larger. The probability of conducting 
transactions using spot market contracts increases with increases in the number of buyers. 
Higher buyer availability will therefore be associated with verbal and written contracts with 
difficulties in finding buyers being associated with spot market contracts. 
 Monitoring and enforcement costs (ex post costs) 
Monitoring may be necessary once the transaction or contract has been entered into to ensure 
compliance by all or both parties to the transaction.  Monitoring costs arise because of 
problems of information asymmetry that result in moral hazards and opportunistic tendencies 
among transacting parties. The efforts put in to ensure compliance with the terms of the 
transaction depend on the perception of the likelihood of opportunistic tendencies. Various 
measures have been used to represent monitoring costs. Hobbs (1997) uses quality uncertainty 
and shrinkage losses to represent monitoring costs. Vakis et al (2003) use trust levels in the 
buyers, time to get paid and extent of the importance of signed agreements among the 
transacting parties.  
The time taken to get paid is reflected in the credit transactions. For cash sales, monitoring 
costs will be negligible. For credit sales however, associated default risks emerge leading to 
monitoring efforts designed to check likely defaults in payments. The duration of credit 
period can vary from zero (for spot cash payments) to over 30 days. It is thus hypothesized 
that since longer credit periods require more monitoring to ensure compliance, relational 
based coordination mechanisms are necessary to provide the required safeguards. These are 
governance structures that are likely to minimize the possible monitoring costs that may arise 
from the credit transactions.  
The presence or absence of signed agreements (legal contracts) also indicates the extent to 
which monitoring costs influence the transacting parties. Higher importance is likely to be 
attached to signed agreements when transactions are carried out under relational based 
coordination mechanism as opposed to spot market contracts. Furthermore, higher levels of 
trust, reputation or reliability among transacting partners are likely to be associated with 
relational based coordination mechanism rather than spot market contracts. The relations 
above are summarized in the diagram 5.2 below. 
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Figure 5.2: The conceptual model 
Source: Own conceptualization, 2006 
5.6 Determinants of supply chain performance 
5.6.1 Supply chain performance measurement 
The next issue the study addresses is the relationship between socioeconomic characteristics, 
firm specific factors, transaction cost factors, coordination mechanisms, and performance in 
the Kenyan fresh milk supply chains. Most studies on performance have focused on single 
firms/households emphasizing internal efficiency over external effectiveness. There is a 
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limited availability of multi firm performance measures and in addition performance has not 
been linked directly to transaction costs in the studies undertaken. Industry structure has been 
the main focus in performance related studies; however the changes that have been taking 
place in the economies call for a review of the structural paradigm, especially in developing 
countries. Competition is changing from single firm competition to chain competition. This 
study therefore takes a holistic approach to the supply chain by investigating the determinants 
of supply chain performance in Kenya.  
Performance in agricultural markets has frequently been evaluated based on the industrial 
organization model, the S-C-P model (Scherer, 1970; Shepherd, 1979; and Debrah and 
Anteneh, 1991). The model examines the causal relationships between market structure, 
conduct and performance, and is usually referred to as the S-C-P (structure, conduct, 
performance) model. However, empirical applications of the model in the presence of 
imperfect markets show some deficiencies, especially for developing markets whose markets 
are far from imperfect or are missing. Kriesberg (1986) in Jabbar et al (1997) proposes a more 
appropriate model for the less developed countries as an alternative to the S-C-P model. 
Kriesberg’s model differentiates between marketing efficiency and marketing effectiveness as 
performance measures. Marketing efficiency is related to the amount or cost of inputs 
required to obtain a given level of output, and is measured by input to output or, cost to 
benefit ratios. For instance, a change which reduces input costs without reducing consumer 
services or satisfaction would be considered as raising efficiency. Marketing effectiveness is 
viewed in terms of the objectives set for the marketing system (for example, higher net prices 
to producers or movements of larger quantities of goods at reasonable cost to urban 
producers). It is thus measured in terms of objectives and depends on comparisons between 
alternative supply chains or channels, enterprises, or even countries with similar 
developmental conditions. Marketing efficiency and effectiveness have essentially the same 
meaning if the objectives sought are the same. Market performance is then evaluated by how 
well the process of marketing is carried out and how successfully its aims are accomplished 
(Jabbar et al, 1997).  
Further attempts at evaluating performance while recognizing the importance of transaction 
relationships (both vertical and horizontal market relations) among categories of firms within 
the marketing system have been made by French (1977) cited in Jabbar et al, 1997) and, 
Scarborough and Kydd, (1992). This extended approach is known as the 'food or commodity 
system framework' (Schaffer, 1973 and 1980 in Jabbar et al, 1997) and is similar to French’s 
concept of "filiére", which means a commodity production and marketing chain. Furthermore, 
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this approach recognizes the importance of joint products and services, and the existence of 
marketing firms and channels that handle a number of commodities or services using the same 
facilities.  
An alternative theory to the above is based on market organization incorporating transaction 
cost and information theories. In these theories, markets, firms, relational contracts, vertical 
integration, groups and associations are regarded as different forms of organization ruling 
transactions implying that market is just one form of organization in the process of 
transaction. Non-price relationships in transactions are given particular importance in these 
theories. There are few empirical applications of these theories in the less developed 
countries, particularly in the area of food marketing. Moustier (1996) in Jabbar et al (1997) 
gives a good review of the conceptual differences among the strands of organization theory, 
and applies the theory to a study of vegetable market organization in Brazzaville.  
Theoretical developments in transaction cost economics are based on the premise that many 
factors that affect the operations of the agents in the market are hardly completely measurable 
but are important enough to determine whether a transaction succeeds in the market or not in 
the market.  Therefore other criteria apart from quantitative measures have to be included in 
the assessment of the performance of transactions in the market.   
The primary interest in evaluating performance in agricultural markets is to assess the impacts 
of marketing inefficiencies on consumer and producer prices, on levels of production and 
consumption by all agents in the supply chain. Thus evaluating performance in supply chains 
goes beyond the price effects to address the relationships among the transacting agents (Whan 
and Suh, 2004; Mentzer et al, 2001; Hobbs, 1996). The concept of supply chain management 
and the role of transaction costs in determining performance in the supply chains are yet to be 
well addressed for developing markets. Furthermore an appreciation of the fact that 
performance of individual agents is tied to the performance of the entire system of agents in 
the supply chain has yet to be fully evaluated for agricultural supply chains in these countries. 
Another challenge is provided by the available measures of performance which show that 
there is a limited availability of multi firm performance measures and, in addition 
performance has not been linked directly to transaction costs in many of the works. This study 
attempts to fill this gap for developing markets. 
The study adopts various measures of supply chain performance that have been used in 
previous studies and computes a score on the measures to represent the level of performance 
attained in the supply chain transactions. Venkatraman and Ramanujan (1987) make use of 
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subjective performance measures as proxies for measuring performance in supply chains and 
notes that the subjective measures give results similar to their quantitative counterparts. Their 
findings are particularly useful since standardized performance measures and especially at the 
chain level are not yet available. In this case, composite measures of performance 
incorporating measures subjectively derived from the respondents as well as financial 
measures where available are used. Supply chain performance in this study was measured by 
the extent to which the agents were satisfied with various aspects of their transactions with 
their partners Performance was therefore represented by five key measures of performance 
that included satisfaction with prices offered, quantities of milk handled, information and 
communications, quality of milk, and the agents’ reputation and trustworthiness.  
The study hypothesizes that performance in the supply chains is influenced by transaction cost 
characteristics, coordination mechanisms, the socioeconomic characteristics and firm specific 
factors. Thus in addition to the factors influencing coordination mechanisms discussed in 
section 5.5 above, the level of performance attained in the supply chains is also influenced by 
the type of coordination mechanisms employed. The type of coordination mechanisms used 
provides an indicator of whether the relationship between the transacting parties is close or at 
arms length. Verbal and to some extent written contracts represent closer transaction relations 
than spot market contracts. Verbal and written contracts are therefore an attempt at 
relationship building in the supply chains. Relationships in the supply chain are manifested 
through long term ties and size and number of transacting partners.  Low levels of transaction 
costs are expected in relational based coordination mechanisms, which are consequently 
expected to show higher performance levels compared to spot market contracts.    
5.6.2 A theoretical model for determinants of supply chain performance 
This section focuses on developing a theoretical model for the determinants of supply chain 
performance in the fresh milk supply chains. Performance relations are investigated in 
transactions between milk producers and their buyers and milk traders and their customers. 
Trader transactions constitute upstream transaction activities with their milk suppliers and 
downstream transactions with their milk buyers. The two types of upstream and downstream 
trader transactions are analyzed separately.  
In carrying out their transactions, market participating milk producers and traders make 
decisions regarding who to sell their milk to and what volumes of milk to sell to them. The 
decision regarding the transaction partners and quantities of milk to transact with them 
depends on the satisfaction or performance they expect to derive from the transactions, which 
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is equivalent to maximization of their expected utility. The agents therefore strive to 
maximize an objective function, in this case, maximization of expected utility. The agents are 
assumed to be risk neutral and therefore prefer higher performance levels to lower 
performance levels. The expected utility can be expressed in form of net revenues derived 
from the transactions by allocating quantities of milk to the available transaction partners. 
High satisfaction results when the objective function is realized or closely mirrors the actual 
results. On the other hand, low satisfaction results when the objective function is not 
achieved. The attainment of the objective function can be calibrated on a continuous scale that 
captures the extent to which the agents have been able to achieve their objectives.  
 The net revenues attained by the agents is however constrained by various factors that 
include socioeconomic characteristics, firm specific factors, transaction costs faced as well as 
coordination mechanisms used. The agents also face certain production constraints in 
transforming their products in readiness for the market, which can be represented by the 
inputs they use for farmers and purchase of milk for resale in the case of traders. Assuming 
the traders and milk producers are risk neutral and therefore maximize expected profits, the 
objective function in light of the constraints can be expressed as:  
30...........................................................................................].........'),([ CICZPQEMaxt −=  
where E is the expectation operator given the constraints facing the milk producers and 
traders in the market, P is the output price, Q is the output expected to be transacted in the 
market, C is a column of vector production inputs, I is a column vector of input prices(cost of 
purchased milk), and Z is a vector of the agents’ socioeconomic characteristics, location, firm 
specific attributes, coordination mechanisms, and transaction cost characteristics. The net 
revenues pi  attained by the agents can be expressed as a function of the constraints facing the 
agents as follows: 
31..............................................................................................................).........,,,( IZPpipi =  
implying that the net revenues attained are a function of the output and input prices as well as 
socioeconomic characteristics, firm specific factors, transaction cost characteristics and 
coordination mechanisms used. The relationship between the net returns and the constraining 
factors can be expressed in stacked form as:  
32........................................................................................................................,ey +Χ= β  
with y representing the objective function (net revenue), X representing the constraining 
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factors, ß representing the coefficients for the determinants of performance and e expressing 
the effect of unobservable factors.   
However, since the net profits attained cannot be observed, they can be considered as a latent 
function of the explanatory factors. What is observed is an ordinal measure of the level of 
performance attained by the agents, which is assumed to be a continuous function of the 
factors determining it. Let the observed performance level be represented by y*.  y* is an 
ordinal measure of the satisfaction level derived from the transaction. Let the y* indicate the 
disposition to the state of affairs of the agent’s transaction with his partners such that the 
higher the value of y*, the more favorably disposed the agent is to the transaction. 
We assume that y* is fully known to the parties transacting themselves and independent 
among the transactions entered into and that y* is a linear combination of the observed and 
unobserved characteristics determining it, so that 
33.......................................................................................................................,* ey +Χ= β     
where y* is an ordinal measure depicting the level of performance in the transaction, X is the 
vector of the observed factors influencing the level of performance (socioeconomic, firm 
specific, transaction cost and coordination mechanism used), and e reflects the net influence 
of unobserved factors on y*, and ß is the vector of the coefficients. 
5.6.3 An Ordered Probit model for determinants of supply chain performance 
Unlike coordination mechanisms that are considered to be discrete in nature, evaluating 
performance involves ordered responses. The study seeks to evaluate the determinants of 
supply chain performance and the extent to which these determinants impact of the 
performance level achieved by the parties in the milk supply chain transactions. To capture 
the ordinal nature of the responses, an ordered probit model is used to analyze the data for the 
transactions between milk producers and their buyers, between traders and their suppliers and 
between the traders and their downstream customers. Probit models use the inverse of the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function and assume the categorical dependent 
reflects an underlying quantitative variable. Unlike the multinomial logit models which ignore 
ordering of the responses, ordered probit models make use of the extra information contained 
in the ordering of the responses. The ordered probit model can be derived as follows: 
Let y be the ordered response taking the values 0,1,2. The ordered probit is derived from a 
latent variable, y*, such that  
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Let α be the unknown cut off points such that 21 αα < , and define  
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The response variables vary as follows: 0 for low performance, 1 for moderate performance 
and, to 2 for high performance. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed, 
therefore the probability of observing a performance level for a transaction given X is 
represented as follows:  
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where Ф (.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and βΧ  is the probit 
score or index.    
Thus the distribution gives the probability that in transaction n the performance or likelihood 
of being satisfied with the transaction is high or low.  
The model collapses to a binary probit model when J =1 such that  
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The parameters of the probit model can be estimated by the maximum likelihood methods. 
The log likelihood function for the model becomes 
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The probit model can thus be expressed in brief as  
Pr(y=1|x) = Φ(xb)……………………………………………………………………….....39 
The model is amenable to analysis with LIMDEP™ statistical software. 
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CHAPTER 6  
DATA DESCRIPTION 
The chapter discusses the operationalization of the determinants of coordination mechanisms 
and supply chain performance in the fresh milk supply chains in Kenya and their sampling 
results. The chapter draws on empirical studies on Transaction Cost Economics and Supply 
Chain Management theories to operationalize the relationships among transaction costs, 
operator socioeconomic characteristics, firm specific factors, and coordination mechanisms 
and supply chain performance. The study focuses on the fresh milk supply chain transactions 
in Kenya. The unit of analysis is the transaction between milk sellers and buyers. The supply 
chain is analyzed at three levels: transactions between milk producers and their buyers, 
transactions between milk retailers and their milk suppliers, and transactions between milk 
retailers and their downstream customers. At the producer stage of the supply chain, milk 
buyers include direct consumers, traders and processing firms. Sources of milk supplies for 
the retail outlets include direct farm supplies and supplies from other milk traders. On the 
other hand, customers of the retailers include direct consumers or users and milk processing 
firms. In all these transactions, the modes of coordination were spot market contracts, verbal 
contracts and written contracts.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents the survey strategy that involves a 
characterization of the survey area, sampling and data collection techniques and data 
definitions. Section 6.2 presents a characterization of the types of transactions in the milk 
supply chains. Section 6.3 presents a characterization of the coordination mechanisms used in 
the milk transactions. Sections 6.4 to 6.6 presents a description of the factors influencing both 
coordination mechanisms and performance in the milk supply chains. Finally section 6.7 
presents sample results for the dependent variable in supply chain performance.    
6.1 Survey strategy  
6.1.1 Characteristics of the study area  
The study covered Nyandarua and Nakuru districts of Kenya. Nyandarua district is in Central 
Province while Nakuru district is in the Rift Valley Province but the two districts share 
common borders with each other. There are differences in the two districts: Nakuru district 
has population of about 1.5 million while Nyandarua district has about 0.5 million people. 
Nakuru district has several urban areas and towns, which serve as captive markets for the milk 
produced, but the biggest captive market is Nakuru town with about 300,000 people. Nakuru 
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town also receives milk from the northern parts of Nyandarua district. Nyandarua district is 
mainly a rural district with very few urban areas and situated about 75 kilometers from 
Nairobi city. Nairobi city with a population of about 3 million is a major market for the milk 
produced in the two districts especially for processed milk.   
Nyandarua is the leading milk producing district in the country, while Nakuru is considered 
the third largest milk producer in the country. The two districts are characterized by some of 
the highest concentration of dairying activities in the country ranging from production to 
processing and to consumption. The dairying (feeding) system in Nakuru district is 
characterized as semi intensive while that of Nyandarua district is characterized as extensive 
system. The two districts thus constitute a fair representation of the dairy industry in the 
country.  
For sampling purposes, the districts were further divided according to administrative 
divisions. Nakuru district has a total of 13 divisions while Nyandarua has six divisions. Four 
divisions were selected from Nakuru district and two from Nyandarua district for inclusion in 
the study. The divisions were selected based on their unique characteristics, which included 
their geographical location, milk production levels and diversity of dairy activities. The 
divisions selected were Nakuru Municipality, Bahati, Rongai and Molo divisions from 
Nakuru district and North Kinangop and South Kinangop from Nyandarua district. 
Nakuru Municipality was selected for its location that includes Nakuru town (population of 
about 300,000 people) and has diverse dairying activities ranging from production, trading, 
processing to consumption. Bahati division on the other hand is the leading milk producing 
division in Nakuru district and has mostly small scale level milk enterprises and serves 
Nakuru town and its environs. Rongai division is characterized by a mixture of large scale and 
small scale milk production activities and also serves Nakuru town and a number of 
processing firms elsewhere in the country. Molo division is situated farthest away from 
Nakuru town and mostly comprises of Molo Township. Molo is generally a small scale 
production area. It also receives milk from neighboring catchment divisions of Kamara, 
Kuresoi and Elburgon.  
Parts of Nyandarua district, especially the northern divisions have similar characteristics to 
those of Bahati division of Nakuru district and were therefore not included in the study. South 
Kinangop serves Nairobi city and other milk processors in the central Kenya region, and is 
characterized by small scale milk production. North Kinangop on the other hand is situated 
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more than 100 km from Nairobi and is characterized as a large scale milk production area. 
The two divisions are major producers of milk in Nyandarua district.  
6.1.2 Sampling techniques 
The population of interest constitutes commercial (market participating) dairy farmers and 
intermediaries in the fresh milk supply chain in Nakuru district in Rift Valley Province and 
Nyandarua district in Central Province of Kenya. The intermediaries include fresh milk retail 
outlets (shops, milk bars, kiosks, mobile/itinerant traders, brokers and, mini dairies) and 
farmer cooperative organizations (cooperative societies and farmer groups). Cross sectional 
data was collected on the participants’ transactions at each of the supply chain levels 
(production and retailing).  
A listing of retail outlets was compiled from the local authority list of licensed retail outlets 
and supplemented by on site visits at the market centers and along the major roads where they 
were located. On site visits were necessary as some of the retail outlets were no longer in 
operation. A listing of the dairy producers was not in existence therefore transects were 
utilized to access and sample the milk producers.  
After selecting the divisions of interest, smaller administrative units (sub-locations) were 
randomly selected for inclusion in the study. At the producer level, a random sample of the 
milk producers was achieved by means of transects sampling. Transects sampling was the 
most optimal way of selecting milk producers as no sampling frame for milk producers was in 
existence at the time of the study for both districts. The sampling was based on certain 
landmarks or geographical features in the areas of interest. The starting point on the transect 
line was randomly selected to reduce bias in sampling. All cooperative societies and farmer 
groups were included in the study as their number was not large. However, stratified sampling 
was used to select the traders for inclusion in the study. Traders and other intermediaries were 
normally located in urban areas or market centers or at major road intersections. For the 
mobile traders, simple random sampling was applied as the traders operated and traveled in 
groups.  
6.1.3 Data gathering methods 
Data gathering was carried out by means of personally administered questionnaires. The 
surveys were designed to collect data from the three different transaction types in the fresh 
milk supply chain: transactions between milk producers and their buyers, transactions 
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between the milk traders and their suppliers, and transactions between the traders and their 
buyers. The questionnaire was prepared using information derived from measurements 
previously used by other researchers, the respondents’ recollection and their perceptions of 
their transaction relationships. The main source of data was primary surveys where data was 
collected on the coordination mechanisms employed, transaction costs characteristics, 
socioeconomic characteristics of the operators and firm specific factors in the chains and, 
extent of satisfaction with partner transactions. Constructs used to measure perceptions and 
attitudes employed likert type scales. The surveys were supplemented by general background 
information on the structure and operations of the dairy industry. The questions were adjusted 
to reflect each stage of the supply chain. Before collecting data, a pre-test was carried out to 
assess the appropriateness of the data collection instruments in order to increase the reliability 
and validity of the instruments. A pilot study was further carried out using the refined 
instruments on actual respondents leading to further refinement of the instrument and 
constructs. Both pre test and pilot surveys were intended to pinpoint any feasibility problems 
and, the suitability and relevancy of the instrument for the study’s objective. Necessary 
adjustments were thereafter made on the instrument which was subsequently applied to the 
commercial milk producers and milk traders. 
6.1.4 Data and variable definitions 
The definition of key variables is based on transaction cost economics predictions and supply 
chain management theory. Use is made of proxy measures that represent the theoretical 
measures. Several indicators of the theoretical measures have been used to capture the 
different aspects of a theoretical measure. This is intended to minimize measurement errors.  
The depended variables 
The first dependent variable was coordination mechanisms used in the milk transactions. The 
coordination mechanisms were measured by the proportion of milk transacted under each 
coordination mode. Three coordination mechanisms were identified and included spot market 
contracts, verbal contracts and the written contracts. The dependent variable for the second 
model was supply chain performance and was measured by the extent to which the transaction 
partners were satisfied with key aspects of their transactions. The key aspects included 
satisfaction with quantities of milk handled, prices of milk, information flows and 
communications, quality of milk, and reputation and trustworthiness of the partners. The 
measures were represented by 3 point likert scales measuring the extent to which partners 
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were satisfied with each others’ transactions across key supply chain performance aspects. A 
score was then computed to represent the overall performance levels in the transactions. 
Explanatory variables 
Explanatory variables consisted of information on the following aspects: data on 
socioeconomic characteristics of the farm and retail outlet operators such as gender, education 
level, experience and age of the operators. Data was also collected on enterprise specific 
factors such as firm size (in terms of quantity of milk produced), type of customers, and 
location of enterprise (in Nakuru or Nyandarua district including the divisions), type of retail 
outlets, and type of grazing systems for the milk producers. A third aspect on which data was 
collected was transaction cost characteristics, represented by information and market search 
costs, negotiation costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs.  Finally information was 
collected on performance evaluations of the supply chain partners. The questionnaire was not 
structured along these aspects of information but according to the natural flow and ease of 
answering the questions by the respondents.   
Table 6.1 below summarizes the constructs and their expected influences for determinants of 
coordination mechanisms. A positive sign indicates a high probability for the particular 
coordination mechanism when a high value of the independent variable is given. A negative 
sign indicates a high probability for the use of the given alternative coordination mechanism 
is expected for a low value of the independent variable. Question marks indicate weak or 
unclear impacts of the independent variable on the possibility of the alternatives arising in the 
two dependent variables. A multinomial logit model (MNL) was used to estimate the 
parameters and their effects on coordination mechanism. 
Table 6.2 below summarizes the constructs for the determinants of supply chain performance 
for the Kenyan fresh milk supply chains. A positive sign indicates a high probability of higher 
performance for a high value of the independent variable. An ordered probit model was 
applied to analyze the supply chain performance relationships. Both models were amenable to 
analysis by LIMDEP™ econometric software. However, descriptive analyses were carried out 
in SPSS™ statistical software.  
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 Table 6.1: Summary of constructs for determinants of coordination mechanisms  
 Construct  Construct description *spot *verb *writ 
1 Gender Sex of operator (1- male, 2-female) - + + 
2 Education Number of schooling years  + - + 
3 Experience Enterprise experience in years - + + 
Firm specific characteristics    
4 Firm/farm size  Size of operation in liters of milk handled per day + - + 
5 Enterprise type Type of operation or form of business (traders) ? ? ? 
6 Location  Location of the enterprise (1- Nakuru district,  2-  
Nyandarua district) 
+ - - 
7 Chain Type/length of supply chain (direct or indirect 1/2)  +- - + 
Transaction cost characteristics    
Measures of information and search costs    
8 Distance Distance between milk seller and buyer or nearest 
outlet/collection points in km 
+- - + 
9 Time  Time to travel between milk seller and buyer or  
nearest outlets/collection points in hours 
+ - + 
10 Sell time Average time required to sell the milk in hours - + + 
11 Relations  Importance of personal relations in transactions (1-3) - + + 
12 Price knowledge Extent of knowledge of  milk price in advance (1-3) - + + 
13 Price information 
from traders 
Importance of price information from partners (1-3) - + + 
14 Price information 
from government 
Importance of price information from government or 
state (1-3) 
+ - - 
Measures of negotiation costs    
15 Current Prices Amount received or paid for a liter of milk in Kshs** -+ -+ -+ 
16 Lack of buyers Extent of problem of lack of buyers (1-3)  - + + 
Measures of monitoring costs    
17 Credit time Length of credit period, in days - + + 
18 Legal contracts Extent of importance of legal contracts in transactions 
( 1-3) 
- + + 
The coordination mechanisms     
*18 Coordination Type of coordination mechanism employed ( 0-Spot, 
1-verbal and, 2- written)  
   
**Kshs = Kenya shillings. 1 Kshs = 100 cents 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 107
Table 6.2: Summary of constructs for determinants of supply chain performance  
 Construct  Construct description Effect 
1 Gender Male or female head (household or firm) (1- male, 2-female) ? 
2 Education Number of schooling years  + 
3 Age Age of operator in years + 
4 Experience Enterprise experience in years + 
Firm specific characteristics  
5 Firm/farm size  Size of operation in liters of milk handled per day + 
6 Location Location of the enterprise (1-Nakuru, 2-  Nyandarua) ? 
7 Chain Type/length of supply chain (direct/indirect 1-2) ? 
Transaction cost characteristics  
Measures of information and search costs  
8 Distance Distance between milk seller and buyer or nearest outlets in km + 
9 Sell time Average time required to sell the milk in hours - 
10 Trader info Importance of price information from partners (1-3) + 
11 Neighbor info Importance of (public) price information from government or state (1-3) + 
Measures of negotiation costs  
12 Prices offered Amount received or paid for a liter of milk in Kshs** + 
13 Lack of buyers Extent of problem of lack of buyers/suppliers (1-3) - 
14 Reliable partners  Extent of partner reliability (1-3) - 
Measures of monitoring costs  
15 Credit time Length of credit period, in days + 
16 Pay delay Extent to which lack of payments is problem (1- 3) - 
17 Milk adulteration Extent to which adulteration of milk is problem (1- 3)  - 
Type of  Coordination employed  
18 Coordination Type of coordination mechanism ( 0-Spot, 1-verbal and, 2- written) + 
Dependent variable: Measures for supply chain performance   
Y1 Supplies  Extent of satisfaction with quantities of milk (1- 3)  
Y2 Prices  Extent of satisfaction with prices offered (1- 3)   
Y3 Quality  Extent of satisfaction with quality of milk (1- 3)  
Y4 Information Extent of satisfaction with information flows and communications (1- 3)  
Y5 Reputation/trust Extent of satisfaction with partner reputation and trust (1- 3)   
**Kshs = Kenya shillings. 1 Kshs = 100 cents 
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6.2 Sample characteristics and descriptive analysis of the responses:  
distribution of the transactions  
The unit of analysis in the study is the transaction. The transactions were between the milk 
producers and their respective customers/buyers and between the milk retail outlets and their 
respective milk suppliers and buyers. 
Producer-buyer transactions 
In total, 340 usable milk producer transactions were realized from the survey. About 70.59% 
of the milk transactions were from Nakuru district while 29.41% were from Nyandarua 
district. There were also 256 retailer-supplier transactions and 278 retailer-buyer transactions. 
Table 6.3 below summarizes the distribution of the transactions by district and division.  
Table 6.3: Sample distribution for milk producer transactions by district and division  
  Producers-Buyer* 
transactions 
Retailer-Supplier** 
transactions 
Retailer-Buyer*** 
transactions 
  Number of 
Cases 
Percent 
(%) 
Number  of 
cases 
Percent  
% 
No  of 
cases 
Percent 
%  
Nakuru 
District 
Nakuru 
Municipality 
56 16.47 40 15.63 51 18.35 
  Bahati 73 21.47 66 25.78 61 21.94 
  Rongai 67 19.71 33 12.89 37 13.31 
  Molo 44 12.94 36 14.06 40 14.39 
 Sub-total 240 70.59 175 68.36 189 67.99 
 Nyandarua 
District  
South 
Kinangop 
57 16.76 55 21.48 61 21.94 
  North 
Kinangop 
43 12.65 26 10.16  28 10.07 
 Sub-total 100 29.41 81 31.64 89 32.01 
  Total 340 100 256 100 278 100 
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
*includes direct consumers, traders, farmer cooperative organizations and processing firms 
** includes direct farm suppliers and milk supplies from other traders 
*** includes direct consumers and sales to processing firms 
Table 6.4 below shows that about 32% of the transactions were carried out with direct 
consumers. Milk bars, hotels and restaurants constituted about 17.4% of producer 
transactions. The next supply chain constituted sales of milk directly to milk processing firms, 
or to cooperative organizations and brokers who further transferred the milk to processing 
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firms and constituted 30% of the producer transactions. The final supply chain consisted of 
mobile traders who took up 20.3% of the producer’s transactions. Mobile traders resell the 
milk to various users like consumers and milk bars and kiosks and trade on their own account.  
Table 6.4: Producer-buyer chains in the milk industry 
Supply chain component Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Producer - direct consumer chain 110 32.4 32.4 
 Producer- milk bar/hotel chain 59 17.3 49.7 
producer –processor chain  102 30.0 79.7 
 Producer - mobile traders chain 69 20.3 100.0 
Total 340 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Retailer-supplier transactions 
Retail outlets got their milk from two main sources: direct farm suppliers and from other 
traders. Direct farm supplies constituted about 82% of supplier transactions while supplies 
from other traders constituted about 18% of the transactions. Table 6.5 below shows the 
distribution of the retailer-supplier transactions. 
Table 6.5: Retailer-supplier milk supply chains 
 Retailer supplier chain Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Retailer-Direct Farm 
supplies 
211 82.42 82.42 
Retailer-other milk suppliers 
(traders) 
45 17.58 100.00 
Total 256 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Retailer-buyer transactions 
Most of the transactions between the retailers and buyers were with direct consumers and 
constituted about 65% of the retailer-buyer transactions. About 20% of the transactions were 
conducted with hotels and restaurants. Finally, about 15% of the transactions were carried out 
with milk processing firms. The results are summarized in table 6.6 below.  
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Table 6.6: Retailer-buyer milk supply chains 
Retailer-buyer chain    
  
  Frequency  Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Retailer-Consumer  chain 180 64.75 64.75 
 
Retailer-Hotels/Restaurants chain 56 20.14 84.89 
 
Retailer-Processor chain 42 15.11 100.00 
 Total 278 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
 
6.3 Sample characteristics of the coordination mechanisms  
Producer-buyer coordination  
The dependent variable was coordination mechanisms, defined by the kind of contractual 
arrangement used in carrying out milk transactions with milk buyers. Three main coordination 
mechanisms were identified as spot market contracts, verbal contracts and written contracts. 
The distribution of the contractual arrangements for transactions between milk producers and 
buyers is shown in table 6.7 below. The results show that spot market contracts constituted 
44.12% of all transactions between the milk producers and their buyers while verbal 
agreements took up 43.94% of the transactions. Written contracts comprised of 12.94% of the 
producer transactions. 
Table 6.7: Coordination mechanisms and their distributions in producer transactions 
 Nature of coordination Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Spot market contracts 150 44.12 44.12 
Verbal Agreements 146 43.94 88.06 
Written agreements 44 12.94 100 
Total 340 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Retailer-supplier coordination 
The distribution of the coordination mechanisms in transactions between milk retailers and 
their suppliers is shown in table 6.8 below. About 63% of the retailer supplier transactions 
were based on spot market contracts while 32% of the transactions were based on verbal 
contracts. Written contracts constituted about 5% of the retailer-supplier transactions. 
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Table 6.8: Distribution of coordination mechanisms 
Nature of contract Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Spot market contracts 161 62.89 62.89 
Verbal contracts 83 32.42 95.31 
Written contracts 12 4.69 100.00 
Total 256 100   
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Retailer-buyer transactions 
The distribution of coordination mechanisms in the retailer-buyer transactions is shown in 
table 6.9 below. Spot market contracts constituted 71% of transactions between the retail 
outlets and their milk buyers. Verbal contracts constituted 23% of the transactions while less 
than 6% of the transactions consisted of written contracts. 
 Table 6.9: Distribution of coordination mechanisms in retailer-buyer transactions 
Type of contract Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Spot market contracts 198 71.22 71.22 
 
Verbal contracts 64 23.02 94.24 
 
Written contracts 16 5.76 100 
 Total 278 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
6.4 Characteristics of the factors influencing coordination mechanisms 
between milk producers and their buyers 
A description of the factors influencing coordination mechanisms and supply chain 
performance is discussed in this section below.  
Gender of operators 
In the producer-buyer transactions surveyed, about 46% of the transactions were carried out 
by women farm operators and 54% by men in both districts. Nakuru district had a significant 
number of female respondents (49%) compared to 33% for Nyandarua district (table 6.10 
below). 
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Table 6.10: Distribution of production units by district and gender 
Gender District Total 
  Nakuru Nyandarua   
 Male 50.7% 67.0% 55.8% 
  Female 49.3% 33.0% 44.2% 
Total% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Educational level of respondents 
About 10% of the respondents reported having attended either adult education classes or no 
education at all. About 9% had between one and four years of primary school education.  A 
further analysis showed that 28% of the respondents had between 5 and 8 years of primary 
school (primary school graduates) but the majority of the respondents (about 33%) reported 
having received between 10 and 12 years of education (at least secondary school education). 
More than 13 years of schooling was reported in 20% of the farm operators which comprises 
of advanced secondary school education, tertiary college training or university education 
(table 6.11 below). 
Table 6.11: Classification of respondents by educational class 
Educational class Proportion of respondents 
No formal education at all 10% 
1 to 4 years of formal education 9% 
5 to 8 years 28% 
10 to 12 years 33% 
13 to 16 years 20% 
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
The overall mean number of schooling years was about 9 years (table 6.12 below) while the 
modal number of schooling years was about 12 years. The results show a relatively high level 
of education indicating that most of the milk producers are relatively well informed about 
their dairy activities. This also explains the commercial nature of the milk producers. Further 
analyses showed that there were no significant differences in the mean education levels 
among the milk producers.  
Enterprise experience and age 
Table 6.12 below also shows the distribution of enterprise experience and age of the milk 
producers. Experience of the operator was measured by the number of years since the 
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enterprise began. The overall mean number of years since the enterprise began was about 15.6 
years. However the largest proportion of producers had operated their farms for about 10 
years with the longest time in operation being 50 years and the shortest time being less than 
one year. The distribution of the producers based on experience was relatively well balanced 
in the study regions and between the genders. The age of the dairy operators ranged from 18 
years to 85 years. The overall mean age of the milk producers was about 45.744 years with 
the modal age being about 35 years old. The sample results show that older dairy operators 
were also the more experienced ones. 
Table 6.12: Descriptive statistics for producer-buyer transactions 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Average schooling years 0 16.000 9.076 
Age of respondent in years 18 85.000 45.744 
Experience of operator in years 0 50.000 15.438 
Quantity bought by buyer in liters per day 1 70.000 9.694 
Distance of buyer from seller to buyer in km 0 35.000 1.460 
Time required to sell milk stocks in hours 0 17.000 5.676 
Price per liter of fresh milk in Kshs* 11 30.000 17.099 
N = 340    
Source: Field Survey Results, 2005 
* Kshs = Kenya shillings, one shilling = 100 cents.  
Farm size, distances traveled, mean time to sell and milk selling prices 
Table 6.12 above shows that the mean quantity of milk sold by the farmers was 9.694 liters 
per transaction per day. But this quantity varied between 1 liter and 70 liters showing 
skewness towards lower quantities. The mean distance required to travel between the milk 
producers and the milk buyers was about 1.5 km. The distance however varied from 0 km to 
35 kilometers, with a general skewness towards shorter distance between producers and 
buyers. The overall mean duration taken by the farmers to sell the milk after milking was 
5.676 hours with a range of 0 hours (immediate sales after milking) to 17 hours after milking. 
Furthermore, the mean price of milk per liter was about 17 Kenya shillings (Kshs). The lowest 
price fetched for the milk per liter was kshs 11 while the highest price fetched by the 
producers was Kshs 30. The data show a wide variation in the milk selling prices among the 
producers.   
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Importance of legal contracts in transactions 
Frequency distributions for the importance of legal contracts shows that in most of the 
transactions, legal contracts were not used or were not considered important to producers in 
83.8% of the transactions with buyers. About 8% of transactions indicated that legal contracts 
were a significant part of their transactions while another 8% indicated that legal contracts 
contributed only partly to transactions with their buyers. The results therefore show that there 
were very few written contracts in transactions between the producers and the buyers. This 
result attests to the dominance of informal transaction relations between the producers and or 
use of spot market contracts. A summary of the observations are presented in table 6.13 
below.  
Table 6.13: Importance of legal contracts in producer-buyer transactions 
Presence of contract with 
buyer 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
not true 285 83.82 83.82 
 
partly true 28 8.24 92.06 
 
true 27 7.94 100.00 
 Total 340 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Extent of lack of buyers in producer transactions 
Buyer availability was represented by the extent to which lack of buyers was perceived to be a 
problem in producers’ transactions with their buyers. This is shown in table 6.14 below. Lack 
of buyers was reported as a serious problem in about 12% of the producers’ transactions with 
buyers, while in 24% of the transactions, lack of buyers was reported as being a small 
problem. Lack of buyers was not a problem in about 64% of the transactions.  
 Table 6.14: Seriousness of problem of lack of buyers 
Lack of buyers  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
serious 41 12.06 12.06 
 
a small problem 82 24.12 36.18 
 
no problem 217 63.82 100.00 
 Total 340 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
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Advance milk price information in the supply chains 
Milk producers were further asked to indicate the extent to which they were always able to 
determine prices for their milk in advance of selling milk (table 6.15 below).  In about 20.3% 
of the transactions, it was very difficult for producers to know milk prices in advance of the 
transactions. In 26.76% of the transactions, producers were sometimes able to know milk 
prices before selling while in about 53%, the producers were always able to know the milk 
prices before selling their milk.  
Table 6.15: Extent of price knowledge in producer transactions 
Knowledge about buyer price offers   
    Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
very difficult to  know their prices 69 20.30 20.29 
 
sometimes able to know 91 26.76 47.06 
 
full knowledge 180 52.94 100.00 
 Total 340 100  
  Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Length of credit period in transactions 
Milk could be sold for spot cash payments or on credit. Most of the milk transactions were 
carried out on credit. Spot cash transactions constituted about 31% of all transactions. Among 
the credit transactions, 25% consisted of credit periods of up to 2 weeks, and 43.5% consisted 
of credit periods of at least one month. Thus in general there were more credit transactions 
than spot cash payments in the producers’ transactions with buyers (table 6.16 below). 
Table 6.16: Length of credit period    
length of credit period    
    Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Spot cash sales 106 31.18 31.18 
 
1 to 2 weeks credit sales 86 25.29 56.47 
 
One month or more credit 
sales 
148 43.53 100.00 
 Total 340 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
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6.5 Characteristics of retailer-supplier transactions 
Gender of retail operator 
Female retail operators constituted about 43% of the retailer-supplier transactions and male 
operators about 57% of the transactions (table 6.17 below). The distribution of retailer-
supplier transactions by gender was similar to producer-buyer transactions.  
Table 6.17: Distribution of retailer-supplier transactions by gender 
Gender  
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Male  145 56.64 56.64 
Female  111 43.36 100.00 
Total 256 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Type of retail operation 
The transactions were also broken down according to the type of enterprise as shown in table 
6.18 below. Grocery shops and kiosks constituted about 34% of the retailer-supplier 
transactions. Milk bars accounted for about 39.5% of the transactions while mobile traders 
and farmer cooperative societies accounted for about 20% and about 6% of the retailer-
supplier transactions respectively. 
Table 6.18: Distribution of retailer-supplier transactions by type of retail outlet 
    Frequency Cumulative 
Percent 
Grocery/kiosk   87 33.98 33.98 
Dairy/milk  bar 101 39.45 73.44 
Mobile traders 52 20.31 93.75 
Cooperative  
societies 
16 6.25 100.00 
Total 256 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Age, experience and educational level 
Table 6.19 below shows summary statistics for key socioeconomic, firm specific and 
transaction cost variables in retailer-supplier transactions. The age of the retail operators 
ranged between 15 and 70 years with a mean of about 33 years. It implies that most of the 
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retail operators were relatively young. Some of the retail outlets were hardly more than a year 
in operation having been newly set up. However, some outlets, especially the cooperative 
societies, had been in operation for longer periods. The mean enterprise experience indicates 
that most of the retail operations were new having been set up within the last decade, which 
coincides with when liberalization policies were initiated in the industry. Regarding the 
educational levels of the retail operators, the mean number years of schooling was 10 years 
with a range of zero to 16 years. Educational levels were higher in cooperative societies and 
milk bar operators, which also operated at higher levels than other business types such as 
kiosks or mobile traders.      
Table 6.19: Retailer-supplier transactions, summary descriptive statistics  
  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Respondent's Age in years 15.00 70.000 33.340 
Enterprise experience in years 0.00 41.000 3.945 
Educational level of respondent in years 0.00 16.000 10.387 
Quantity of milk supplied by supplier in liters per day 1.00 17,000.000 298.980 
Time to transport from supplier in hours 0.05 9.000 1.109 
N = 256    
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Travel times, prices and quantities of milk handled 
Table 6.19 above also shows that the quantity of milk handled in the retailer-supplier 
transactions varied from 1 liter to 17,000 liters with a mean quantity of about 300 liters per 
transaction. Lower quantities of milk were handled by the smaller operators especially the 
kiosks and the mobile traders while larger quantities were handled by the milk bars and 
cooperative societies. To transport milk from the suppliers to the retail outlets required 
between 0.05 hours to about 9 hours. However, the mean time required to transport the milk 
was about 1.1 hours, indicating skewness towards shorter delivery times. Larger operators 
tended to take longer procuring their milk supplies compared to smaller retail operators.   
Supplier reliability 
The reliability of the milk supplier was considered an important factor in about 80% of the 
retailer-supplier transactions. In the remaining 20% of the transactions, reliability of the milk 
supplier was not considered an important factor in the transactions. The results are 
summarized in table 6.20 below.  
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Table 6.20: Extent of partner reliability  
Partner is reliable    
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Not true 51 19.92 19.92 
True  205 80.08 100.00 
Total 256 100   
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Alternative supplier search costs 
In about 64% of the transactions between retail outlets and milk suppliers, finding alternative 
milk suppliers was not considered difficult. In about 22% of the transactions, there were some 
difficulties in finding alternative milk suppliers. On the other hand, difficulties in finding 
alternative milk suppliers were reported in 14% of the transactions (table 6.21 below). 
Table 6.21: Extent of difficult of finding alternative milk suppliers 
It is difficult to find other suppliers   
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Not true 164 64.063 64.063 
Partly true 56 21.875 85.938 
True  36 14.063 100.00 
Total 256 100   
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Trader information sources 
In 90% of the retailer-supplier transactions, traders were considered to be very useful sources 
of market information. In about 10% of the retail transactions, trader information sources 
were not considered to be useful in the transactions. Thus a high significance was attached to 
market information exchanges by the retail operators in their transactions (table 6.22 below).  
Table 6.22: Usefulness of trader information sources to retailers 
Trade information 
sources 
   
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
not very useful 26 10.16 10.16 
Useful or very 
useful 
230 89.84 100.00 
Total 256 100.00   
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
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Government market information sources 
In about 89.5% of retailer-supplier transactions, government sources of market and price 
information were not considered to be useful in the transactions (figure 6.23 below). In the 
remaining 10.5% government information sources were indicted to be useful in retailer-
supplier transactions. The results of evaluation of government information sources by retailers 
are likely to be a pointer to non availability rather than usefulness of the information. Market 
information from the government is rarely available to many dairy operators on time when 
they require it.   
Table 6.23: Usefulness of government market information to retailers  
Government information sources   
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
not very useful 229 89.45 89.45 
very useful 27 10.55 100.00 
Total 256 100   
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Personal relations in transactions 
Personal relations between the retail outlets and milk suppliers were not considered important 
in about 31% of the transactions. In 37.5% of the transactions, personal relations were 
considered to be partially important in the transactions with milk suppliers. About 31.6% of 
the retail-supplier transactions considered the presence of personal relations to be an 
important factor in their transactions with milk suppliers. The results are summarized in table 
6.24 below. 
Table 6.24: Personal relations in retailer transactions 
Have relations with supplier   
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
not true 79 30.86 30.86  
partly true 96 37.50 68.36  
true 81 31.64 100.00  
Total 256 100   
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
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Length of credit period 
Spot cash payments (no credit) accounted for about 57.4% of the transactions with milk 
suppliers (table 6.25 below). Weekly credit periods accounted for 24.6% of the transactions 
while monthly credit periods accounted for about 18% of the transactions with milk suppliers. 
This is unlike milk producers most of whose transactions were mostly carried out on credit 
basis.  
Table 6.25: Length of credit period in retailer-supplier transactions 
Length of credit period 
  Frequency  Percent Cumulative percent 
Spot cash payments 147 57.42 57.42 
Weekly 63 24.61 82.03 
Monthly 46 17.97 100.00 
Total 256 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
6.6 Characteristics of retailer-buyer transactions 
Gender 
About 57% of the transactions between retail operators and buyers were carried out by male 
operators. Female retail operators were responsible for about 43% of the transactions. The 
distribution of the retailer-buyer transactions by gender are shown in table 6.26 below.  
Table 6.26: Distribution of transactions by gender  
Gender    Cumulative 
    Frequency Percent Percent 
 male 159 57.19 57.19 
 female 119 42.81 100 
 Total 278 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Type of retail outlet 
An analysis of the retail transactions by type of retail outlet indicated that 32% of the milk 
transactions were carried out by grocery shops. Milk bars handled 41.7% of the transactions 
while mobile traders and cooperative societies handled 20.5% and 5.75% of the transactions 
respectively. Unlike grocery shops, milk bars, mobile traders and cooperatives usually 
exclusively handle milk and milk related products. The results are shown in table 6.27 below. 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 121
Table 6.27: Distribution of retailer-buyer transactions by type of retail outlet 
Type of retail outlet   Cumulative  
  
  Frequency Percent Percent 
 
Grocery/kiosks 89 32.01 32.02 
 
Dairy/milk bars 116 41.73 73.74 
 
Mobile traders 57 20.50 94.24 
 
Cooperative societies 16 5.76 100 
 Total 278 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Educational level, enterprise experience and age  
The education level of the retail operators was captured by the number of years they attended 
school. The overall mean number of schooling years was about 10.6 years (table 6.28 below) 
and ranged from none at all to 16 years. The mean number of years of enterprise experience 
was about 4 years. The mean age of the retail operators was about 33 years but ranged from a 
minimum of 15 years and a maximum of 70 years. The mean quantity of milk sold by the 
retailers per transaction was about 266 liters per day indicating that on average the retail 
outlets were larger compared to the milk producers.  
Distance, travel time, and milk prices 
Table 6.28 below shows that the mean distance between the retail outlets and the buyers was 
about 10 kilometers. The mean distance is highly influenced by buyers situated in distant 
locations such as processing firms and buyers in major towns. For transactions between 
retailers and direct consumers, distances were less than one kilometer.  
The mean time required to travel between the milk buyers and the retail outlets was 0.80 
hours (about 48 minutes) but varied between 0 and 7 hours. The variation in the times also 
reflected the differences between sales to direct consumers and sales to processing firms. The 
time required to reach the buyers is however affected by the means of transport used and the 
condition of the road. The main means of transport used either to deliver or collect milk were 
on foot, by bicycle or, by vehicle. Thus the time required to reach buyers may not necessarily 
be an indicator of distance from buyers but a function of the difficulties faced in attempts to 
reach the transacting parties. 
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Table 6.28: Summary descriptive statistics for retailer-buyer transactions 
  Minimum Maximum Mean  
    
Educational level of retail 
operators in years  
 
0 
 
16.000 
 
10.576 
Enterprise experience in years 0 41.000 4.047 
Age  15 70 33 
Quantity bought by buyer in 
liters per day 
2 17000.000 265.775 
Distance to buyer in km 0 220.000 10.275 
Time to get to buyer in hours 0,01 7.000 0.799 
Current price for buyers per 
liter 
 
14 
 
30.000 
 
21.367 
Number of buyers 1 400 38 
Time to clear fresh milk stocks 
in hours 
0.40 48.000 12.404 
N=278    
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
The mean selling price of milk was about Kshs 21.40 per liter. The selling price ranged 
between Kshs 14.00 and Kshs 30.00, indicating wide variations in the prices received by 
retailers in their transactions. And finally, the mean number of milk buyers was 38 buyers. 
However, the number of buyers ranged from one to 400 buyers. 
Furthermore, the time required to sell milk ranged from slightly under half an hour to about 
48 hours. Operators with cooling facilities (milk bars and some cooperatives) could afford 
longer stocking times than others (e.g. mobile traders). 
Length of credit period 
About 74% of the retailer-buyer transactions were based on spot cash payment basis without 
any credit being offered to buyers. In about 7.6% of the transactions, a credit period of one 
week was allowed by the retail outlet operators. Monthly credit periods constituted 18.7% of 
the retail transactions (table 6.29 below). 
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Table 6.29: Distribution of retailer transactions by length of credit period 
Length of credit period   Cumulative  
  
  Frequency Percent Percent 
 
Spot cash transactions 205 73.74 73.74 
 
Weekly 21 7.55 81.29 
 
Monthly 52 18.71 100 
 Total 278 100  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
 
6.7 Characteristics of the dependent variable: supply chain performance 
The distribution of the dependent variable in the transactions between the milk producers and 
buyers is shown in table 6.30 below. In about 9% of the transactions, producers reported 
being dissatisfied in their transactions with the buyers. In more than 51% of the transactions, 
producers were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied in their transactions. On the other hand, 
satisfaction was reported in 39% of the producer-buyer transactions. The figures show that the 
performance of milk producers was quite modest as a majority of them indicated that they 
were not satisfied in transactions with their partners (about 60%). 
 
Table 6.30: Performance in producer-buyer transactions 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Table 6.31 below presents summary descriptive results for performance in retailer-supplier 
transactions. Dissatisfaction was reported in about 10% of the transactions with milk 
suppliers. In a further 54%, retailers indicated that they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
in their transactions with milk suppliers. Finally, retailers reported being satisfied in 36% of 
the transactions with their partners.  
  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative percent  
Dissatisfied 30 8.82 8.82 
Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
175 51.47 60.29 
satisfied 135 39.71 100.00 
Total  340 100.00  
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Table 6.31: Performance in retailer- supplier transactions 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative percent 
Dissatisfied 27 10.55 10.55 
Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
138 53.91 64.46 
satisfied 91 35.54 100.00 
Total 256 100.00  
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
Responses on retailer-buyer transactions were grouped into two categories: very satisfied and 
not very satisfied (table 6.32 below). High satisfaction levels were reported in a majority of 
the retailer-buyer transactions at 62%. Transactions in which the retailers were not satisfied 
with their buyers’ transactions constituted the remaining 38%. Thus on average, retailers 
performed better in transactions with their buyers compared to transactions with their 
suppliers. Low average satisfaction levels were also observed in transactions between the 
producers and their buyers. 
Table 6.32: Performance in retailer- supplier transactions 
  Frequency Percent 
Not very satisfied 105 37.77 
Very satisfied 173 62.23 
Total  278 100.00 
Source: Field Survey Data, 2006 
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CHAPTER 7  
DETERMINANTS OF COORDINATION AND SUPPLY CHAIN 
PERFORMANCE 
The chapter is divided into two major parts. Part one consists of sections 7.1 through 7.3 and 
discusses multinomial logit model results for the determinants of coordination mechanisms in 
the fresh milk supply chains in Kenya. Section 7.1 discusses coordination in transactions 
between milk producers and buyers. Section 7.2 discusses coordination in transactions 
between retailers and milk suppliers while section 7.3 deals with coordination in transactions 
between retailers and milk buyers. 
Part two consists of sections 7.4 to 7.6 and discusses ordered probit results for the 
determinants of supply chain performance in the fresh milk supply chain. Section 7.4 
discusses determinants of supply chain performance in producer-buyer transactions. Section 
7.5 discusses determinants of supply chain performance in retailer-supplier transactions while 
section 7.6 deals with the determinants of supply chain performance in retailer-buyer 
transactions. 
7.1 Model results and discussions: determinants of coordination mechanisms 
in producer-buyer transactions 
Table 7.1 below shows the multinomial logit results for the relationship between coordination 
mechanisms and the explanatory factors. Most of the explanatory factors were significant at 
the 5% and 10% levels. In the producer-buyer transactions a number of variables were 
significant in determining the kind of coordination mechanism used in the transactions. The 
log likelihood chi-square value of 146.09 was significant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.00000). 
The pseudo R square was 0.217 and a moderate prediction of 67.94% for the coordination 
mechanisms was achieved. The parameter estimates for the producer-buyer transactions and 
the corresponding t-values (in brackets) are shown in table 7.1 below. Further discussions of 
the model results by means of marginal effects follow below. 
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Table 7.1 Multinomial Logit Model estimates for determinants of producer-buyer coordination  
 Variable description Prob(Y=1)
-                               
verbal 
Prob[Y = 
2]-written 
Constant         -2.824** -2.128 
  (-2.453) (-1.225) 
DISTRICT        Location of farm (Nakuru/Nyandarua district) -1.220*** -1.540*** 
  (-3.420) (-2.807) 
EXPERIENCE       Experience of farm operator in years 0.018 -0.022 
  (1.380) (-1.020) 
QUANTITY      Quantity of milk sold in liters per day -0.015 0.019 
   -(1.017) (0.995) 
SALETIME      Average time required to sell milk in hours 0.148*** 0.084** 
  (5.414) (2.106) 
DISTANCE     Distance in kilometers between farm and buyers -0.049 0.113** 
   (-0.730) (2.199) 
SELLPRICE     Milk selling price per liter -0.054 -0.158** 
  (-1.193) (-2.208) 
CREDIT       Length of credit period (none, 2 weeks, monthly) 0.584*** 0.596*** 
   (5.241) (3.569) 
PRICEKNOW      Extent of price knowledge before milk sales (1-3) 0.512*** 0.471* 
  (2.645) (1.630) 
NOBUYERS     Extent of problem of buyer availability in (1-3) 0.391** 0.407 
  (2.261) (1.484) 
LEGALCON     Importance attached to legal contracts in (1-3) 0.799*** 1.225*** 
  (2.732) (3.735) 
N=340, Pseudo R-squared =0.217, percentage correctly predicted =67.94, chi-square = 146.089***; 
*** significant at 1%, ** 5% and *10%. t-values in brackets. 
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
Table 7.2 below presents the marginal effects for transactions between milk producers and 
milk buyers for the three coordination mechanisms of spot market contracts, verbal contracts 
and written contracts. The results for the transactions show that the location of the producer 
was significant in distinguishing between the coordination mechanisms. Being located in 
Nyandarua district increased the probability of using spot market contracts with a marginal 
effect of 0.315. On the other hand, being located in Nakuru district increased the probability 
of using verbal and written contracts. The marginal effects of location for verbal and written 
contracts were -0.224 and -0.090 respectively indicating that being located in Nakuru district 
significantly increased the probability of using verbal and written contracts respectively. The 
results therefore imply that repeat transactions with partners were more likely to be 
undertaken in Nakuru district than in Nyandarua district. Such repeat transactions are likely to 
lead to lower information and market search costs. The use of the safeguards (relational 
contracting) is likely to result in lower transaction costs in Nakuru district compared to 
Nyandarua district.  
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The differences in the two districts can be accounted for by historical and geographical 
considerations. Nyandarua district being a rural district implies that the market for milk may 
not be readily available in producers’ neighborhoods. There are also very few major urban 
areas that could act as captive markets for the milk produced in Nyandarua district compared 
to Nakuru district. Therefore most of the milk producers in the district are likely to sell their 
milk in distant markets and for this reason it becomes difficult to enter into relational based 
transactions which normally require more information and knowledge about the buyers. The 
cost of acquiring such information is likely to be very high and therefore spot market 
contracts rather than relational based transactions (verbal and written contracts) are more than 
likely to predominate. This observation is further strengthened by the influence of distance 
between the milk sellers and the buyers on the coordination mechanisms used as discussed 
below, where longer distances favor use of spot market contracts. A further explanation is 
based on the institutional changes that appear to have affected Nyandarua district more 
negatively than Nakuru district, restricting farmers in Nyandarua district to rely more on spot 
market contracts.  
Experience of the farm operators had a significant and positive marginal effect on the use of 
verbal contracts. Longer experience in the dairy operations increased the probability of using 
verbal contracts. The marginal effect of enterprise experience for verbal contracts was 0.006. 
This implies that more experienced producers establish social networks (social capital) for 
milk sales and the networks are likely to persist for long periods. The marginal effects for 
both spot and written contracts were -0.003 indicating that having shorter enterprise 
experience increased the likelihood of using both spot market contracts and written contracts 
in transactions between milk producers and buyers but its effect was not statistically 
signficant. However, experience did not have a significant influence on the use of spot market 
contracts and written contracts.  
The results also show that verbal contracts were associated with lower quantities of milk 
handled (marginal effect of -0.005) but the effect was not significantly different from zero. On 
the other hand, positive marginal effects for quantity of milk sold imply that higher quantities 
of milk handled were positively associated with the use of spot market and written contracts 
in the transactions. The positive marginal effects for milk quantity signify that with increasing 
production levels, transactions are likely to be closed through spot market contracts and 
written contracts. However, the overall effect of quantity of milk sold was not significant in 
distinguishing between the coordination mechanisms.  
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Table 7.2  Marginal effects of explanatory variables on the probability of coordination choice 
Variable Variable description Spot 
market  
Verbal  
contracts 
Written  
contracts 
Constant  0.660** -0.592** -0.067 
   (2.444) (-2.233) (-0.420) 
DISTRICT Location of farm (Nakuru/ Nyandarua 
district 1-2) 
0.315*** -0.224*** -0.090* 
  (3.774) (-2.735) (-1.854) 
EXPERIENCE Experience of farm operator in years -0.003 0.006* -0.003 
  (-0.812) (1.849) (-1.585) 
QUANTITY Quantity of milk sold in liters per day 0.002 -0.005 0.003 
  (0.611) (-1.381) (1.583) 
SALETIME Average time required to sell milk in 
hours 
-0.033** 0.032*** 0.001 
  (-5.190) (5.278) (0.227) 
DISTANCE      Distance in kilometers between farm 
and buyers 
0.004 -0.018 0.014*** 
   (0.285) (-1.172) (2.847) 
SELLPRICE Milk selling price per liter 0.018* -0.005 -0.013** 
  (1.706) (-0.520) (-2.037) 
CREDIT Length of credit period (none, 2 weeks, 
monthly) 
-0.144*** 0.115*** 0.029** 
   (-5.543) (4.519) (1.971) 
PRICEKNOW   Extent of price knowledge before milk 
sales (1-3) 
-0.124*** 0.103** 0.021 
    (-2.744) (2.308) (0.774) 
NOBUYERS Extent of problem of buyer  
availability in the transactions (1-3) 
-0.097** 0.076** 0.020 
  (-2.395) (1.889) (0.799) 
LEGALCON  Importance attached to legal  
contracts in the transactions (1-3) 
-0.217*** 0.136** 0.081*** 
 (-3.153) (2.182) (3.094) 
*** Significant at 1%, ** 5% and *10% 
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
The time required to sell milk was highly significant for spot market contracts and verbal 
contracts. Shorter times before selling milk significantly increased the likelihood of using spot 
market contracts (marginal effect of -0.033). On the other hand, longer times before selling 
milk increased the chances of using verbal contracts with a marginal effect of 0.032. Longer 
hours before selling were also positively associated with written contracts but were not 
statistically different from zero in their influence. Longer hours before selling milk are likely 
to increase uncertainty in transactions especially when there are no safeguards. Since milk is a 
highly perishable commodity, bargaining power will be low for milk producers especially 
when exposed to open markets. Milk producers therefore strive to close their sales as fast as 
possible using spot market contracts to reduce long exposures to uncertainties in the absence 
of safeguards that are usually provided by relation
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Longer distances between milk producers and buyers had a significant positive influence on 
the use of written contracts (marginal effect of 0.014). Milk producers selling to buyers 
located farther away were more likely to use written contracts. Long distances also favored 
the use of spot market contracts but the effect was not significant. Shorter distances increased 
the likelihood of using verbal contracts but the effect was also not significant.  
Higher milk selling prices increased the likelihood of using spot market contracts by 
producers. The marginal effect of prices for spot market contracts was 0.018. Higher prices 
associated with spot market contracts reflect the lack of safeguards against transaction failure 
or opportunism. Lower milk selling prices were likely to favor the use of verbal contracts in 
the producer-buyer transactions but the effect was not significant. However, milk selling 
prices were significant in influencing the use of written contracts, albeit negatively. The 
marginal effect of milk selling prices on written contracts was -0.013 indicating that lower 
prices increased the probability that written contracts would be used in producer-buyer 
transactions. This result is theoretically supported in Transaction Cost Economics theory, 
where written contracts and other relational based contracts provide safeguards which can be 
represented by the difference between the spot market prices and the prices received or paid 
for under written contracts. The safeguards provide some insurance against market search 
costs, and bargaining costs which ensure that there is always a market for the highly 
perishable milk products, and in addition, contract enforcement is also made easier. 
Safeguards are also necessary when larger quantities of milk are sold or handled. 
The length of credit period was highly significant in influencing the coordination mechanisms 
in various ways. Short credit periods (mostly 0 to 2 days) favored the use of spot market 
contracts (marginal effect of -0.144). Longer credit periods on the other hand favored the use 
of verbal and written contracts. For the verbal contracts, the effect of credit period was 
significant with a marginal effect of 0.115 while for written contracts the marginal effect was 
0.029. Thus the effect of credit period was stronger for verbal contracts compared to written 
contracts. The length of credit period is often affected by the amount of trust subsisting 
between the transacting partners. Earlier results on the effect of enterprise experience 
indicated that more experienced operators tended to use verbal and written contracts, a result 
that could be explained by the trust and reputation developed over time as part of their social 
capital. Less experienced operators tended to use spot market contracts. Monitoring costs are 
likely to rise whenever milk is sold on credit due to perceived opportunism from transaction 
partners. Monitoring and enforcement costs can be reduced when there are effective legal 
enforcement mechanisms in the event of default. Reputation of the transacting partner may 
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also determine whether transactions are to be carried out on credit or not. Credit is usually 
extended to partners who are known to the sellers and or have good reputations (such as 
neighbors) or where legal redress can be easily sought (such as processing firms).   
Some producers were able to determine milk prices in advance before the transactions took 
place. Others were not always able or were only able to determine the prices in advance. Low 
levels of price knowledge significantly favored the use of spot market contracts. Therefore 
difficulties in accessing price information by farmers increase the probability of using spot 
market contracts. The marginal effect of price knowledge of –0.124 for spot market contracts 
was significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, advance price knowledge before 
transacting increased the likelihood that verbal contracts and written contracts would be used 
in the transactions. However, the influence of price knowledge on written contracts was not 
significant though it was positive. Information search costs are likely to be lower in the two 
relational coordination mechanisms compared to spot market contracts. The results indicate 
that adequate price knowledge is necessary for both verbal and written contracts.  
Lack of price information leads producers to sell to buyers located near their farms to avoid 
uncertainties associated with insufficient market information. It would be difficult to use 
verbal contracts in such distant markets. The data also indicate that farmers using verbal 
contracts were also fairly more experienced than farmers using spot market contracts and 
written contracts, meaning that experienced farmers were more likely to have more price 
information relative to less experienced farmers. From the results, the positive relationship 
between high information availability and the relational contracts imply that the available 
information was most likely to have been gained from private sources, such as other farmers 
or milk buyers or traders. Farmers that did not have adequate information therefore opted to 
use spot market contracts in their transactions.  
Difficulties in getting adequate numbers of milk buyers significantly favored the use of spot 
market contracts. On the other hand, high buyer availability significantly increased the 
likelihood of using verbal contracts with a significant marginal effect of 0.076. Higher buyer 
availability was also likely to increase the possibility of using written contracts but this was 
not statistically significant at the 10% level. The number of buyers in the market determines 
the relative bargaining powers and costs that farmers are likely to face in their transactions. 
Fewer buyers make it difficult to effectively bargain leading to high negotiation costs.  
The importance of perceived enforceability of contracts, whether explicit or implicit, also 
influenced the type of coordination mechanisms used. Low importance attached to legal 
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contracts significantly increased the likelihood of using spot market contracts. The marginal 
effect of importance of legal contracts for spot market coordination mechanism was -0.217. 
But as the importance of contract enforcement increases, the probability of using the 
relational coordination mechanisms also increases. The marginal effects of legal contracts for 
verbal and written contracts were 0.136 and 0.081 respectively. Legal contracts are important 
for contract enforcement purposes. Availability of contract enforcement mechanisms reduces 
the costs of monitoring transaction partners. The presence or absence of contract support 
institutions affects the amount and extent of monitoring costs required in transactions between 
the producers and the buyers. 
7.2 Determinants of coordination in retailer –supplier transactions 
Regression results for determinants of coordination mechanisms in transactions between the 
milk retail outlets and milk suppliers show that the type of coordination mechanism employed 
was also influenced by socioeconomic factors, firm related factors and transaction costs 
characteristics. The regression results are presented in table 7.3 below. The model log-
likelihood chi-square value was 126.877 with a p-value less than 0.00001. The pseudo R 
squared value was 0.31 and the model was able to predict the probability of using the 
coordination mechanisms up to 78% of the time. Further analyses and discussions of the 
results using marginal effect follow from table 7.4 below. 
The results in table 7.4 show that being located in Nyandarua district significantly increased 
the probability of using spot market contracts with a marginal effect of 0.452. On the other 
hand, being located in Nakuru district significantly increased the probability of using verbal 
contracts (marginal effect of -0.410) in transactions between retailers and milk suppliers. 
Being located in Nakuru district also increased the likelihood that written contracts would be 
used in retailer-supplier transactions (marginal effect of 0.042). The results for the effect of 
location in retailer-supplier transactions closely mirror results in producers-buyer transactions.  
Being a male retail operator significantly increased the chance of using spot market contracts 
with a marginal effect of -0.185. On the other hand, being a female retail operator 
significantly increased the likelihood of using relational coordination mechanisms, that is, 
both verbal and written contracts. The marginal effects were 0.176 and 0.009 for verbal and 
written contracts respectively. Female operators are likely to perceive higher transaction costs 
and are more likely to adopt safeguards in their transactions than their male counterparts. 
DETERMINANTS OF COORDINATION AND SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE 
 132
Table 7.3  Multinomial Logit Model estimates for determinants of retailer-supplier coordination  
 Description of the variables Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) 
Constant  -3.997** -8.182* 
  (-2.129) (-1.711) 
DISTRICT     Location of the retail outlets (Nakuru, Nyandarua 1-
2) 
-2.301*** -3.078*** 
  (-4.427) (-2.895) 
RESPSEX     Gender of operator (Male/female 1-2) 0.975*** 0.802 
  (2.691) (1.137) 
QUANTITY     Quantity of milk sold in liters per day 0.000 0.000 
  (1.357) (1.075) 
TRADERIN    Importance of trader price/market information 
sources (1-3) 
0.570** 1.543** 
      (2.435) (2.299) 
GOVTINFO Importance of government price/market information 
sources (1-3) 
-1.257*** -0.712 
   (-3.338) (-1.275) 
TIME_1   Time required to travel between milk retail outlet and 
milk  supplier in hours 
-0.370** -1.077* 
   (-2.096) (-1.731) 
RELIABLE     Importance of supplier reliability in transaction (1-3) 0.793* 1.447 
  (1.815) (1.278) 
RELATION     Importance of personal relations in transactions  (1-3) 1.035*** 0.582 
   (4.060) (1.183) 
COST_1   Ease of finding alternative milk suppliers (1-3) 0.290 -1.196* 
     (1.184) (-1.689) 
SALETIME Average time required to sell milk in hours -0.056*** -0.010 
  (-2.747) (-0.282) 
CREDIT     Length of credit period (none, up to 2 weeks, 
monthly) 
0.854*** 1.357*** 
  (3.118) (2.718) 
N=256; Chi squared =126.877***; Pseudo R squared = 0.31; percentage correctly predicted = 78.13%. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** 5% and *10% 
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
 
The size of the retail operation was measured in terms of the quantity of milk handled and did 
not have a significant influence on the use of the coordination mechanisms. However, the 
negative marginal effect of quantity of milk handled for spot market contracts indicates that 
low quantities of milk purchased increased the likelihood that retailers would use spot market 
contracts to purchase milk. On the other hand, positive marginal effects of quantity of milk for 
verbal and written contracts imply that larger quantities of milk were likely to be transacted 
using verbal and written contracts. Continuous supply is crucial for the retailers especially 
those that handle large quantities of milk and therefore verbal and written contracts provide 
the necessary safeguards against uncertainties in milk supplies.  
Two sources of price information were evaluated for their significance in the retailer supplier 
transactions: trader price information sources and government price information sources. Both 
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had significant influence on the kind of coordination mechanisms employed. Low trader 
information availability increased the likelihood that spot market contracts would be used in 
the transactions (marginal effect of -0.122) while high trader information availability 
significantly increased the likelihood of using verbal contracts as well as written contracts 
with marginal effects of 0.098 and 0.023, respectively.  
On the other hand, high availability of price information from the government significantly 
increased the likelihood of using spot market contracts (marginal effect of 0.235). Having low 
levels of government price information increased the probability that verbal and written 
contracts would be used in the transactions (with marginal effects of -0.228 and -0.007 
respectively). Thus the influence of market information depends on the source of the 
information. Trader and government information sources represent private and public 
information sources respectively with different effects in the market. Private information is 
not usually available to the public and benefits only those parties that have access to it. This is 
a case of asymmetric information which is leveraged for private benefit or rent seeking. On 
the other hand, government information is normally considered open to the public as it can be 
available to all parties interested in using it. Such information sources are likely to reduce 
information asymmetries in the market and improve the workings of the whole market. 
Information and market search costs are likely to decline in the presence of more public 
information. Public information sources do not proffer any special competitive or business 
advantages to any particular individual or group but is likely to benefit all parties that have 
access to it. 
The time required to travel between the retail outlets and the milk suppliers also significantly 
influenced the kind of coordination mechanisms used. Longer times required to reach milk 
suppliers increased the likelihood of using spot market contracts (marginal effect of 0.080) 
while shorter times to reach the milk suppliers increased the probability of using verbal and 
written contracts with marginal effects of -0.064 and -0.016 respectively. The results show 
that retail outlet operators that took shorter times to reach suppliers were likely to be those 
using relational based contracting while retail outlets that took longer times to access their 
milk sources were likely to be those using spot market contracts. Longer times to reach 
partners are pointers to difficulties in the transactions.  
The time required to reach the milk suppliers is a function of several factors: the distance 
between the parties, the condition of the road and the means of transport used (asset 
endowments); all of which are likely to increase or decrease the time required to travel 
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between the transacting parties. Longer distances on good roads and good asset endowments 
(means of transport) reduce the times required to reach the transacting partners. On the other 
hand, shorter distances in the presence of poor road conditions and or lack of good means of 
transport will lead to longer times to reach the partners. In this regard, it is possible that 
retailers who use spot market contracts face certain difficulties that may include poor roads, 
poor means of transport or long distances traveled, and consequently face higher transaction 
costs. The result could also be explained by the possibility that such retailers transport their 
milk on foot due to smaller quantities involved. 
Table 7.4  Marginal Effects of explanatory variables on the probability of coordination choice: retailer-
supplier  
           Description of the variables Spot 
market 
Verbal 
contracts 
Written  
contracts 
Constant  0.821** -0.701** -0.120 
            (2.316) (-2.048) (-1.292) 
DISTRICT  Location of the retail outlets (Nakuru, 
Nyandarua 1-2) 
0.452*** -0.410*** -0.042* 
  (4.712) (-4.416) (-1.702) 
RESPSEX   Gender of operator (Male/female 1-2) -0.185*** 0.176*** 0.009 
  (-2.697) (2.653) (0.765) 
QUANTITY  Quantity of milk sold in liters per day 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-1.385) (1.351) (0.903) 
TRADERIN Importance of trader price/market information 
sources (1-3) 
-0.122*** 0.098** 0.023* 
  (-2.713) (2.280) (1.650) 
GOVTINFO  Importance of government price/market 
information sources (1-3) 
0.235*** -0.228*** -0.007 
  (3.613) (-3.535) (-0.693) 
TIME_1 Time required to travel between milk retailer 
outlet and milk supplier in hours 
0.080** -0.064** -0.016* 
  (2.444) (-2.021) (-1.658) 
RELIABLE  Importance of supplier reliability in transaction 
(1-3) 
-0.161** 0.140* 0.021 
  (-1.949) (1.762) (1.049) 
RELATION  Importance of personal relations in transactions  
(1-3) 
-0.193*** 0.188*** 0.005 
  (-4.119) (4.132) (0.660) 
COST_1   Ease of finding alternative milk suppliers (1-3) -0.037 0.058 -0.021 
  (-0797) (1.313) (-1.507) 
SALETIME    Average time required to sell milk in hours 0.010*** -0.010*** 0.000 
  (2.703) (-2.814) (0.122) 
CREDIT   Length of credit period (none, up to 2 weeks, 
monthly) 
-0.171*** 0.151*** 0.019 
  (-3.263) (3.011) (1.553) 
*** Significant at 1%, ** 5% and *10% 
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
Reliability of milk suppliers was also significant in distinguishing between the coordination 
mechanisms. Transacting with unreliable milk suppliers increased the likelihood of using spot 
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market contracts. The marginal effect of reliability on spot market contracts was -0.161. On 
the other hand, high levels of supplier reliability increased the likelihood that verbal contracts 
would be used in transactions with milk suppliers with a marginal effect of 0.140. High 
supplier reliability was also likely to favor the use of written contracts but the influence was 
not significant enough, its marginal effect was only 0.021. Supplier reliability reduces the 
efforts required to search for milk suppliers each time a transaction takes place. Low 
reliability increases the likelihood of using spot market contracts when complementary 
investments in trust among trading partners is not possible.  
The findings on the effect of partner reliability are similar to those on the effect of personal 
relations in the transactions. Absence of personal relations in transactions between retailers 
and milk suppliers increased the likelihood of using spot market contracts with a marginal 
effect of -0.193. On the other hand, the presence of personal relations increased the likelihood 
of using verbal and written contracts in the transactions. The marginal effect of personal 
relations on verbal contracts was 0.188 and on written contracts, the marginal effect was 
0.005. Personal relations are a specific asset (relational asset or social capital) and reduce 
transaction costs in transactions.  
Difficulties in finding alternative milk suppliers did not significantly influence the type of 
coordination mechanism used. But the negative marginal effect indicated that difficulties in 
searching and getting alternative milk suppliers were likely to increase the likelihood of using 
spot market contracts and written contracts. Higher buyer availability on the other hand were 
likely to increase the likelihood that verbal contracts would be used in the transactions.  
The time required to sell milk had a significant influence on the probability of using spot 
market contracts and verbal contracts but did not influence the use of written contracts. 
Longer hours to sell milk increased the probability that the transaction would be carried out 
using spot market contracts with a marginal effect of 0.10. On the other hand, shorter milk 
sale times increased the likelihood that the transaction would be carried out using verbal 
contracts. The marginal effect was -0.01. Longer milk sale times were also likely to increase 
the probability of using written contracts but the effect was not significant.  
Preference for shorter credit periods significantly increased the probability of using spot 
market contracts with a marginal effect of -0.171. on the other hand, longer credit periods 
increased the probability that verbal contracts and written contracts would be used with 
marginal effects of 0.151 and 0.019, respectively. However, for written contracts, the effect 
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was not significant. Both verbal and written contracts provide some level of safeguards 
against default on milk sold on credit.    
7.3 Coordination in retailer-buyer transactions 
The results in table 7.5 below show that various types of transaction cost and socioeconomic 
characteristics were significant in influencing the type of coordination mechanisms used.  The 
chi-square value of 105.599 was significant indicating that the model was appropriate in 
addressing the determinants of coordination mechanisms in retailer-buyer transactions. The 
pseudo-R squared value of 0.254 shows a moderate fit but the prediction level was moderately 
good at 76%. Despite the low pseudo R2, the high number of significant individual variables 
eliminates possibility of multicollinearity being present in the explanatory variables.  
Table 7.5 Multinomial Logit Model estimates for determinants of  retailer-buyer coordination 
 Description of variable  Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) 
Constant  -1.838 -
13.558*** 
  (-1.132) (-3.129) 
DISTRICT     Location of the retail outlets (1=Nakuru, 2= Nyandarua)  -1.532*** -2.362** 
   (-2.767) (-2.050) 
RESPSEX     Gender of operator (Male/female) 0.624* 1.935** 
   (1.858) (2.343) 
RESPAGE2   Age of operator in years -0.052*** 0.035 
  (-2.717) (1.108) 
QTYBOT_1     Quantity of milk sold in liters per day 0.000 0.001** 
  (-0.713) (2.464) 
DISTANCE     Distance between milk retail outlet and milk buyer 0.024*** 0.017 
  (2.841) (1.470) 
CPRICE_1      Price of milk per liter in Kenya shillings 0.106** 0.236** 
  (2.100) (1.892) 
CREDITTI    Length of credit period (none, up to 2 weeks, monthly) 1.152*** 2.246*** 
   (4.289) (4.494) 
RETCHAIN     Type/length of supply chain ( direct consumers, processors) 0.248 1.331* 
  (0.770) (1.796) 
N= 278; Chi-square = 105.599***; Pseudo R squared = 25.4%; percentage correctly predicted =76%. *** 
Significant at 1%, ** 5% and *10% 
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
 
Table 7.6 below presents the marginal effects of the determinants of coordination mechanisms 
in retailer-buyer transactions that are used for the interpretation of the model results. In the 
retailer-buyer transactions, the location of the retail outlet was significant in distinguishing 
between the use of spot market contracts and verbal contracts. Being located in Nyandarua 
district increased the likelihood of using spot market contracts. The marginal effect of 
Nyandarua district for spot market contracts was 0.260.  Being located in Nakuru district on 
the other hand significantly increased the likelihood that verbal and written contracts would 
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be used in the retailers’ transactions with buyers, with a marginal effect of -0.238. The 
marginal effect of Nakuru district for verbal contracts was significant with a marginal effect 
of -0.238. However, location had no effect on the use of written contracts. Thus for all 
transactions in the supply chain, operators in Nyandarua district were more likely to use spot 
market contracts while operators in Nakuru district were more likely to use relational based 
contracting.  
Gender of the retail operator also had a significant influence on the kind of coordination 
mechanisms used except for written contracts where its influence was not significant. Being a 
male retail operator increased the probability that the transaction would be carried out under 
spot market contracts (marginal effect of -0.114). Being a female retail operator on the other 
hand increased the likelihood that the transactions would be carried out using verbal contracts 
with a marginal effect of 0.095. The effect of gender on the type of coordination mechanism 
used is similar previous findings in retailer-supplier transactions. 
Table 7.6  Marginal effects of explanatory variables on the probability of coordination choice retailer-
buyer coordination  
 Description of variable  Spot  
market 
Verbal  
contracts 
Written  
contracts 
Constant  0.401 -0.264 -0.137* 
  (1.499) (-1.019) (-1.760) 
DISTRICT    Location of the retail outlets (1=Nakuru, 2= 
Nyandarua)  
0.260*** -0.238*** -0.021 
  (2.980) (-2.794) (-1.375) 
RESPSEX   Gender of operator (Male/female) -0.114** 0.095* 0.019 
  -(2.074) (1.774) (1.556) 
RESPAGE2   Age of operator in years 0.008*** -0.008`*** 0.000 
  (2.673) (-2.885) (1.137) 
QTYBOT_1  Quantity of milk sold in liters 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.663) (-0.752) (1.454) 
DISTANCE  Distance between milk retail outlet and milk 
buyer 
-0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000 
  (-2.927) (2.892) (0.930) 
CPRICE_1  Price of milk per liter in Kenya shillings -0.019** 0.016** 0.002 
  (-2.254) (2.033) (1.375) 
CREDITTI  Length of credit period (none, up to 2 weeks, 
monthly) 
-0,199*** 0.178*** 0.021* 
  (-4.460) (4.148) (1.755) 
RETCHAIN   Type/length of supply chain ( direct 
consumers, processors) 
-0.050 0.037 0.013 
  (-0.965) (0.726) (1.504) 
     
*** Significant at 1%, ** 5% and *10% 
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
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The age of the retail operator also played a significant role in influencing the use of spot 
market contracts as well as verbal contracts but not written contracts. Being a younger retail 
operator increased the probability that the transaction would be carried out using verbal 
contracts with a marginal effect of -0.008. The results also show that being an older retail 
operator increased the likelihood that the transaction would be carried out under spot market 
contracts with a marginal effect of 0.008. Age had no effect on the use of written contracts.  
Shorter distances between retail operators and milk buyers significantly raised the probability 
of using spot market contracts (marginal effect of -0.004). On the other hand, longer distances 
significantly increased the probability of using verbal contracts in the transactions (marginal 
effect of 0.004). Therefore it appears that retail outlets that are likely to use spot market 
contracts are those that sell within their neighborhoods or vicinity. On the other hand, retail 
operators selling in distant markets are those that were likely to use verbal contracts to 
safeguard their business relations in the light of the distances involved.  
Low milk prices increased the probability of using spot market contracts for the retail outlet 
operators (marginal effect of -0.019). The perishability of milk does allow for extensive 
negotiations to take place. This exerts pressure on prices received by the retail outlets. Higher 
milk selling prices significantly increased the probability of using verbal contracts (marginal 
effect of 0.016). In this case, buyers are willing to pay a higher price (over spot market prices) 
to safeguard continuous milk supplies.  
The length of credit period was also significant in explaining the probability of using the 
coordination mechanisms. The marginal effect of the length of credit period for spot market 
contracts was -0.199 indicating that shorter credit periods increased the probability that spot 
market contracts would be used in the transactions. However, longer credit periods increased 
the probability that verbal and written contracts would be used in the transactions with 
marginal effects of 0.172 and 0.021, respectively. Similar results were observed for 
transactions between the retail outlets and their suppliers. 
The type of retail chain was not significant in influencing any particular coordination 
mechanism. The coordination mechanisms were equally available to all retail supply chains 
whether to direct consumers or processing firms. 
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7.4 Determinants of supply chain performance in producer-buyer milk 
transactions 
Table 7.7 below presents ordered probit regression results for the determinants of supply 
chain performance in transactions between milk producers and buyers. The results show that 
the type of coordination mechanism used, experience of the operator, distance between the 
producers and the milk buyers, extent of the problem of lack of buyers and the length of credit 
period were not significant in influencing supply chain performance in transactions between 
milk producers and buyers. However, the positive coefficient for coordination mechanism 
implies that the possibility of higher performance was likely to be associated with verbal and 
written contracts than with spot market contracts. Similarly, the positive coefficient for 
experience shows that higher enterprise experience was most likely to be associated with 
better performance compared to lower experience. Furthermore, sales to distant buyers were 
more likely to be associated with higher levels of performance compared to nearer markets. 
On the other hand, the negative coefficients for buyer availability in the transactions indicates 
that lack of buyers increases the probability that performance in the supply chain would be 
lower and, for credit period, shorter credit periods (spot cash payments) were more likely to 
be associated with lower performance levels than transactions carried out under longer credit 
periods.  
For the significant variables, longer times before selling milk negatively influenced the level 
of supply chain performance. Producers that were able to sell their milk in longer times were 
more likely to be dissatisfied in their transactions. Longer times before selling were also 
significantly associated with moderate levels of performance in producer transactions. On the 
other hand, shorter selling times were highly associated with high performance in the 
transactions. The result can be attributed to reduced transaction costs arising from buyer 
search uncertainties, reduced wastages and low bargaining costs in the market.   
The milk selling price was significant and positively related to performance in producer-buyer 
transactions. Higher milk selling prices were likely to lead to higher supply chain 
performance. Lower selling prices were associated with low or moderate performance levels. 
This result is further corroborated by the results of other price related items such as presence 
or absence of pricing problems and price offers that were positively related to higher 
performance. Thus in general better or higher prices offers significantly increased the 
likelihood that milk producers would be satisfied in transactions with their partners and 
consequently the supply chain to which they belong were also likely to perform better. 
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Information flows and communications also played a vital role in influencing performance in 
producer-buyer transactions. Higher exchange of price and market information between milk 
producers and traders increased the likelihood that the milk producers would be satisfied in 
their transactions. This lack of information from traders was likely to lead to low or moderate 
performance compared to when adequate information is available. Information flows and 
communication on prices serves to assure producers that their milk is being sold under 
favorable terms. The result is also corroborated by the fact that higher information exchange 
takes place when relational based contracts rather than spot market based contracts are used.  
In summary, results on determinants of supply chain performance indicate that the main 
factors contributing to higher performance in transactions between milk producers and buyers 
are better milk price offers, shorter milk selling times and, better information and 
communications with the buyers. Low values on these variables were likely to bring about 
low or moderate performance among farmers. Such low supply chain performance may 
consequently affect the entire supply chain to which the farmers belong.  
Table 7.7: Ordered Probit parameter estimates for determinants of producer-buyer transaction 
performance  
Variable  Parameter estimate t-value 
COORDINATION .1801203786E-01 .165 
EXPERIENCE .7967351939E-02 1.211 
MILK SALE TIME -.4340082716E-01 -3.267*** 
DISTANCE .4815763036E-02 .271 
SELLING PRICE .6087252426E-01 2.803*** 
(LOW PRICE PROBLEM 1-3) .5858820749 7.481*** 
(BETTER PRICES OFFER 1-3) .3765882850 3.999*** 
LACK OF BUYERS  -.4523021554E-01 -.725 
CREDI PERIOD -.1063985158 -1.264 
TRADER INFO .2473232485 3.623*** 
Threshold         .14850694** 14.864*** 
 
N=340; χ2= 156.0962***; cell counts y0 =30, y1= 174, y2=135; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%        
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
7.5 Performance in retailer-supplier milk transactions 
In transactions between milk retailers and their suppliers, the type of coordination mechanism 
used was significant in determining the level of performance achieved in transactions between 
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retailers and milk suppliers. The use of written contracts increased the possibility of attaining 
higher performance levels compared to the use of spot market contracts. Written contracts 
ensure steady supplies of milk products and reduce the uncertainties of having to search for 
suppliers each time they want to transact. Thus verbal and written contracts were positively 
associated with high satisfaction in transactions between the retail outlets and the milk 
suppliers. The results are presented in table 7.8 below. 
The location of retail outlets also contributed to whether performance was likely to be high or 
low. Being located in Nakuru district was associated with higher satisfaction in supplier 
transactions compared to being located in Nyandarua district. Nakuru is associated with a 
better infrastructure, larger urban population relative to Nyandarua district and this could be a 
significant factor for the milk traders when sourcing for their milk. Relative to Nyandarua 
district, Nakuru faces lower transaction costs which are reflected in the performance levels 
attained by the agents. 
Retailers that sourced their milk directly from other traders rather than directly from farmers 
were less likely to be satisfied in their transactions. Sourcing milk from the farms is difficult 
especially when producers are small in size and dispersed but is associated with lower farm 
gate prices and milk quality can be monitored compared to the case when traders are used as 
suppliers. However, direct milk supplies from farms is not able to guarantee high 
performance, a result that can be attributed to high transaction costs of trading with small and 
dispersed milk producers.  
Results on the effect of milk purchase prices indicated that higher prices did not significantly 
influence high performance. However, low prices were significantly associated with low 
performance in transactions with milk suppliers. Since retailers thrive on margins between 
purchase and sales prices, this result seems to go against expectations. However, when looked 
at in conjunction with the previous result on sources of milk supplies, the result becomes 
clear. Accessing the lower farm gate milk prices for most retailers is associated with higher 
transaction costs as the traders would need to trade with a very large number of producers. 
Traders are therefore likely to forego the lower farm gate prices in favor transacting with 
other traders despite the higher milk purchase prices. It is also possible to establish long term 
trading relations with the few transaction partners which saves on transaction costs. Thus 
lower milk purchase prices do not necessarily lead to higher performance levels for the milk 
retailers.  
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Results on the effect of the importance of price offers in the transactions indicate that good 
milk price offers significantly increased the likelihood of the retailers being satisfied in their 
transactions with milk suppliers. The results imply that prices arrived at are likely to have 
been reached through negotiations with suppliers and thus are acceptable to them or in the 
case of transactions with the producers, the retailers are able to extract a favorable price from 
them due to their large sizes.  
Table 7.8 Ordered Probit parameter estimates for determinants of retailer-supplier transaction 
performance 
Variable  Parameter estimate t-value 
COORDINATION .3324759033 2.264** 
DISTRICT -.5251692522 -2.691*** 
TYPE OF MILK SUPPLIER  -.6314276746 -2.888*** 
MILK PRURCHASE PRICE .5105358203E-01 1.649* 
TRADER INFO .2017831213  1.623* 
NEIGHBORHOOD INFO .1580122432  1.396 
RELIABLE .4642593592     2.279** 
LATE PAYMENT 
PROBLEMS 
.9428563372E-01   .998    
BETTER PRICE OFFERS .4597450687 3.546*** 
   
       Threshold 1.935489705***        13.801***   
 
N=256, χ2= 74.70575***, cell counts: y0 =27, y1= 138, y2=91 *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
Information flows and communications were only marginally significant in influencing the 
level of satisfaction with retailer-supplier transactions. Higher information exchanges had the 
potential to lead to higher performance in transactions between the retailers and their milk 
suppliers. However, the effect of information from both traders and the neighborhoods were 
not statistically significant.  
Supplier reliability also contributed to the observed level of performance in retailer-supplier 
transactions. Higher levels of reliability among milk suppliers increased the likelihood that 
performance would be higher. This result underscores the need to transact with a small set of 
partners who can be monitored or vetted for reliability compared to a large number of 
partners.  
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In summary the results show that the main factors that contribute to higher levels of 
satisfaction in retailer-supplier transactions are use of relational based coordination 
mechanisms (verbal to written contracts), better price offers, better market information flows 
and communications, and high supplier reliability. On the other hand, retailers were not 
satisfied with direct supplies of milk from the farms. Retailers in Nakuru were also not 
satisfied in their transactions with milk suppliers.  
7.6 Performance in retailer-buyer milk transactions 
Table 7.9 below shows probit results for the determinants of performance in retailer-buyer 
transactions. Performance was measured on two-point scale; low performance and high 
performance, necessitating the use of a binary probit model according to whether the retailers 
were satisfied or not in transactions with their partners.  
Reliability of buyers was important in influencing the level of satisfaction of milk retailers in 
their transactions with milk buyers. High buyer reliability therefore increased the possibility 
of higher satisfaction in retailer-buyer transactions. Reliability coupled with better or higher 
prices significantly increase the chances that the retailers would be satisfied in their 
transactions with milk buyers. Better information flows and communications with buyers 
were also positively associated with higher satisfaction in the retailer-buyer transactions. The 
presence of adequate numbers of buyers in the market also increased the chances of higher 
performance for the retailers.  
The type of coordination mechanism did not significantly influence the level of performance 
but the positive coefficient implies that written contracts and verbal contracts were likely to 
be associated with high performance relative to spot market contracts. Similarly, absence of 
quality problems in the milk transactions increased the possibility of attaining higher 
performance levels in retailer-buyer transactions. 
On the other hand, difficulties in finding alternative milk buyers were significantly associated 
with lower satisfaction in retailer-buyer transactions. This is a reflection of thin markets and 
high transaction costs that prevail in the market. Other factors that were not statistically 
significant but which had a negative effect on performance were transport problems and low 
educational levels, both of which were associated with low satisfaction levels in the retailer-
buyer transactions.  
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Table 7.9: Probit parameter estimates for determinants of retailer-buyer transaction performance 
Variable  Parameter estimate t-value 
COORDINATION .2194394777 1.370 
RELIABLE BUYER .4337364493      1.985** 
BETTER PRICE OFFERS .5142616726       2.752*** 
EASE OF GETTING ALTERNATIVE BUYERS -.3765049414        -1.646* 
TRADER INFO .2188633291        1.673* 
TRANSPORT PROBLEMS -.6350597871E-01     -.328  
LACK OF BUYERS  .3415152379        1.676* 
MILK QUALITY PROBLEMS   .2051858289        1.036 
LOW PRICES  .8633960018        3.698*** 
DISTANCE -.1779919575E-02   -.531    
MILK SALE PRICE .7931179265E-01   3.172*** 
EDUCATION LEVEL -.6971414959E-02   -.210    
 
N=278, χ2= 76.67823***, Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-squared = 6.62311, P-value= .57779,  
McFaden =.20803, cell counts: y0 =105, y1= 173, *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%        
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
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CHAPTER 8   
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 presents a summary of the major findings in 
the study. Section 8.2 discusses the implications of the study for industry and policy in light 
of the findings and section 8.3 suggests areas for further research in light of the changes 
occurring in the dairy industry in Kenya.  
8.1 Summary  
The study has investigated two main issues among the market participating agents in the 
Kenyan milk supply chains. The first issue was to identify and evaluate the determinants of 
coordination mechanisms used in the Kenyan fresh milk supply chains. The second was to 
identify and evaluate the determinants of supply chain performance in the milk supply chains. 
The issues were investigated for transactions between milk producers and their buyers, 
between retail outlets and their suppliers, and between the retail outlets and their buyers. 
Coordination was defined by the kind of contracts used in transactions between the sellers and 
the buyers of milk. Three types of coordination mechanisms were identified in the milk 
supply chains; spot market based contracts, verbal contracts and written contracts. On the 
other hand, supply chain performance was defined by the extent to which the supply chain 
partners were satisfied with key aspects of their transactions with their partners and was 
measured on likert type scales. 
To investigate the two issues, primary data was collected on commercial dairy activities from 
two districts in Kenya, Nakuru and Nyandarua districts. The data collected comprised of the 
agents’ socioeconomic characteristics, farm/firm specific factors, transaction cost 
characteristics and performance related aspects such as prices, milk quantities, milk quality, 
information flows and communications, and transaction partner reputation and 
trustworthiness. The data was collected using questionnaires that were personally 
administered to milk producers and traders in the two districts between April and September 
2005. Two econometric models were applied to analyze the collected data. A multinomial 
logit model was applied to analyze the determinants of coordination mechanisms while an 
ordered probit model was applied to analyze data for determinants of supply chain 
performance. Both models were run in LIMDEP™   econometric software. Additional 
descriptive analyses were carried in SPSS™ statistical software. 
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Determinants of coordination mechanisms 
The results of multinomial logit model showed that in all transactions between the milk sellers 
and buyers, agents in Nakuru district favored employing verbal and written contracts but their 
counterparts in Nyandarua district were more disposed to using spot market contracts. 
Socioeconomic characteristics however had no influence on the kind of governance mode 
used by the producers except for enterprise experience. Enterprise experience was significant 
in explaining the use of verbal contracts only in producer-buyer transactions. The role of 
gender was prominent in the traders’ transactions with the milk suppliers and milk buyers. 
Male retail operators were likely to use spot market contracts while their female counterparts 
were disposed to using verbal and written contracts. The age of the operator also played a role 
in transactions between milk retailers and buyers such that older retail operators were inclined 
to use spot market contracts while younger retail operators were more likely to use verbal and 
written contracts. 
The results also show that the three components of transaction costs (information and market 
search, negotiation and monitoring costs) were significant in explaining the kind of 
coordination mechanisms employed. In all the three transaction types, the length of credit 
period played a significant role in determining the kind of coordination mechanisms used. 
Short credit periods favored use of spot market contracts while long credit periods increased 
the likelihood that verbal and written contracts would be used, which shows the importance of 
monitoring and enforcement costs in the milk transactions. Monitoring costs were further 
underlined by the importance attached to legal contracts in producers’ transactions with their 
buyers. Legal contracts were not significant in trader transactions.  
Market and information search problems were exemplified in various ways in the milk 
transactions. In producer-buyer transactions, producers that did not have adequate market 
information had a high probability of using spot market contracts while those that had access 
to more information were more likely to use verbal and written contracts. On the other hand, 
the effect of information on the type of coordination mechanisms in retailer-supplier 
transactions depended on the type of information source. Two sources of price information 
were significant in the retailer-supplier transactions. Information from traders increased the 
likelihood of using relational based coordination mechanisms while government information 
sources increased the likelihood of using spot market contracts in the transactions. The effect 
of market information on retailer-buyer transactions was not significant. 
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Further indicators of market search costs were reflected in distances and times required to 
reach the buyers or sellers. Distance to market was significant in influencing the use of 
written contracts in transactions between the producers and the buyers. Longer distances 
increased the likelihood that written contracts would be used with similar results being 
reflected in retailer-buyer transactions. However, in retailer-supplier transactions, the most 
important component was the time required to reach the milk suppliers. Longer times to reach 
suppliers were associated with spot market contracts while shorter times were associated with 
verbal and written contracts.   
The results also show that more negotiation costs were present in producer’s transactions with 
the buyers. One measure of the negotiation costs was prices received or paid for the milk. In 
producer-buyer transactions, low prices were associated with verbal and written contracts 
while high prices were associated with spot market contracts. On the other hand, in 
transactions between retailers and buyers, low prices were associated with spot market 
contracts and high prices with verbal and written contracts. The lower spot market prices are a 
result of the competition in the retail markets where buyers have many outlets to choose from. 
In this case, retailers are price takers with little influence on the prices consumers pay. 
However, the retailers seem to be able to negotiate with processing firms and other buyers for 
favorable prices which may be attributed to the size of their operations.  
Buyer/supplier availability was important in transactions between producers and their buyers 
and between retailers and their milk suppliers. In both cases, low buyer/supplier availability 
increased the likelihood that spot market contracts would be used while the presence of an 
adequate number of buyers or suppliers increased the probability that verbal and written 
contracts would be used in the transactions. The significance of buyer availability implies that 
producers are compelled to transact in open markets with the implication that the anxiety to 
sell their milk as fast as possible denies them bargaining strength in the market. Sales in the 
open markets therefore prevail in the absence of adequate numbers of buyers, and in retailer-
supplier transactions, when low supplier unreliability and lack of personal relations among the 
transacting parties prevail in the transactions. Another important factor in producers’ and 
retailers’ transactions with their buyers and suppliers is the time needed to sell the milk which 
indicates that shorter times to sell milk were associated with spot market contracts while 
longer times to sell were associated with verbal and written contracts. This finding reinforces 
the results on lack of buyers and the urgency to sell milk that characterizes the use of spot 
market contracts and consequently contributes to the low bargaining power (especially) 
among the milk producers. A summary of these results is presented in table 8.1 below 
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Table 8.1 Determinants of coordination mechanisms in the milk supply chains  
Factor  Spot market contracts Verbal contracts  Written contracts 
Location Nyandarua Nakuru Nakuru 
Gender  Males Females Females  
Age  Older  Younger  Younger  
Experience  Low  High  Not significant 
Trader Information 
sources 
Low  High  High 
Government information 
sources  
High  Low  Low  
Distance to partners Short  Long  Long  
Time to reach market Long  Short  Short  
Time to sell milk Long  Short  Not significant 
Prices of milk Lower for suppliers,  
high for producers 
High  Lower for producers, 
high for retailers 
Reliability/relations Low  High  High 
Buyer availability Low  High Not significant 
Length of credit period Low High High 
Importance of legal 
contracts 
Low High  High 
Source: Survey Results, 2006. 
Determinants of supply chain performance 
The ordered probit model results show that socioeconomic characteristics did not significantly 
influence performance in the fresh milk supply chains at both producer and retailer stages of 
the milk supply chain. But one firm specific factor, location of firm, was significant in the 
traders’ transactions with their milk suppliers. Traders in Nyandarua district appear to 
experience difficulties in getting milk supplies and are thus less satisfied in their transactions. 
The difficulties in milk supplies in Nyandarua district could be attributed to the prevalence of 
higher transaction costs arising from thin markets and infrastructural problems. Location did 
not have a significant influence on performance in producer-buyer and retailer-buyer 
transactions. Another significant firm specific factor in the retailer-supplier transactions was 
the type of milk supplier.  Milk supplies from other traders rather than from farmers led to 
lower performance levels, a result attributed to high purchase prices and quality problems, 
however, farm supplies did not guarantee higher performance possibly due to the higher 
transaction costs associated with transacting with individual farmers.  
The type of coordination mechanism used had a significant influence on the performance of 
retailer-supplier transactions but not between producers and their buyers or retailers and their 
buyers. However, in all cases, coordination mechanisms were positive in effect implying that 
there was possibility of higher performance with respect to verbal and written contracts. Use 
of spot market contracts was likely to lead to lower satisfaction levels than use of verbal and 
written contracts.    
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Transaction cost characteristics were significant at all stages of the fresh milk supply chain. 
The main transaction cost characteristics influencing the level of performance at the producer 
stage of the supply chain were mainly negotiation cost factors such as milk selling prices and 
the length of time taken to sell the milk and information and market search factors 
(information sources from traders). The results were also mirrored in retailer-supplier 
transactions and retailer-buyer transactions, where similar factors were significant 
determinants of supply chain performance in the milk transactions. Monitoring cost related 
factors did not play a significant role in the producer-buyer performance but the presence of 
partner reliability was an important safeguard in selecting the kind of transaction partners so 
as to minimize the possibility of opportunism. 
8.2 Implications of the study for policy  
Changing institutional set up and liberalization 
The changing institutional set up in the agricultural sectors in most developing countries does 
not call for widespread and direct state interventions in industries that have been recently 
liberalized. However, this does not imply that the government has no role to play in these 
industries. The challenge facing governments in developing countries is in ensuring that the 
benefits of institutional changes accrue to the largest portion of its populace, rather than to a 
few individuals. In the agricultural sector, consumers and producers are the two major groups 
of interest and the effects of the institutional changes should be seen in terms of how they 
affect the two groups. Furthermore, the sustainability of the industries dependents on how 
satisfied the consumers and producers are with the changes. Consumers’ interest lies in being 
able to access agricultural products at affordable prices, that is, getting value for their limited 
resources. For the producers, it is in being able to proportionally share in the benefits accruing 
from their activities rather than all the rents accruing to a few agents in the industry. This 
study has important implications for the two groups and on the sustainability of the benefits 
accruing from the liberalization of the dairy industry and in extension, the entire agricultural 
sector. 
The implications of the institutional changes on coordination in the milk industry can be 
looked at from the benefit-cost point of view. In moving from the single processing firm in 
the pre-liberalization period, to the current regime where the number of participants in the 
milk supply chain has increased tremendously, several points arise. First and foremost, the 
large number of processing firms that came up after liberalization provided milk producers 
with a chance to exercise their choice over who to trade with in order to maximize their net 
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benefits. This benefit of choice however seems to be limited to a few regions while other 
regions are yet to experience the benefits (Nyandarua district is an example here). Despite the 
fact that Nyandarua district is one of the highest milk producing districts in the country, 
farmers have not benefited much from the changes due to lack of milk processing firms in the 
district. Empirical results have shown that when producers are faced with lack of adequate 
buyers, low market information, and the urgency to sell the milk, they resort to using spot 
market contracts. The results on performance also indicated that producers taking short times 
to sell are likely to perform better in the market. Since most of the producers who use spot 
market contracts come from Nyandarua district, it can be inferred that the performance of 
milk producers in the district is low and that the exposure to the open market transactions has 
not benefited them due to limited bargaining power. Therefore prevalence of spot market 
contracts in Nyandarua district is an indicator of institutional and organizational failure rather 
than market efficiency. These failures have been detrimental to both milk producers and 
consumers of processed milk. 
 Farmer cooperative organizations 
The nature of the production system that consists of many small producers means that 
transaction costs are relevant to them. Their small sizes cannot allow them individually and 
separately to reap economies of scale or impact favorably on the market. Their semi 
commercial nature further implies that productivity is low. It is costly for the producers to 
search for markets for their products. Transaction costs are therefore relevant to these 
producers. One way of addressing the problem of transaction costs is through farmer 
cooperative organizations. 
Institutions in the dairy industry are undergoing changes. The dominant organizations before 
liberalization were farmer cooperative organizations. But a large number of the cooperatives 
have since failed and therefore deliberate steps are required to ensure that more cooperative 
organizations and institutions are set up in the agricultural supply chains. In some areas 
farmer groups are being formed as alternatives to cooperative societies. Brokers and agents 
are also emerging in the dairy industry, buying milk from producers and selling to processing 
firms and or other traders or consumers. Brokers and agents are trying to fill the gaps left by 
cooperative societies. Smaller traders (mobile traders) have also come up to deliver milk from 
the farms directly to the consumers, especially in the urban areas. The main difference 
between these upcoming modes of organizations and farmer cooperatives is that they are 
private enterprises. However, they play an important role in directing the farmers’ milk to the 
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market. Until farmers themselves come up with their own organizations to use in organizing 
their production for the market, the benefits in the milk supply chain will continue accruing to 
the middlemen while farmers receive only marginal benefits for their milk. Empirical results 
indicated that it will be difficult for farmers to have an impact in the market or endear 
themselves to partners in the supply chains when acting singly. Middlemen and other retail 
outlet operators prefer to transact directly with farmers due to favorable farm gate prices and 
ability to monitor milk quality, however, direct farm supplies was not able to significantly 
lead to high performance levels.    
Cooperatives are supposed to provide small producers with a means of reducing transaction 
costs they face through substituting individual information search, quality control, market 
search and monitoring for the group activity. Transport costs can be lower through collective 
action. The problem of small size productions is reduced by accumulating their quantities into 
one unit. Cooperatives can also guarantee a more or less continuous supply of products for 
other chain members. The failure of these member owned organizations further raises 
transaction and other costs that the participants (especially producers) face in the market. 
With the failure of cooperatives, horizontal co-ordination through collection and 
transportation is lost for the producers. The results have indicated that retail operators 
sourcing their milk directly from farmers were more likely to be satisfied or likely to perform 
better compared to those who got their milk from other traders. Transaction costs were higher 
for direct farm supplies since direct farm supplies involve searching for and transacting with 
very many small farmers individually but compensated with favorable farm gate prices.  In 
such a case, the transaction costs faced by retailers outweigh the benefits arising from the 
lower farm gate prices. Cooperative organizations can therefore play a vital role in reducing 
the transaction costs (especially the bargaining costs) to ensure that they are not taken 
advantage of due to their small sizes.  
The results have consequences for the policy makers in charge of the cooperative movement 
to assist in providing guidelines and education to farmers on the importance of cooperatives 
and their role in the milk supply chains and essentially in identifying the causes for the failure 
of farmer cooperative organizations. Cooperatives enable farmers to increase their role in the 
milk supply chain and share in the rents available in the market with their consumers through 
increased bargaining power in the market. Cooperatives increase the possibility of reducing 
transaction costs for the producers and thus making them attractive partners to transact with in 
the milk supply chain.   Cooperative organizations should be strengthened to assist the small 
scale farmers to achieve their goals.  
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Importance of stable contractual arrangements  
The study also has implications for the sustainability of the dairy enterprises in the country 
especially the competitiveness of the milk supply chains. There is need to come up with 
successful milk supply chains that are able to compete against each other in the market. 
Farmers have to identify which supply chain partners they can link up with in order to deliver 
affordable and quality milk products to consumers. This is due to the realization that full 
commercialization of the dairy industry improves milk producers’ production methods hence 
making them more efficient and competitive. 
For sustainability and competitiveness to be achieved, the consumer has to be taken into 
consideration. Milk prices must be within what the consumer can afford otherwise farmers 
will not find it worthwhile to invest if they can not sell their milk. The implications are that 
supply chain members have to add value in the supply chains for the benefit of the consumers. 
Unnecessary costs must be eliminated in the supply chains. This requires foregoing short term 
gains to establish supply chains that can bring value to the consumers. Close working 
relations with supply chain partners is necessary to achieve competitiveness in the supply 
chains. In this regard, the use of explicit contracts and relational based contracting will be 
necessary coupled with information exchange. The results indicated that quantities of milk 
handled under written contracts were generally higher than under alternative coordination 
mechanisms. Performance results also showed that agents using relational based contracting 
were more likely to be satisfied in their transactions with their partners than those relying on 
the spot market contracts to transact their milk. Verbal contracts are an important component 
of the milk transactions, however, as the results demonstrate, verbal contracts are not 
adequate to guarantee the producers and traders full sale of their milk. They are also restricted 
within the locality of the agents. It therefore means that the highest potential for all 
participants lies in being able to find markets beyond their localities where verbal contracts 
may no longer be effective. Written contracts are therefore likely to play a crucial role to 
safeguard all the agents involved. Use of written contracts should make it easier for the 
farmers to increase their investments in their enterprises and consequently benefit from their 
commercial activities.  
Processing firms and milk prices 
The importance of the processing firms in the milk supply chain is that they ensure that 
consumers are able to access milk when they need it, and that farmers are given chance to 
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expand their production due to the large quantities of milk the firms are able to buy. Though 
the number of processing firms was initially high, some are now inactive and concentration is 
going on in the industry. Some market power is thus exercised over the small producers in 
matters regarding quality and quantity of the milk. However, the large number of small 
producers may make it difficult to carry out monitoring activities due to the high transaction 
costs involved. Buying in bulk or in larger quantities and regularity and stability of delivery is 
of interest for the processors and other buyers. The prices paid for milk deliveries reflect the 
differences in transaction costs, and consequently their performance differentials.  
The main challenges facing processing firms in the milk supply chain is utilization of their 
installed processing capacity. This problem is compounded by the fact that the prices of 
processed milk are usually beyond the reach of most consumers. Processing firms thus incur 
high fixed costs which are passed over to consumers further shrinking the consumer base for 
processed milk. It is necessary for the processing firms to increase efficiency in milk 
processing so as to keep the costs and prices to consumers low to stimulate more consumption 
of milk. This will further improve capacity utilization and lead to further price reductions. 
Uptake of milk from producers will also increase. Thus the findings have implications for the 
management of the private firms involved in the dairy industry to increase their efficiency as 
they are necessary for the sustainability and full commercialization of the dairy industry.  
Information flows in the supply chains 
The study identifies two major sources of market information and their importance in 
affecting the amount of transaction costs in the milk supply chains: public and private 
information sources. The study shows that agents that did not have advance price information 
sold their milk using spot markets contracts while those who had the information entered into 
verbal and written contracts. For the farmers, the source of market information was not 
important rather the availability of the information. But for the traders, the effect of the 
information depended on the source of the information. The information needs of producers 
and traders are not exactly the same. Farmers prefer information that is generally available 
irrespective of the sources. For the traders, information exchange among them led to more use 
of verbal and written contracts while availability of public market information was likely to 
increase use of spot market contracts.  
Despite the differences in the information sources, public information is necessary to make 
the market more transparent. The consequence is that public information sources improve the 
market condition for all participants while private information is used to benefit only a few 
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agents in the market. Furthermore, higher information availability was positively associated 
with satisfaction in transactions with their partners. The results also point to the necessity of 
setting up market information bureaus to assist market participants make informed decisions 
in their transactions. This recommendation can be supported by the result that price 
knowledge was more likely to lead to better contracts being crafted thus reducing 
opportunistic tendencies among the supply chain partners. In this case, the role of the Kenya 
Dairy Board should be re-evaluated to incorporate dairy information dissemination within the 
dairy industry.  
Infrastructural facilities and other public goods  
The information problems facing the farmers and traders are also as a result of inability to 
access markets due to poor transport infrastructure. Poor infrastructure is represented by poor 
road conditions and lack of proper means of transport. This implies that distances may not 
necessarily be long but that it takes a long time to get to the market. As such, agents are not 
able to access the market on time. A remedy for this problem can be provided by the 
government undertaking policies aimed at improving access to milk producing areas. This 
will ensure faster access to the markets and consequently access the necessary information for 
their transactions.  Information costs are a vital component of fixed transaction costs that can 
determine whether one participates in the market or not or whether a particular coordination 
mechanism is optimal or not. Thus improvement of transport infrastructure and provision of 
market information are vital interventions in reducing both the fixed transaction costs and the 
subsequent variable transaction costs.  
The interventions are based on the observation that the nature of the transaction costs faced 
keep changing and can be affected by the supply chain partners or the government’s policies 
regarding efforts to reduce the transaction costs. Such policies and efforts include 
infrastructural reforms (such as road construction, provision of market information), and 
mechanisms to improve legal redress that may arise from the contractual obligations of the 
partners. This is basically in the provision of public goods that benefit all the participants in 
the industry. Thus state can play an important role by providing or improving the institutional 
environment and physical infrastructural facilities, which are public goods. This should be 
able to address a number of transaction costs related to information and market search and 
monitoring and enforcement costs. The number and types of transaction costs are likely to be 
reduced for the benefit of the dairy industry and the agricultural sector as a whole. 
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Government participation in business 
There have been efforts by the government to participate in the dairy sector especially in the 
processing of milk. However, the participation has been in terms of being one of the 
processing firms on commercial basis and to act as a market leader to stabilize the industry. 
Such efforts have not hindered the private sectors’ participation, as long as it is run purely on 
commercial basis. The reason for the re-entry into the market was that the market was facing 
problems following the failure of the sole milk processing firm after liberalization. Farmers 
had limited outlets for their milk and the need to correct this situation led to revamping of the 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries into a new firm New KCC Ltd, now a parastatal body. The 
government’s investment in the firm should help stabilize the milk market and provide chance 
for the farmers to come up with appropriate organizational forms that they can use to 
negotiate with other supply chain members for their benefit. However, the government 
should, with time, reduce its ownership in the firm in favor of private ownership (e.g. issue 
shares to the public and farmers) to minimize political interference in its management and in 
its commercial orientation. 
8.3 Directions for further research 
The role of information in both the kind of coordination mechanisms used and on the 
performance of the supply chains has been shown to be significant. However, information 
comes in different types. Private information supports formation of relational based 
contracting modes to the exclusion of the market. Government or public sources of 
information encourages not only the development of market based transactions but also 
provides a basis for coming up with better relational based contracts especially written 
contracts. There is need to design information systems that can serve the various parties in the 
supply chains. In this regard, there is need to evaluate the relative merits and feasibility of the 
various information sources and their implications for the participants in the milk supply 
chain. It is also important to design how this information can be disseminated in the industry 
and the costs that are likely to arise from the provision of the services and who is going to pay 
for it. This will also help place the Kenya Dairy Board’s functions in perspective and the 
possibility of the organization playing the role of information dissemination in the industry.  
An evaluation of transaction costs and coordination at the production and trader/retailer levels 
of the supply chain has been investigated. Furthermore, some downstream members in the 
milk supply chain have been included in the study. For a holistic approach to the supply 
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chain, other agents need to be incorporated in future studies. The agents include milk 
processing firms and input suppliers as they play an equally vital role in the industry. Specific 
interest is on the nature of transaction costs that the processing firms and input suppliers face 
and how the costs affect their performance in order to minimize or eliminate them to create 
value in the entire supply chain for the benefit of consumers. This will enable the alignment of 
the supply chains for maximum effect in serving the consumers and benefiting the agents as 
well. 
Performance measurement has been arrived at based on subjective evaluations of the extent of 
satisfaction with key aspects of the supply chain transactions. A further step in this 
measurement process is to incorporate more quantitative supply chain performance measures 
in the analysis. Quantitative supply chain performance measures are still developing and it 
would be of interest to show how close or divergent the quantitative supply chain 
performance measures are from the qualitative supply chain performance measures in the 
milk supply chains.  
The study has focused on small and medium scale milk producers as they constitute the 
majority of the milk producers. It would be of interest to compare the transaction costs faced 
by the small and medium scale producers on the one hand and the large scale milk producers 
on the other. This will permit a full appreciation of the differences or similarities in the milk 
production enterprises in the country that may be valuable for policy making purposes and 
improvement of the commercial orientation of the milk producers.  
Cooperative societies and farmer groups have been recommended as some of the important 
institutions that can assist the milk producers in increasing their bargaining power in their 
supply chains and in the reduction of the myriad transaction costs facing the small and 
medium scale commercial milk producers. An evaluation of performance of farmer 
cooperative organizations vis-à-vis other private intermediaries (middlemen) may help 
identify areas of weaknesses for the farmer organizations and help them to improve their 
services.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Questionnaires for Milk Producers 
 
Questionnaire Number  
Enumerator  _________________ 
Sub-location  _________________ 
Division   _________________ 
      District   _________________ 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge. 
 
1. When did you begin keeping dairy animals and with how many cows? Please state the year and the number 
of cows. 
 
Year        Number of cows  
 
 
2. What kind of milk products do you currently handle? Please provide also information about the milk 
products as requested in the table. 
 
Product  Average 
quantity per 
day 
Units of 
measure 
Do you sell 
product? Yes/No 
How long it 
takes   
to sell 
product 
Quantity able to sell 
before expiry or spoilage 
Fresh milk      
Yoghurt      
Cheese       
Mala/fermented      
Other (specify)      
 
3.  
a) What type of milk cows do you keep? Please tick the appropriate ones and also indicate their numbers.  
 
         Type                                         Number 
   1)     Indigenous cows 
 
  2)     Cross breeds 
 
   3)     Pure breeds (Grade) 
 
b) Which one of the following grazing systems best describes your dairy operation? Please tick as 
appropriate?   
1) Zero grazing system 
2) Open grazing without supplements 
3) Open grazing with supplements 
4) Tethering 
5) Other, specify  
  
4.  
a. How much milk do you currently produce per day on average? Please state also the units of 
measure. 
 
   Highest amount   per day  Lowest amount produced  
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b) What quantity of the milk is consumed by your family per day on average? Please fill in the box the 
amount and the units of measure used.  
           
      Amount    units of measure  
 
   
 
b. Considering the amount of milk in the question above (question 4 above), how does this amount 
compare to what you produced in the previous year and what you expect in the coming year? 
Please tick as applicable.  
 
Compared to this year,           
last year was ….    Next year is expected to be …….. 
 
More      More 
The same     The same 
Less      Less 
  
 
 
5. a) What is the size of your dairy related workforce? Please state their number. 
     Permanent  ___________________________ 
     Casual   ___________________________ 
     Family labor ___________________________ 
 
b) What major costs do you usually incur in your milk operations? Please provide also information about 
the costs by filling in and ticking as applicable. 
 
   
Cost component Quantity/amount  Frequency Trend over last five years 
   Increasing Constant Decreasing 
Wages      
Power      
Fuel       
Water      
Forages and hay      
Veterinary and drugs      
Feed/concentrates      
Transport costs      
Others (specify)      
(NB: frequency = daily, weekly, bi-weekly or monthly) 
 
 
6. Who are the main buyers of your milk products? Please provide also the following information about them 
in the table below. 
Type of buyer  Quantity 
bought 
Units Distance 
in km 
Average 
time 
Transport 
means 
Transport 
costs 
Who 
delivers/ 
collects 
Commi-
ssions 
Neighbors        
Hotels        
Milk bar/kiosk        
Cooperatives        
Farmer groups        
Processors        
Mobile traders        
 
Brokers         
Others(specify)         
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7. What reasons explain why you trade with your current buyers? Please tick as applicable. 
 
a) Neighbors 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
b) Hotels  
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
c) Milk bars/kiosk 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
 
 
 
c) Cooperatives 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
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d) Processors  
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
e) Mobile traders 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
f) Others, please specify 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
8. Which of the following best describes the buying frequency of your customers? Please indicate by ticking as 
applicable below. 
  
Type of buyer  Regular buyer Irregular buyer 
Neighbors   
Hotels   
Milk bar/kiosk   
Cooperatives   
Farmer groups   
Processors   
Mobile traders   
Brokers   
Others(specify)   
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9. Which of the following best captures your knowledge of milk prices in the market? Please tick one for each 
of your buyers? 
 
 
Type of buyer  I always know 
prices in advance 
I sometimes know 
prices in advance 
I hardly know prices 
in advance 
Other please 
specify 
Neighbors     
Hotels     
Milk bar/kiosk     
Cooperatives     
Farmer groups     
Processors     
Mobile traders     
Brokers     
Others(specify)     
 
 
10. How useful are each of the following as sources of market price information for your milk? Please tick as 
appropriate using the scale: 1 = not useful 2= a little useful  3= useful 4= very useful  
 
 1 2 3 4 
Information source Not useful A little useful useful Very useful 
From neighbors and other producers     
From traders and buyers     
From government organizations     
Through mass media (radio, TV, Newspapers)     
Through negotiations     
Others, please specify     
 
 
11. In the table below you are requested to provide information on your buyers by filling as appropriate in the 
table.   
  
Type of buyer  Price units Price over last one 
year 
 Quantity sold under each method of payment 
   low High cash In 
kind 
Credit sales 
       Length of 
credit 
Quantity paid within 
credit period 
Neighbors         
Hotels         
Milk bar/kiosk         
Cooperatives         
Farmer groups         
Processors         
Mobile traders         
Brokers         
Others(specify)         
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12. For each of the buyers of your milk, what kind of selling arrangements do you use? Please provide also 
information about the agreements by filling in the table below. 
 
 
 Quantity sold under each type of selling agreement 
 No 
agreements 
Verbal agreements Written agreements 
Type of buyer  Quantity Duration of 
agreements 
Quantity Duration of 
agreement 
Quantity 
Neighbors      
Hotels      
Milk bar/kiosk      
Cooperatives      
Farmer groups      
Processors      
Mobile traders      
Brokers      
Others(specify)      
 
 
13. If you were to increase the quantity of milk produced for example by 50% (half), how much would you be 
able to sell successfully) Please tick one. 
 
I would be able to sell all of it 
 
I would be able to sell part of it 
 
I would not be able to sell at all 
 
I don’t know 
 
 
14. Please indicate by ticking how often you experienced shortages and excess milk production in your 
enterprise over the last year. 
 
Always  Sometimes  Rarely  Never 
Shortages 
 
Excess supplies  
 
15. How serious are each of the following problems in your trading with your buyers) Please indicate the 
seriousness by ticking using a scale of 1- very serious, 2-serious, 3-moderate and 4- not a problem. 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Type of problem Very serious  Serious Moderate Not a problem 
Milk is not collected      
Milk goes bad while being transported or handled     
There are not enough buyers in the market     
Water/chemicals are added to milk by buyers     
Our buyers fail to pay us on time     
Prices are sometimes too low     
Others, please specify      
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16. What quantity of your milk is wasted on average at each of the following points? Please indicate also how 
frequent this problem occurs on average in a month by filling below. 
 
           
Point where loss occurs  Quantity lost or wasted How frequent (times)  problem 
occurs in a month 
On farm during and after milking   
During transport   
Suring storage (spoilage)   
Failure to collect or deliver milk   
Others (please specify)   
 
 
17. In cases of milk scarcity, how much milk are you normally able to offer each of your buyers on average? 
Please tick as appropriate for each of your buyers. 
 
Type of buyer  Full share Less than full share None  
Neighbors    
Hotels    
Milk bar/kiosk    
Cooperatives    
Farmer groups    
Processors    
Mobile traders    
Brokers    
Others(specify)    
 
                
18. In cases of excess milk production, what happens to the extra milk? Please tick the appropriate ones form 
the list below.  
 
 
Sell at reduced prices 
 
Use at home 
 
Find new buyers for it 
 
Convert into other milk products to sell later 
 
Dispose or give away free 
 
Others, (please specify) 
       
                                             
19. What other arrangements would you prefer for your milk given your available resources and abilities? 
Please tick the appropriate arrangement below. 
 
I would prefer to increase amounts of milk I produce and sell 
 
I would prefer to produce less 
 
I would prefer no change 
 
Others, please specify 
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20. Using a five point scale where 1 is very unsatisfied, 3 is neutral, and 5 is very satisfied, please indicate by 
ticking how satisfied you are with the following aspects of your relationships with the selected buyer(s) over 
the last 12 months. 
 
Neighbors 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Hotels 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
 
Milk bars/kiosks 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
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Cooperatives 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Other farmer groups 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
 
Processors  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
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Mobile traders 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Brokers  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Others, please specify 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
Please tell us more about yourself now by ticking one  
 
21. Sex of respondent (please tick one)  
 
Male 
 
Female 
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22. Position in enterprise 
 
Owner 
 
Employee 
 
Other, please specify 
 
 
23. Year of birth  
 
 
24. Your  Highest Education level attained (please tick) 
 
   None   Class 1-4   Class 5-8   
 
  Form I-II    Form III-IV  A-level 
 
 College    University  Adult literacy 
 
 Other (please specify) 
          
       
 
Thanks a lot for your patience and responses 
If there is any other information that you would like us to know about your operations, please feel free to express 
or write them in the space provided here. 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for milk retail outlets 
 
 
Questionnaire Number   
Field Researcher  _________________ 
Sub-location   _________________ 
Division   _________________ 
      District   _________________ 
 
 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge. 
 
1. When did you begin your milk operations? Please state the year you began. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. In the table below, you are requested to provide information about the dairy products your firm trades in. 
Please provide information about the products by filling in the table below. 
 
 
Price range Milk product  Average 
quantity per 
day 
Unit of 
measure Highest Lowest 
How long it takes  
to sell product 
Quantity able to sell 
before expiry or 
spoilage 
Pasteurized 
milk 
      
Yoghurt       
UHT       
Fresh farm 
milk 
      
Ice cream       
Cheese        
Other 
(specify) 
      
 
.  
3. What type of retail outlet do you operate? 
 
         Type                                          
  a)     Grocery shop 
 
  b)     Milk Bar/mini dairy 
 
  c)     Mobile trader 
 
  d)     Other (please specify) 
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4.  
a. How much milk do you currently handle per day on average? Please state also the units of measure. 
 
    Amount   per day  units 
 
b.     Amount during peak season    low season  
           
 
   
c.    What is the maximum amount of milk you can handle in a day? 
 
 
 
5. Considering the amount of milk in the question above (question 4 above), how does this amount compare to 
what you produced in the previous year and what you expect in the coming year? Please tick as applicable.  
 
Compared to this year,           
last year was ….     Next year is expected to be …….. 
 
More      More 
The same     The same 
Less      Less 
 
6.   
a) What is the size of your dairy related workforce? Please state their number. 
     Permanent  ___________________________ 
     Casual   ___________________________ 
     Family labor ___________________________ 
 
b) What major costs do you usually incur in your milk operations? Please provide also information about 
the costs by filling in and ticking as applicable. 
 
   
Cost component Quantity/amount  Frequency Trend over last five years 
   Increasing Constant Decreasing 
Wages      
Power      
Fuel       
Water      
Rent      
Licenses      
Packing costs      
Transport costs      
Others (specify)      
(NB: frequency = daily, weekly, bi-weekly or monthly) 
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7. a) Please specify in the following table who the main suppliers of your milk products are. Please provide 
also information about them as requested in the table. 
Type of 
Supplier  
No. of 
suppliers 
Quantity 
bought 
Units Distance 
in km 
Average 
time 
Transport 
means 
Transport 
costs 
Who 
delivers/ 
collects 
Commi-
ssions 
Individual 
farmers 
         
Cooperatives          
Other farmer 
groups 
         
Processors          
Hawkers          
Others, 
please 
specify 
         
 
 
 
b) Who are the main buyers of your milk products? Please provide information about them in the table below. 
 
Type of 
buyer  
No. of 
buyers 
Quantity 
bought 
Units Distance 
in km 
Average 
time 
Transport 
means 
Transport 
costs 
Who 
delivers/ 
collects 
Other 
costs 
Consumers          
Hotels          
Institutions 
(schools  
hospitals) 
         
Processors          
Others, 
specify 
         
 
     
8. a) What reasons explain why you trade with your current suppliers? Please tick for each as appropriate. 
 
a) Individual farmers 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
b) Cooperatives  
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
Appendices 
 185
c) Other farmer groups 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
c) Processors 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
d) Mobile traders 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
e) Others, please specify 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
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   b) What reasons explain why you trade with your current buyers? Please tick for each as appropriate. 
 
a) Consumers 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
b) Hotels  
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
c) Institutions (Schools and Restaurants) 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
c) Processors 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
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f) Others, please specify 
 
Reasons  True Partly true Not true 
Out of habit    
Reliability    
Better credit terms    
Better prices    
Cost of finding a new buyer is high    
Personal relations and contacts    
Presence of legal contracts    
Others (specify)    
 
 
9. a) Which of the following best describes the buying frequency of your customers? Please indicate as 
applicable below. 
  
Type of buyer  Regular buyer Irregular buyer 
Consumers   
Hotels   
Institutions    
Processors   
Others(specify)   
 
 
   b) How would you classify the frequency with which you transact with your suppliers? Please indicate as 
applicable in the table below. 
  
Type of supplier  Regular buyer Irregular buyer 
Individual farmers   
Cooperatives    
Farmer groups   
Processors   
Mobile traders   
Others(specify)   
 
 
10.  
b. Which of the following best captures your knowledge of milk prices in the market? Please tick one 
for each of your buyers? 
 
 
Type of buyer  I always know 
prices in advance 
I sometimes know 
prices in advance 
I hardly know prices 
in advance 
Other please 
specify 
Consumers     
Hotels     
Institutions     
Processors     
Others(specify)     
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b) Which of the following best captures your knowledge of milk prices in the market? Please tick one 
for each of your suppliers? 
 
 
Type of supplier  I always know 
prices in advance 
I sometimes know 
prices in advance 
I hardly know 
prices in advance 
Other please 
specify 
Individual 
farmers 
    
Cooperatives     
Farmer groups     
Processors     
Mobile traders     
Others(specify)     
 
 
11. a) How useful are each of the following as sources of market price information for your milk? Please tick as 
appropriate for your buyers  using the scale: 1 = not useful 2= a little useful  3= useful 4= 
very useful  
 
Milk suppliers 1 2 3 4 
Information source Not useful A little useful useful Very useful 
From neighbors and other producers     
From traders and buyers     
From government organizations     
Through mass media (radio, TV, Newspapers)     
Through negotiations     
Others, please specify     
 
b) How useful are each of the following as sources of market price information for your milk? Please 
tick as appropriate for your suppliers using the scale: 1 = not useful 2= a little useful  3= useful
 4= very useful  
 
Milk buyers 1 2 3 4 
Information source Not useful A little useful useful Very useful 
From neighbors and other producers     
From traders and buyers     
From government organizations     
Through mass media (radio, TV, Newspapers)     
Through negotiations     
Others, please specify     
 
 
12. a) In the table below you are requested to provide information on your buyers. Please fill in the table as 
applicable. 
 
 Price units Price over last one 
year 
 Quantity sold under each method of payment 
   low High cash In 
kind 
Credit sales 
Type of buyer       Length of 
credit 
Quantity paid within 
credit period 
Consumers         
Hotels         
Institutions         
Processors         
Others(specify)         
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b) In the table below you are requested to provide information on your suppliers. Please fill in the table as 
applicable. 
 
 
 Price units Price over last one 
year 
 Quantity sold under each method of payment 
   low High cash In 
kind 
Credit purchases 
Type of supplier       Length of 
credit 
Quantity paid within 
credit period 
Individual 
farmers 
        
Cooperatives         
Farmer groups         
Processors         
Mobile traders         
Others(specify)         
 
 
13. a) For each of the buyers of your milk, what kind of selling arrangements do you use? Please provide also 
the requested information about them by filling in the table. 
 
 Quantity sold under each type of selling agreement 
 No 
agreements 
Verbal agreements Written agreements 
Type of buyer  Quantity Duration of 
agreements 
Quantity Duration of 
agreement 
Quantity 
Consumers      
Hotels      
Institutions      
Processors      
Others(specify)      
 
 
 b) For each of the suppliers of your milk, what kind of buying arrangements do you use? Please provide also the 
requested information about them by filling in the table. 
 
 
 Quantity sold under each type of selling agreement 
 No 
agreements 
Verbal agreements Written agreements 
Type of supplier  Quantity Duration of 
agreements 
Quantity Duration of 
agreement 
Quantity 
Individual 
farmers 
     
Cooperatives      
Farmer groups      
Processors      
Mobile traders      
Others(specify)      
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14. If you were to increase the quantity of milk you handle for example by 50% (half), how much would you be 
able to sell successfully) Please tick one. 
 
I would be able to sell all of it 
 
I would be able to sell part of it 
 
I would not be able to sell at all 
 
I don’t know 
 
 
15. Please indicate by ticking how often you experienced shortages and excess milk in your business over the 
last year. 
 
Always  Sometimes  Rarely  Never 
Shortages 
 
Excess supplies  
 
 
16. a) How serious are each of the following problems in your trading with your buyers? Please indicate the 
seriousness by ticking using a scale of 1- very serious, 2-serious, 3-moderate and 4- not a problem. 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Type of problem Very serious  Serious Moderate Not a problem 
Milk is not collected      
Milk goes bad while being transported or handled     
There are not enough buyers in the market     
Water/chemicals are added to milk by buyers     
Our buyers fail to pay us on time     
Prices are sometimes too low     
Others, please specify      
 
 
b) How serious are each of the following problems in your trading with your suppliers? Please indicate the 
seriousness by ticking using a scale of 1- very serious, 2-serious, 3-moderate and 4- not a problem. 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Type of problem Very serious  Serious Moderate Not a problem 
Milk is not collected      
Milk goes bad while being transported or handled     
There are not enough buyers in the market     
Water/chemicals are added to milk by buyers     
Our buyers fail to pay us on time     
Prices are sometimes too low     
Others, please specify      
 
17. How much of your milk is wasted on average at each of the following points? Please indicate how frequent 
this problem occurs on average in a month below. 
 
           
Point where loss occurs  Quantity lost or wasted How frequent (times)  problem 
occurs in a month 
On farm during and after milking   
During transport   
During handling storage (spoilage)   
By processors and traders   
Failure to collect or deliver milk   
Others (please specify)   
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18. In cases of milk scarcity, how much milk are you normally able to offer each of your buyers on average? 
Please tick as appropriate for each of your buyers. 
 
Type of buyer  Full share Less than full share None  
Consumers    
Hotels    
Institutions    
Processors    
Others(specify)    
 
 
19. In cases of milk scarcity, how much milk are you normally able to receive from each of your suppliers on 
average? Please tick as appropriate for each of your buyers. 
 
Type of supplier  Full share Less than full share None  
Individual farmers    
Cooperatives    
Farmer groups    
Processors    
Mobile traders    
Others(specify)    
 
            
20. In cases of excess milk production, what happens to the extra milk? Please tick the appropriate ones.  
 
 
Sell at reduced prices 
 
Use at home 
 
Find new buyers for it 
 
Convert into other milk products to sell later 
 
Dispose or give away free 
 
Others, (please specify) 
 
                                             
21. What other arrangements would you prefer for your milk given your available resources and abilities? 
Please tick one. 
 
I would prefer to increase amounts of milk I produce and sell 
 
I would prefer to produce less 
 
I would prefer no change 
 
Others, please specify 
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22. a) Using a five point scale where 1 is very unsatisfied, 3 is neutral, and 5 is very satisfied, please indicate by 
ticking how satisfied you are with the following aspects of your relationships with the selected buyer(s) over 
the last 12 months. 
 
Consumers  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Hotels 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Institutions (schools, hospitals) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
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Processors  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Others, please specify 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
22. b) Using a five point scale where 1 is very unsatisfied, 3 is neutral, and 5 is very satisfied, please indicate by 
ticking how satisfied you are with the following aspects of your relationships with the selected suppliers(s) over 
the last 12 months. 
 
 
Individual farmers 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
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Cooperatives 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Other farmer groups 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Processors 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Mobile traders 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
Appendices 
 195
 
 
Others, please specify 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Performance item Very 
unsatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied  
Satisfied Very 
satisfied 
Continuous milk purchases 
over the year 
     
Prices they pay for the milk      
Communication and 
information sharing 
     
Quality standards demanded 
by buyer 
     
Reputation of the buyer      
Trustworthiness of buyer      
 
 
Please tell us more about yourself now by ticking one  
 
23. Sex of respondent (please tick one)  
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
 
24. Position in enterprise 
 
Owner 
 
Employee 
 
Other, please specify 
 
 
 
25. Year of birth  
 
 
26. Your  Highest Education level attained (please tick) 
 
   None   Class 1-4   Class 5-8   
 
  Form I-II    Form III-IV  A-level 
 
 College    University  Adult literacy 
 
 Other (please specify) 
          
       
 
Thanks a lot for your patience and responses 
If there is any other information that you would like us to know about your operations, please feel free to express 
or write them in the space provided here. 
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Map 1 Map of Kenya showing the research area  
Source: www.4-siteplanning.com/. ../maps-large.html Accessed on 3.5.2006 
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